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The main goal of many political and intelligence forecasts is to effectively 
communicate risk information to decision makers (i.e. consumers). Standard reporting 
most often consists of a narrative discussion of relevant evidence concerning a threat, and 
rarely involves numerical estimates ofuncertainty (e.g. a 5% chance). It is argued that 
numerical estimates of uncertainty will lead to more accurate representations of risk and 
improved decision making on the part of intelligence consumers. Little work has focused 
on how well consumers understand and use forecasts that include numerical estimates of 
uncertainty. Participants were presented with simulated intelligence forecasts describing 
potential terrorist attacks. These forecasts consisted of a narrative summary of the evidence 
related to the attack and numerical estimates of likelihood and potential harm. The primary 
goals were to explore how the structure of the narrative summary, the format oflikelihood 
information, and the numerical ability (numeracy) of consumers affected perceptions of 
v 
intelligence forecasts. Consumers perceived forecasts with numerical estimates of 
likelihood and potential harm as more useful than forecasts with only a narrative evidence 
summary. However, consumer's risk and likelihood perceptions were more greatly 
affected by the narrative evidence summary than the stated likelihood information. These 
results show that even "precise" numerical estimates of likelihood are not necessarily 
evaluable by conswners and that perceptions of likelihood are affected by supporting 
narrative information. Nwneracy also moderated the effects of stated likelihood and the 
narrative evidence swnmary. Consumers higher in numeracy were more likely to use the 
stated likelihood information and conswners lower in nwneracy were more likely to use the 
narrative evidence to inform their judgments. The moderating effect of likelihood format 
and conswner's perceptions of forecasts in hindsight are also explored. 
Explicit estimates of uncertainty are not necessarily useful to all intelligence 
conswners, particularly when presented with supporting narrative evidence. How 
conswners respond to intelligence forecasts depends on the structure of any supporting 
narrative information, the format of the explicit uncertainty information, and the numerical 
ability ofthe individual conswner. Forecasters should be sensitive to these three issues 
when presenting forecasts to conswners. 
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
 
Introduction to Policy and Intelligence Analysis
 
Human societies are more interdependent with respect to economics, culture, and 
human ecology than at any other time in history. As a result of this increased 
dependency, political and business leaders are often faced with monumental decisions 
about policy that have the potential to affect vast numbers of people around the world. 
Thus, it is very important that these decisions are based on the very best information and 
analysis. 
There are numerous public and private agencies that conduct analysis and research 
with the goal of aiding political decision makers. This decision support is called policy 
analysis and/or policy focused-research. Morgan & Henrion (1990) define policy 
analysis as an "analytical activity undertaken in direct support of specific public or 
private sector decision makers who are faced with a decision that must be made or a 
problem that must be resolved" (pg. 16). In addition, "the objective ofpolicy analysis 'is 
to evaluate, order and structure incomplete knowledge so as to allow decisions to be 
made with as complete an understanding as possible of the current state of knowledge, its 
limitations and implications' (Morgan, 1978)". 
US intelligence agencies are an example of a public entity that provides policy 
analysis and policy-related research to senior US decision makers. The analysis and 
forecasting activities of US intelligence agencies take several unique forms, which can be 
categorized into three basic types of intelligence - strategic, tactical, and indications and 
warnings intelligence (Clark, 2004; a similar categorization is discussed by Cooper, 
2005). Strategic intelligence involves in-depth research focused on the capabilities and 
plans of a target. These are long-range intelligence products that tend to be broad and 
complex in terms of both information sources and the time window covered in the report. 
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The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) generated by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) are strategic intelligence products. In contrast to the complexity and 
breadth of the NIE's, tactical intelligence involves the collection and transmission of 
current (real-time) information to support issues that require immediate action or are 
currently being executed. Finally, arguably the highest priority activity for an 
intelligence agency is "providing indications and warning on threats to national security" 
(Clark, 2004, pg. 159). Indications and warnings intelligence involves "detecting and 
reporting time-sensitive information on foreign developments that threaten the country's 
military, political, or economic interests" (Clark, 2004, pg. 159). Generating forecasts 
and providing reports warning ofpotential terrorist attacks is one example of this type of 
intelligence product. 
One of the primary goals of indications and warnings intelligence is communicating 
risk information to government decision makers or other consumers of the risk analyses l . 
As Fisk (1995) comments, "Problems of 'indications analysis' or 'intelligence warning' 
are essentially questions ofhow to assign probabilities to hypotheses of interest" (pg. 
264). For example, one hypothesis of interest could be the proposition that a known 
terrorist group will carry out a specific terrorist act within a given timeframe. Decision 
makers responsible for national security would greatly benefit by being warned of such a 
plot, and ideally they would also like to know the chances that this attack will occur and 
the potential harm that would result if the attack were to succeed. In this sense, the 
indications and warnings intelligence process is really a form of estimating and 
communicating risks. The present work is focused on understanding the factors that 
influence consumer perceptions of indications and warnings intelligence products. 
Reporting the Results of Intelligence Forecasts 
US intelligence analysts, and policy analysts more generally, have traditionally relied 
on qualitative methods for the bulk oftheir analysis and forecasting. Two main 
1 In this context, the "consumers" are those individuals that use intelligence forecasts to make decisions 
about policy and action (e.g. military leaders, the president, and others). 
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techniques include model based approaches (see Clark, 2004) and scenario-based 
forecasting (see Clark, 2004; Schwartz, 1996). One common feature of these qualitative 
approaches is that probability and/or margins ofuncertainty are not explicitly represented 
when developing and reporting forecasts. Although there are several modem examples 
of large-scale policy analyses in which numerical uncertainties are estimated and reported 
(Morgan & Henrion, 1990), explicit uncertainty analysis has not reached the state of 
standard practice in many domains ofpolicy and risk analysis. 
Several authors have noted that the insufficient description ofprobability and analyst 
uncertainty has contributed to intelligence failures and other difficulties in 
communicating forecasts. For example, Armstrong, Leonhart, McCaffery & Rothenberg 
(1995) discuss several intelligence failures that were caused, at least in part, by a 
"reluctance to quantify their [the analysts'] theories ofprobability or their margins of 
uncertainty" (pg. 240). The historical forecasts they examined included the first Chinese 
nuclear test, the OPEC price decrease ofDecember 1973, and the Ethiopian revolution of 
1974. In addition, Michael Schrage in an editorial for the Washington Post (February, 
20th , 2005) discussed the importance of analysts including estimates ofuncertainty in 
intelligence reports. He describes the lack of quantitative uncertainty estimates as an 
institutional bias and points out that many other professionals, including insurance 
analysts, bankers and public health practitioners, routinely use quantitative risk analyses. 
Why should intelligence forecasts concerning national security, often reported directly to 
the President, have less analytic complexity than the forecasts generated by the 
professionals mentioned above? The closest that most intelligence analysts come to 
quantifying probability or margins ofuncertainty are vague verbal probability estimates 
(i.e. this attack "could" occur; the attack is "highly unlikely" at this point, etc; Zlotnick, 
1995). However, because verbal probability statements are poorly defined and may mean 
different things to different people, they are not ideal for the accurate communication of 
risk (Armstrong et aI., 1995; see Chapter II). 
When it comes to communicating the results of an intelligence forecast, most finished 
intelligence products are presented in scenario-based or narrative form that describe the 
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possible future states of the world or target (Clark, 2004). Analysts appear to "prefer to 
transmit knowledge through writing, because only writing can capture the full complexity 
of what they have to say" (Gardiner, 1995, pg.354). Consequently, the form and style of 
these narrative reports is an important part of communicating risk and analytic 
conclusions between analyst and consumer. In fact, several authors have discussed 
methods for writing convincing scenarios to increase the chances that consumers will 
accept a forecast (Clark, 2005; Gregory & Duran, 2001). However, because of 
institutional norms and consumers' preferences for information in narrative form, 
intelligence reports are not likely to become purely quantitative in nature. The most 
natural way to include quantitative estimates of uncertainty in current intelligence 
reporting is along side supporting narrative information concerning the evidence and 
reasoning supporting the conclusions. 
The Benefits ofIncluding Explicit Estimates of Uncertainty 
Morgan and Henrion (1990) discuss several general reasons why explicitly addressing 
uncertainty is important in policy and intelligence analysis. Their first argument is one 
by analogy, arguing that if natural scientists are expected to be explicit about uncertainty 
in measured quantities, why shouldn't policy-focused research be held to the same 
standard, particularly because the uncertainty is much greater in the policy domain than 
in the natural sciences? They also point out three more specific arguments in favor of 
uncertainty analysis and explicit reporting: 
1. A central purpose of policy research and policy analysis is to help 
identify the important factors and the sources of disagreement in a 
problem, and to help anticipate the unexpected. An explicit treatment of 
uncertainty forces us to think more carefully about such matters, helps us 
to identify which factors are most and least important, and helps us plan 
for contingencies or hedge our bets. 
2. Increasingly we must rely on experts when we make decisions. It is 
often hard to be sure we understand exactly what they are telling us. It is 
harder still to know what to do when different experts appear to be telling 
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us different things. Ifwe insist they tell us about the uncertainty of their 
judgments, we will be clearer about how much they think they know and 
whether they really disagree. 
3. Rarely is any problem solved once and for all. Problems have a way of 
resurfacing. The details may change but the basic problems keep coming 
back again and again. Sometimes we would like to be able to use, or 
adapt, policy analyses that have been done in the past to help with the 
problems of the moment. This is much easier to do when the uncertainties 
of the past work have been carefully described, because then we can have 
greater confidence that we are using the earlier work in an appropriate 
way. (pg. 3) 
Related to the third point above, Fisk (1995) and Schrage (2005) note that 
consistently including quantitative uncertainty estimates in intelligence reports could act 
as an audit trail for analytic judgment, which could be revisited and reviewed by 
consumers and the analytic community. Schrage (2005) also points to several other 
benefits of this greater analytic accountability. For one thing, it would put pressure on 
analysts to think extra hard about their analysis and conclusions. It would also give 
consumers much more information on which to judge the analytic conclusions, and 
ideally, the explicit uncertainty estimates would allow a more accurate transferal for risk 
information from analyst to consumer (e.g. the likelihood that that the analyst assigns to 
the potential threat is accurately communicated to the consumer). Consumers could 
quickly assess the level of confidence that an analyst has in his or her evidence and 
conclusions, and the explicit uncertainties would give consumers an idea ofwhere more 
work needs to focused to reduce the uncertainty: "Then their ability to push, prod and 
poke the intelligence community would be firmly grounded in their own perception of the 
strength and weakness of the work coming out of it" (Schrage, 2005). 
Why Might Analysts be Reluctant to Include Explicit Estimates of Uncertainty? 
The analytic community continues to primarily focus on qualitative techniques for 
forecasting in which they do not consistently provide numerical estimates of uncertainty. 
There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, many intelligence problems 
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are so complex and multifaceted, and involve such a great degree of uncertainty, that it 
may seem impossible to estimate the uncertainty in the system. Morgan and Henrion 
(1990) note that it may be because of the "vast uncertainties" inherent in many policy 
analyses that it is "still not standard practice to treat uncertainties in an explicit 
probabilistic fashion" (pg.20). Considering this enormous complexity and uncertainty, it 
is not surprising that many analysts see a qualitative approach to analysis as the only 
alternative. The work of the intelligence analyst has even been compared to that ofthe 
historian, both of which labor to fit disparate pieces of evidence together into a coherent 
causal story (Heuer, 1999). For many intelligence problems, this focus on forming a 
coherent story out of a set of evidence may lead analysts into a scenario/narrative 
presentation ofthe results and away from thinking probabilistically about their 
conclusions and forecasts. 
It is clear that there are many situations in which uncertainty must be estimated 
through expert judgment alone, and it is understandable that this may seem like a 
daunting task. However, most analysts would agree that they cannot be sure about the 
level ofuncertainty present in a system (for example, the precise probability that an event 
will occur), but they are not completely ignorant either. Analysts are likely to have some 
idea or intuition about uncertainty, and there are several structured techniques that can be 
used to help elicit probability estimates from experts (see Armstrong, 2001). 
The second reason that analysts may be reluctant to use numerical estimates of 
uncertainty in forecasts is that they feel that there are no structured techniques available 
for applying risk analysis or estimating uncertainties in the intelligence domain. In recent 
years, however, several different schemes and approaches for probabilistic and 
uncertainty analysis that would be applicable to intelligence problems have been 
developed. For example, several authors have discussed the potential application of 
quantitative risk analysis procedures to problems of terrorism prediction and forecasting 
(for example see Garrick, 2002; Pate-Cornell, 2002; Haimes and Longstaff, 2002; 
Horowitz & Haimes, 2003). 
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A third reason is that analysts may feel that even if they did explicitly report 
probability and margins of error in intelligence reports, consumers would not be 
interested in seeing them, nor would they be able to understand or use the information. 
Michael Schrage in his Washington Post editorial (February, 20th, 2005) relates a 
conversation that he had with a senior CIA officer concerning consumers and quantitative 
analyses: "Intelligence analysts 'would rather use words than numbers to describe how 
confident we are in our analysis,' a senior CIA officer who's served for more than 20 
years told me. Moreover, 'most consumers of intelligence aren't particularly sophisticated 
when it comes to probabilistic analysis. They like words and pictures, too. My experience 
is that [they] prefer briefings that don't center on numerical calculation. That's not to say 
we can't do it, but there's really not that much demand for it. '" 
It is an empirical question as to how well consumers, particularly those 
uncomfortable with numbers, would be able to use, and feel comfortable using, 
intelligence forecasts that include quantitative estimates of uncertainty. There is a 
relatively rich psychological literature on how people perceive likelihood and risk, and 
the experimental work in this dissertation will focus on exploring lay consumers' 
perceptions of forecasts in the intelligence domain. 
A last potential concern is that providing explicit estimates of uncertainty would leave 
an audit trail of analytic forecasts. Analysts may be reluctant to leave themselves open to 
potential criticism if events to which they assign small probabilities occur, or events to 
which they assign high probabilities do not occur. It may be more comforting to keep 
analytic judgments and forecasts vague, which allows only "ambiguous accountability" 
(Schrage, 2005). This may be partly a fear about hindsight bias on the part of future 
auditors of an analyst's forecasts, as well as a fear about finding out how poorly 
calibrated their forecasts really are (see Tetlock, 2005; Heuer, 1999). 
It is unknown how consumers will feel about analytic judgments in hindsight. For 
example, will consumer perceptions be greatly affected by the presence of explicit 
uncertainties in intelligence forecasts? Another focus of the empirical work in this 
dissertation is on how consumers will view the results of quantitative forecasts in 
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hindsight. 
The first two issues concerning analytic methods are outside of the scope of the 
present work. The empirical work in this dissertation will focus on perceptions of risk 
forecasts from the perspective of the consumer. 
Summary 
The focus of this dissertation is on indications and warnings intelligence forecasts. 
The purpose of these forecasts is to communicate risk information in a format that is 
effective and subsequently useful for decision making. However, standard reporting 
methods in policy and intelligence analysis rarely involve explicit, numerical estimates of 
uncertainty. Even though there are many potential benefits of including numerical 
uncertainty estimates in policy and intelligence forecasts, the analytic community has 
been reluctant to express uncertainty in quantitative form. Standard reporting methods 
for intelligence forecasts most often involve a scenario-based or narrative discussion of 
the evidence and possible future states of the world, and any numerical estimates of 
uncertainty would likely accompany this narrative presentation. 
Several writers have argued that the explicit treatment ofuncertainty will lead to 
improved analysis and risk communication (e.g. Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Schrage, 
2005). Quantitative estimates of the likelihood and potential harm ofparticular target 
events (ideally with an accompanying sensitivity analysis) may lead consumers of 
intelligence forecasts to more accurately perceive the attendant risks and to make better 
decisions. One potential benefit of including quantitative estimates in intelligence 
forecasts is greater consistency in interpretations. 
However, two things must happen for this quantitative approach to improve consumer 
decision making. First, the analysts must use solid analytic methods and reach sound 
conclusions. As discussed briefly above, several risk and policy analysts have developed 
techniques for conducting quantitative risk analyses in the intelligence domain. Second, 
the consumers of these reports must be able to understand and be comfortable using the 
results of these quantitative analyses. If consumers misinterpret the results, or otherwise 
9 
misuse or ignore them, then the hard work done by the analysts is lost. It is clear that the 
communication between analysts and consumers is critical component of the process. 
Although many authors have discussed particular analytic techniques that could be 
fruitfully applied in the intelligence domain, how these analyses should be reported for 
the benefit of consumers has received less attention. 
In an intelligence forecast that includes both scenario-based and numerical 
uncertainty information, there are several sources of information that consumers can use 
to make judgments of risk and quality. The focus of this dissertation is on risk 
communication, specifically on how consumers understand and evaluate quantitative 
intelligence forecasts concerning the risk of terrorist attacks. The primary goals are to 
explore how the structure and format of an intelligence forecast, as well as the individual 
characteristics of the consumer (e.g. a consumer's ability to understand probability 
information), affect consumer perceptions of risk and perceptions of the usefulness and 
quality of intelligence forecasts. Another aim of this work is to model how consumers use 
these various sources of information to inform their judgments. 
Selected research literature related to the conceptualization ofuncertainty, intuitive 
perceptions of likelihood and risk, individual differences in numerical ability, and the 
effect of hindsight knowledge is reviewed in the next chapter. In Chapter III, a model of 
consumer risk perception is developed along with specific research questions for the 
empirical work that follows. The following chapters consist of the experimental results 
and conclusions, as well as the implications ofthis work for the communication of risk in 
indications and warnings intelligence forecasts. 
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CHAPTER II
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
Uncertainty, Probability and Sensitivity Analysis
 
The explicit representation of uncertainty is important for policy and intelligence 
forecasting, but how can we conceptualize and define uncertainty, probability, and 
sensitivity analysis? According to Rowe (1994), "Uncertainty is essentially the absence 
of information, information that mayor may not be obtainable." (pg. 743). In general, 
when analysts are asked to report their uncertainty in a forecast, they are being asked to 
detail or quantify the effect that imperfect information has had on the results of the 
analysis. This type ofuncertainty has also been called epistemic uncertainty, which is 
conceptually different from aleatory uncertainty (Pate-Cornell, 1996). Aleatory 
uncertainties "stem from variability in known (or observable) populations and, therefore, 
represent randomness in samples", and epistemic uncertainties stem "from a basic lack of 
knowledge about fundamental phenomena" (pg. 97). Most problems in risk, policy, and 
intelligence analysis will involve both types of uncertainty, although epistemic 
uncertainty will tend to dominate. 
Rowe (1994) describes four different classes of uncertainty important in risk 
analyses: 1) Metrical, uncertainty and variability in measured quantities; 2) Structural, 
uncertainty due to complexity in modeling the phenomenon under study; 3) Temporal, 
uncertainty about future and past states of the world, and 4) Translational, uncertainty in 
transmitting information through the explanation of uncertain results (see also Politi, Han 
& Col, 2006; Peters, 2006). Metrical uncertainty is extremely important in 
intelligence/policy analysis, as it is directly related to the quality and credibility of the 
evidence on which an analysis is based. Evidence credibility is not only important in the 
analysis stage, but might also be helpful to include in a final report for consumers (Heuer, 
1999; Schrage, 2005). For instance, information about evidence credibility could help 
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consumers identify gaps in knowledge that could lead to future information collection 
efforts. Structural uncertainty is also extremely important because it represents 
uncertainty in how a model of a phenomenon is constructed. This is a particularly acute 
problem in policy/intelligence analysis because a large part of the analytic process 
involves attempts to deduce a model of the situation/target under study. Morgan & 
Henrion (1990) argue that uncertainty about model form is generally harder to think 
about than the individual quantities in the model, and that most analysts agree that 
uncertainty about model form is generally more important and will have large effects on 
the eventual results and conclusions. Although this may be difficult in practice, ideally 
analysts would also present a rating of the structural uncertainty in their model. The most 
familiar kind of uncertainty discussed above is temporal, specifically uncertainty about 
future states of the world. This type ofuncertainty is most often modeled by probability, 
and this will be a main focus in the empirical studies discussed below. 
The Interpretation ofProbability 
When a person is asked to interpret the meaning of a probability statement (or assess 
the likelihood of an event), how do they conceptualize "probability"? What does 
probability mean exactly? This has proven to be a very difficult question, and the 
collective answer seems to be that it depends. 
There are two basic schools of thought about the interpretation ofprobability: the 
classical or frequentist school and the subjectivist or Bayesian school. "The classical or 
frequentist view ofprobability defines the probability of an event's occurring in a 
particular trial as the frequency with which it occurs in a long sequence of similar trials" 
(Morgan & Henrion, 1990, pg. 48). Thus, probability is only definable if one can locate 
or generate (at least in principle) a distribution of identical trials of the phenomenon in 
question (Pate-Cornell, 1996). This means that many of the phenomena to which we 
assign probabilities, like the probability of a single event occurring, are meaningless from 
the frequentist point of view. The Bayesian or subjectivist view ofprobability "is the 
degree ofbelief that a person has that it [an event] will occur, given all of the relevant 
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information currently known to that person" (Morgan & Henrion, 1990, pg. 49). Since a 
Bayesian probability is by definition subjective and personal, different people may 
legitimately have different probabilities for the same event, which will depend on their 
state of knowledge. In practice, when one takes a Bayesian stance toward probabilities, 
one can incorporate both frequentistic (or aleatory) information about a process or event 
as well as any other relevant knowledge. In the limited case where only frequency 
information is available, the subjective Bayesian probability will equal the frequentist 
probability. This distinction between the objective probabilities based on frequencies and 
subjective probabilities based on personal belief also roughly maps onto the concept of 
external and internal statements ofprobability, respectively (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a; Teigen, 1994). Frequency based probabilities are restrictively thought of as 
external to the observer, as a property of the system or process in question, while 
subjective probabilities include personal statements ofuncertainty that are a property of 
the knower, not a property of the outside world. Some authors have pointed out that this 
distinction between internal and external probabilities may be part of the gulf between 
analysts and consumers in terms of communicating risk (Walker, 1995). For example, 
consumers that adopt a more internal or subjectivist view oflikelihood may 
misunderstand or ignore risk information based on relative frequency interpretations of 
likelihood. 
Several authors have discussed more detailed taxonomies ofhow probability is 
understood and interpreted. For example, Teigen (1994) discusses six different 
interpretations of intuitive probability. Chance probabilities (or Type I) are external and 
are most naturally thought of in terms of relative frequency. Figuring out the probability 
of being dealt three of a kind in poker (5-card draw) is a good example of a chance 
probability. This type ofprobability is naturally expressed in a frequency format (e.g. 
2/100 chance). When thinking about the probability of a single, unique event like a 
terrorist attack, it becomes more difficult to think of the probability in terms oflong-run 
frequencies (What is the relevant distribution for figuring the frequentist probability?). In 
these cases, people have been found to rely on different interpretations ofprobability. 
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Dispositional probabilities (Type II) are external and can be thought of as a measure 
of how "easily the outcome in question may occur, or how close it is to becoming 
realized" (Teigen, 1994, pg. 220). For single unique events people often think of 
probability as being attached to the event and not as a function oflong-run frequencies. 
Related to dispositional probabilities are their internal counterpart, confidence or 
subjective degree of belief (Type III; Teigen, 1994). The main issue here is the extent to 
which a judge believes that the outcome will occur or will soon become realized. 
Teigen (1994) also discusses uncertainty by ignorance (Type IV), which concerns not 
the probability of the chosen hypothesis, but one's certainty about which hypothesis or 
prediction to choose in the first place. The next interpretation involves the controllability 
of events (Type V). For example, personal control may give a sense of certainty that is 
different than when an event is subject to external, uncontrollable forces. The last variant 
of the probability concept is plausibility (Type VI). This interpretation ofprobability is 
related to perceived closeness to reality, or perceived closeness to truth, and is often 
activated when one reads a narrative concerning an event. The plausibility, and hence the 
probability, can be affected by the completeness of the description, the coherence of the 
story, the causal elements that are included in the story, etc. In practice, quantitative 
probability estimates will almost always be accompanied by narrative summaries. 
Hence, the factors that affect plausibility judgments may strongly influence consumer's 
perceptions of the probability of events. 
The Form ofa Probability Statement 
Because the focus of this dissertation is on consumer perception ofprobabilistic 
forecasts, how analysts format probabilistic information for consumers is very important. 
A probability can be expressed in percentage form (10%), decimal form (.10) or 
frequency form (1/10). Each of these forms is mathematically equivalent and, ideally, 
would be interpreted in the same way. However, as will be discussed further below, the 
format of the probability information has been found to affect perceptions of likelihood 
and risk. 
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Sensitivity Analysis and Presenting Ranges ofPlausible Values 
Due to the large uncertainties present in many policy or intelligence problems, it is 
often very difficult for an analyst to generate a point estimate for all empirical quantities 
and be confident about the structure of the model under study. For example, although it 
may be difficult to produce a single probability value for the occurrence ofan event, 
analysts can often produce a range ofplausible probabilities values. This can be done by 
first producing a best estimate ofthe probability and then choosing a high estimate and a 
low estimate that defines the range of plausible values. As analysts become more 
confident in their estimates, the confidence interval between the high and the low 
estimates will become smaller. As analysts become less confident in their estimates, the 
confidence interval will become larger. For instance, if an analyst was trying to estimate 
the probability of an event occurring, he or she could report the probability as a range 
(Low: 10% Best: 25% High: 40%). 
Additionally, when structured analytical techniques are used to help an analyst 
generate a probability value for an event, sensitivity analysis can be used to produce the 
confidence intervals. Sensitivity analysis refers to changing the inputs, assumptions, or 
data in an analysis to see how these changes affect the output. There are many different 
structured techniques that have been developed for sensitivity analysis (see Helton, 
1993). For instance, an analyst developing a forecast for a particular terrorist plot could 
use the worst-case assumptions of the world to get the high probability estimate and then 
use the best-case assumptions of the world to get the low probability. Producing 
confidence intervals instead of single point estimates of the probability of an event has 
the advantage of giving information about the amount of confidence that an analyst has in 
his or her forecast. Point estimates of the probability of an event will often appear 
precise regardless of the confidence that an analyst has in the estimate. 
In summary, there are several ways ofconceptualizing the uncertainty in a policy or 
intelligence analysis, one of which is temporal uncertainty, or the probability of 
something happening over a given time frame. The focus in this dissertation is on 
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consumer perceptions of probability statements, as well as second-order uncertainty, 
which can be represented by confidence intervals around probability statements. 
Specifically, I will be focusing on perceptions of intelligence reports that include the 
constituent pieces of a risk analysis, which is a probability and potential harm estimate. 
Intuitive Probability Judgments 
A rich psychological literature focuses on how people make intuitive probability 
judgments about uncertain events. These judgments are intuitive in the sense that they 
are made without statistical information about the frequency of the target event in the 
population. For instance, if consumers were presented with a narrative summary of a 
potential terrorist plot, without explicit estimates of probability, they would need to use 
intuitive processes to assess the probability or risk ofthe potential attack. Much of the 
early work in the field ofjudgment and decision making focused on intuitive judgments 
of probability, and it was this work that culminated in the heuristics and biases approach 
to studying human judgment and reasoning (see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
Strategies for Intuitive Probability Judgments 
Researchers have explored several different strategies that judges use to make 
unaided intuitive probability judgments when presented with simple descriptions, sets of 
evidence, or scenarios related to a target event. Two cognitive shortcuts that came out of 
this literature are using representativeness and availability to judge the likelihood of an 
uncertain event (Tversky& Kahneman, 1974). Judges use representativeness when they 
assess the probability of event A by how representative, or how similar, it is of class or 
process B. For example,judges may estimate the probability that an individual is a 
member of a particular group by how well the description of that individual resembles 
their notions of the properties of the group, as in the famous Linda problem (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982ca). In the Linda problem, judges are presented with a short narrative 
description ofthe personality and interests of a woman named Linda. They are then 
asked to choose whether they think Linda is more likely to be a bank teller or a feminist 
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bank teller (among other options). The narrative description included details about Linda 
that seem consistent with Linda being a feminist (e.g. deeply concerned about issues of 
discrimination and social justice), and consequently, the majority ofjudges thought that 
Linda was more likely to be a feminist bank teller as opposed to just a bank teller. 
However, it its clear that the conjunction of two events (Le. bank teller and feminist) 
cannot be more likely than a single event (Le. bank teller), and the judges were said to 
have succumbed to the conjunction fallacy. Thus, the highly representative description of 
Linda was thought to have overwhelmed the probabilistic reasoning of the judges. Other 
biases such as base-rate neglect are also thought to be caused by representativeness, in 
that judges tend to ignore base-rates when given highly representative scenarios. Much of 
the experimental work on the representativeness heuristic has been attacked on 
methodological grounds (e.g. Gigerenzer, 1996), although the notion of 
representativeness provides one powerful explanation for the robust effects ofpresenting 
detailed scenarios of forecasted events on perceptions of likelihood. 
We find no good reason to believe that the judgments ofpolitical analysts, 
jurors, judges, and physicians are free of the conjunction effect. This 
effect is likely to be particularly pernicious in the attempts to predict the 
future by evaluating the perceived likelihood ofparticular scenarios. As 
they stare into the crystal ball, politicians, futurologists, and laypersons 
alike seek an image of the future that best represents their model ofthe 
dynamics of the present. This search leads to the construction of detailed 
scenarios, which are internally consistent and highly representative of our 
model of the world. Such scenarios often appear more likely than less 
detailed forecasts, which are in fact more probable ... The reliance on 
representativeness, we believe, is a primary reason for the unwarranted 
appeal of detailed scenarios and the illusory sense of insight that such 
constructions often provide. (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a, pg. 97-98) 
Ifjudges estimate the likelihood of an event by the "ease with which instances or 
occurrences can be brought to mind" they have been described as using the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, pg. 1128). For example, ajudge may rate the 
likelihood of a particular terrorist attack by the ease with which similar events can be 
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brought to mind. In this sense, availability is really about probing memory for similar 
instances with which the judge can use to estimate likelihood. However, Kahneman & 
Tversky (1982b) also discuss the availability heuristic in terms of the ability to construct 
instances or scenarios, and they call this the simulation heuristic. In other words, judges 
may construct plausible scenarios that would lead to the target event and use the ease 
with which this can be done as a guide to estimating the probability of the event. In the 
case of the intelligence consumer, this scenario construction is often already completed, 
and consumers will likely use the "goodness" of the provided narrative scenario as a 
guide to likelihood estimation. Consumers may, however, intuitively construct additional 
instances and scenarios from the evidence set. 
Several researchers have presented additional models that focus on reasoning as a 
primary process involved in making intuitive probability judgments. Pennington & 
Hastie (1988) developed an influential model of explanation-based decision making, 
which focuses on story construction as the primary reasoning process that mediates many 
judgments and decisions. The decision maker begins by constructing a mental model (i.e. 
story, scenario, explanation, or causal model) of the situation from the available evidence. 
When several potential mental models are reasonable, the best model is chosen based on 
the fit between the evidence and the story model, as well as by the quality of the story. 
The perceived quality of the story is determined by the completeness of the explanation, 
the coherence of the story, the ease of story construction, and other factors (Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001). This type of scenario-based reasoning strategy seems particularly 
applicable to the intelligence consumer, in that the consumer would likely use a strategy 
such as this to make likelihood judgments from the evidence scenario presented by the 
analyst. 
Curley & Benson (1994) discuss a model of belief processing that explicitly focuses 
on the role of reason construction in likelihood estimation. In their view, probability 
assessment is more of a reasoning process in which we construct different reasons for or 
against a proposition (e.g. whether a terrorist attack will occur), form a belief, and then 
we scale the strength this belief to a probability scale. Tversky & Kahneman (l982b) 
18 
also discuss the importance of causal-based reasoning in judgments under uncertainty, in 
which people are thought to use schemas of cause-effect relationships to make sense of a 
set of evidence, which is then used as a basis for judgment. 
In each ofmodels discussed above, the primary reasoning process involves causal­
based scenario construction from a set of evidence on which likelihood judgments are 
based. These types of reasoning processes can also broadly be classified as knowledge­
based as opposed to statistical reasoning. Beach & Braun (1994) discuss a contingency 
model of subjective probability judgment, in which a judge is thought to possess several 
different strategies for making probability judgments (e.g. causal-based, statistical, etc), 
and judges choose the appropriate strategy depending on the context of the problem. For 
example, with problems that involve games ofchance a judge will likely choose to reason 
statistically, but if given a personality description of an individual in the form of a 
narrative they are likely to use knowledge-based reasoning strategies. For our purposes, 
this type ofmodel is interesting in light of the judgment task that intelligence consumers 
face, in which both scenario-based and explicit probability information is presented in a 
forecast. In these situations, there may be a conflict between the likelihood estimates 
based on the scenario presented and the explicit probability presented by the analyst. In 
this case, consumers are explicitly presented with a numerical probability that is 
purportedly based on the evidence presented and the professional judgment of the 
analyst, together with evidence that could be used to create other scenarios and likelihood 
judgments. 
Intuitive Judgments from both Numerical Probabilities and Scenario-based Information 
Relatively few studies have explored judgments when both explicit probability and 
scenario-based information is available to the judge. However, a few researchers have 
found that scenario information accompanying a probability estimate can have a large 
effect on the interpretation of that estimate. Windschitl and colleagues (1999, 2002, 
2003) have reported several experiments in which they demonstrate that although 
numerical probability estimates are less affected by context than verbal probability 
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estimates, they are not free from contextual effects: " ...that any numeric probability­
whether it is a communicated forecast, an internal belief regarding the objective 
likelihood of an event, or external information on which a belief is based - can be 
ambiguous from an intuitive perspective even though it is numerically precise" (Flugstad 
& Windschitl, 2003, pg. 108). 
For example, Flugstad & Windschitl (2003) report several experiments in which 
participants read scenarios about a doctor's diagnosis that was also accompanied by a 
numerical estimate ofthe probability that the surgical intervention would fail. 
Participants were then asked a series of questions about intuitive optimism or pessimism 
regarding surgery. The main finding was that, given a fixed numerical probability, 
positive reasons for the probability estimates provided by the doctor were found to 
increase optimism versus negative reasons for the same event. They connect these 
findings to the evaluability work reported by Hsee and colleagues (1996), in that "an 
isolated numerical probability forecast is often difficult to evaluate and therefore does not 
have strong affective or intuitive implications" (Flugstad & Windschitl, 2003, pg. 108). 
This lack of evaluability is what leaves judgments based on the probability estimate open 
to the effect of scenario or other contextual information. This line of thought also leads 
to the notion that ifparticular judge's were better able to draw meaning from the 
numerical probability information, they would be less likely to be influenced by 
contextual information. This question will be addressed in the experiments below when 
individual differences in numerical ability are explored. 
Hendrickx et al. (1989; 1992) also conducted several interesting experiments on the 
relation between scenario and probabilistic information. They presented subjects with 
descriptions of risky activities and asked them to decide whether to engage in the activity 
and to make ranked accident probability judgments. They manipulated the amount of 
supporting scenario information and whether frequency probability information was 
presented (e.g. "1 in every 25 experienced swimmers gets into trouble"). They found that 
more extensive concrete scenarios had a larger effect on perceived likelihood than 
abstract scenarios had. Additionally, they found that when scenario and frequency 
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information were presented together, the frequency information was dominated by the 
scenario information. 
In summary, this research suggests that judgments based on precise numerical 
probability estimates can still be influenced by contextual information. A narrative 
summary of the relevant evidence supporting a probabilistic intelligence forecast may be 
a prototypical case of supplemental information affecting the interpretation of a 
numerical probability forecast. 
Intuitive Judgments of Risk 
In many forecasting situations, the forecaster is interested in communicating the risk 
associated with a particular event or activity, not just reporting the likelihood with which 
the event will occur. However, researchers have not reached a consensus on how risk 
should be defined or how risk is intuitively understood by the layperson. Brun (1994) 
discusses the many ways in which the risk concept has been defined. Although there are 
exceptions, Brun (1994) concludes that " ...most definitions of risk include an estimate of 
uncertainty (a likelihood, possibility or judged subjective probability) for a negative event 
to happen (a possible loss or a negative consequence of an action). It follows that risk 
perception has a perceived probability/uncertainty aspect as well as a perceived severity 
aspect to it." (pg. 297). It follows, then, that many of the same issues and strategies that 
have been discussed in the context ofprobability estimation are also applicable to risk 
perception (Brun, 1994), including many of the theories discussed above. Interestingly, 
there are several ways in which the concept of risk may be different depending on the 
specific properties of the hazard that is under judgment. For example, Brun (1994) 
discusses research by Vlek and Stallen (1980) in which they state that risk may be 
"primarily associated with the probability ofa loss whenever possible losses are small 
and of a similar magnitude and the probabilities are well specified, but that "risk" refers 
to the size of the loss (e.g. the possible magnitude or severity of an accident) in contexts 
where negative consequences can be serious, but the probabilities are vague and hard to 
assess." (pg. 297). 
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Further research has identified several other characteristics of the hazards that affect 
risk perceptions beyond some combination of likelihood and potential harm perceptions. 
Using a psychometric paradigm, in which laypeople are asked directly about their 
preferences and feelings toward different types of hazards, researchers have discovered 
several different factors, or underlying characteristics, that laypeople use to judge risk. 
The first factor is dread risk, which is defined by "perceived lack of control, dread, 
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits", while the second primary factor is unknown risk, which is defined as 
"unobservable, unknown, new, and delayed in their manifestation of harm." (Slovic, 
1987, pg. 283). 
In addition to characteristics of the hazard, characteristics of the individual are likely 
to have strong effects on perceptions of risk. For example, recent research findings show 
that cultural outlooks and worldviews have a large impact on individuals' feelings and 
perceptions ofvarious societal risks (e.g. egalitarian versus individualistic worldviews). 
An individual's worldview may have a stronger influence than other individual 
characteristics like race, education and political affiliation (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil 
& Cohen, 2007). 
In summary, researchers generally agree that concepts of risk are composed of some 
combination of perceptions of likelihood and potential harm, although the layperson also 
uses characteristics of the particular hazard under judgment and personal worldviews in 
their perceptions of risk. 
Consumer Perceptions of Probabilistic Forecasts and Risk Communications 
Relatively few researchers have examined forecasts from the perspective of 
"consumers" (i.e. individuals using forecasts to make decisions) judging the quality or 
usefulness of forecasts (Fox & Irwin 1998; Yates, Price, Lee & Ramirez, 1996). One 
experimental paradigm comes from the business, law and meteorological domains, in 
which consumers are presented with the past predictive performance of a judge and then 
asked about the quality of the judge (e.g. Considering hislher past performance, which 
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judge would you like as your stock portfolio advisor?). In these experiments, the 
forecaster is providing single-event probability judgments for a series of cases, and the 
consumer is given multiple trials to learn about the past performance of each judge. 
Yates et al. (1996) and Price & Stone (2004), using methodologies as described above, 
found that consumers tended to prefer judges that were categorically correct (i.e. 
forecasted a probability of greater then .5 for events that occurred) and those that were 
more extreme to those that were better calibrated (see also Keren & Teigen, 2001). 
Calibration in this general sense refers to the extent to which a forecaster provides high 
probability estimates for events that do occur and low estimates for events that do not 
occur. Price and Stone called this latter effect the "confidence heuristic" and found that a 
more confident advisor (extreme in assigning probabilities) was thought to make more 
categorically correct judgments and was perceived to be more knowledgeable. Yates et 
al. (1996) also found evidence that consumers were sensitive to the reasons or 
explanations that accompanied the forecasts. 
Keren & Teigen (2001) conducted a series of four experiments that suggest that lay 
people have a clear preference for more extreme and higher probabilities over less 
extreme ones (this is related to the "confidence heuristic" described above). They make a 
useful distinction in judging the "goodness" of probability judgments - namely, how 
informative is it (does it provide accurate information about the state of the world), and 
how valuable is it (is it useful for determining future actions to take). Subjects were given 
pairs ofprobabilities and asked which was more valuable and informative. The main 
finding was that the larger of the two probabilities was judged to be more valuable and 
informative. 
In the second approach to studying consumer perceptions of forecasts and risk 
communications, consumers are presented with forecasts without additional frequency 
information about the past performance of the forecaster. Consumer trust and 
perceptions of source credibility have emerged as important factors in consumer 
perceptions of risk and overall perceptions of the quality or believability of risk forecasts 
(e.g. see McComas & Trumbo, 2001; Peters, Covello & McCallum, 1997; Trumbo & 
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McComas, 2003). One interesting study reported by Trumbo & McComas (2003) 
examined how differences in perceptions of the credibility of government and industry 
reports of risk information related to how consumers process information, which leads to 
differences in perceptions of risk. Their results suggest that perceptions of low credibility 
promote systematic information processing, which leads to greater risk perceptions, 
whereas perceptions ofhigh credibility for state or industry risk communication results in 
greater heuristic processing which leads to lower perceptions of risk. 
Effects ofthe Format ofUncertainty Information on Perceptions of Risk and Perceptions 
of the Quality of the Forecast or Forecaster 
Verbal versus Numerical Expressions ofUncertainty 
There is quite a large literature concerning how people understand and use verbal 
statements to represent uncertainty (e.g. likely, seldom, very unlikely, etc; Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1995; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). In general, verbal expressions of 
uncertainty have been found to be more vague than numerical estimates and, in some 
cases, have been found to relate to judgments that are less consistent and reliable than 
those based on numerical estimates (Wallsten, Budescu, and Zwick, 1993; see Fox & 
Irwin, 1998 for a discussion of the different research traditions relating to linguistic 
expressions ofuncertainty). As noted above, however, numerical estimates of 
uncertainty are not immune to context effects or different interpretations by different 
consumers. In the case of communicating uncertainty information from forecaster to 
consumer, these research results suggest that using verbal statements of uncertainty is 
inferior to more precise numerical uncertainty estimates (Fischhoff, 2001; Heuer, 1999). 
Fox and Irwin (1998) also review research that focuses on preferences for verbal 
versus numerical estimates ofuncertainty. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that 
consumers tend to prefer to receive numerical uncertainty information but forecasters 
prefer to use verbal statements. In addition, Gurmankin, Baron, & Armstrong (2004) 
found that consumers were more trusting and comfortable with physician risk 
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information that included numerical probability estimates as opposed to verbal 
probabilities, although this effect interacted with the consumer's level ofnumerical 
ability (discussed below). Since the focus in this work is on consumers, these findings 
suggest that consumers of intelligence forecasts would prefer to have explicit numerical 
uncertainty information in forecasts. 
Standard Probability Formats versus Frequency Formats 
There has been a heated debate concerning the merits of frequency formats (i.e. lout 
of 10), as opposed to probability (i.e..1) or percentage (10%) formats, as a more natural 
way of communicating uncertainty. Gigerenzer and colleagues (see Gigerenzer, 1994 for 
a review) have argued that humans are more naturally prepared to deal with frequency 
information, given that our species has evolved mechanisms to represent frequencies in 
order to learn from the natural environment. In fact, these authors have found that many 
of the standard biases identified in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g. 
overconfidence, base-rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy) are not present when 
individuals are presented with frequency as opposed to standard probability information 
(Gigerenzer, 1994). The focus of the present investigation, however, is simply the 
transferal of risk/likelihood information from forecaster to consumer and does not 
involve statistical reasoning. 
Additional research suggests that relative frequency information is easier to 
understand and is thought to be clearer than percentage or decimal representations of 
probability (see Burkell, 2004 for a discussion of this research). Overall, frequency 
representations of likelihood are thought to be more amenable to clear understanding and 
are easier to work with when additional calculations or comparisons need to be done to 
arrive at ajudgment (Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 2000; Burkell, 2004). 
However, Burkell (2004) mentions that "when the goal is only to present likelihood, and 
no statistical reasoning is required, percent format (e.g. 2%) is also appropriate [in 
addition to frequency formats], because it is perceived as easy to understand." (pg. 204). 
In the risk communication situation modeled in the present work, this research suggests 
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that frequency or percentage formats may be effective in transferring information from 
forecaster to consumer. 
Several researchers have also reported that consumer risk perceptions differ 
depending on whether probability is expressed as a relative frequency versus a decimal 
probability or percentage. Specifically, these results suggest that consumers perceive 
greater risk when presented with probability information as a relative frequency (Slovic, 
et aI., 2000; Siegrist, 1997; Keller, Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006). For example, Slovic et ai. 
(2000) found that consumers reported greater risk when the dangerousness of a mental 
patient was communicated as a relative frequency (e.g. "Of every 10 patients similar to 
Mr. Jones, 1 is estimated to commit as act of violence to others during the first several 
months after discharge") as opposed to a percentage probability (e.g. "Patients similar to 
Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 10% probability of committing an act ofviolence to 
others during the first several months after discharge"). 
In the present studies, frequency and percentage probability formats will be compared 
for the consistency with which consumers use this information (i.e. greater stated 
likelihood leads to greater perceived likelihood) and how they feel about intelligence 
forecasts with different formats for likelihood information. 
Confidence Intervals and Reporting a Range ofPlausible Probability Values in a 
Forecast 
Several authors have suggested that some type of sensitivity analysis should 
accompany any probabilistic forecast. Presenting a probability point estimate in a 
forecast as well as a range ofplausible values (i.e. a 95% confidence interval) gives the 
consumer information not only about the best probability estimate from the forecaster, 
but also relays information about the level of uncertainty inherent in the probabilistic 
analysis (sometimes called second-order uncertainty). The main goal of this approach is 
to present consumers with the most complete and honest information possible, with the 
hope that consumers will be able to use this information for further judgments and 
decisions. 
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Although including the results of uncertainty or sensitivity analysis in intelligence 
forecasts may seem beneficial, it is not clear that consumers will actually be able to use 
this information in judgment and decisions. In other words, there may be a tradeoff 
between more complete information and a consumer's ability to understand and use the 
information presented. Although not specific to presenting ranges of probability values, 
previous research suggests that more complete information can sometimes lead to a lack 
ofunderstanding and inferior choices (Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon, et aI., 2007; see Peters, 
in press for a brief review). 
Hsee (1995) reports findings on the effects ofpresenting ranges ofvalues on 
judgment and decision making. These findings suggest that when consumers are 
presented with a plausible range of values for an attribute, they may tend to ignore the 
information about this attribute and focus on other, possibly less relevant, information. In 
one study, Hsee (1995) showed participants two different files and asked them which one 
they would like to edit. One of the files was more interesting but paid less, while the 
other file was not as interesting but paid more. When the pay rate was presented to 
participants as a range, a larger percentage ofparticipants chose to edit the more 
interesting but lower paying file. Thus, the range information appeared to allow the 
participants to weigh the pay rate less and focused them on the only other information on 
which to make the choice (Le. how interesting the file was). This finding suggests that 
presenting numerical probability information as a range may cause consumers to ignore 
probability and focus on other information to make their judgments (e.g. the narrative 
summary of the evidence). Thus, one might expect consumers to rely more on the 
narrative information as opposed to the numerical probability information when the 
probability information is presented as a range. 
There has also been research focused on how consumers feel about risk or likelihood 
information when it is presented as a range ofplausible values. For example, in several 
studies, Johnson & Slovic (1995; 1998) presented participants with simulated risk 
communications from government sources like the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). When these risk communications were reported with a range of plausible 
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probability values, participants tended to rate the agency as more trustworthy but less 
competent, and in verbal protocols many subject reported being uncomfortable with the 
range of probability values because it made them feel less confident that the EPA could 
estimate the risks involved (see also Johnson, 2003). In another example from a 
oompletely different domain, Epstein, Alper, & Quill (2004) reviewed the research 
literature relating to the presentation of clinical evidence to medical patients. They 
concluded that less educated and older patients did not like being presented with 
confidence intervals and had trouble understanding them. 
External versus Internal Framing ofProbabilistic Forecasts 
There have been very few studies that have explored internal versus external framing 
ofprobability information in forecasts. An internal frame is thought to direct the 
consumer to interpret the probability estimate as a statement of uncertainty in the 
forecaster's personal belief or judgment (e.g. "I am 10% sure that x will happen in the 
next 6 months"), while an external mode may direct the consumer to interpret the 
probability as a statement about the propensity of the event in the external world, outside 
of the personal belief structure of the forecaster (e.g. "The probability that x will occur 
over the next 6 months is 10%"). 
In an unpublished manuscript, Fox & Malle (1997) discuss several interesting effects 
relating to internal versus external framing of probability information. Their results 
suggest that consumers tend to have more faith or belief in a forecaster that uses an 
internal frame for expressing probability as opposed to an external frame, and consumers 
feel that probability statements with an internal frame indicate that the forecaster is more 
certain and willing to take responsibility for the forecast (Fox & Irwin, 1998). One 
experimental result is particularly interesting in light of the consumer hindsight effects 
that will be the focus of Study 3. Fox and Malle (1997) presented experimental subjects 
with vignettes in which an economist forecasted that exports would increase in the next 
month. The numerical probability was framed as either internal (i.e. 70% sure) or as 
external (i.e. 70% chance) to the forecaster. Consumers where then told about the 
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eventual increase or decrease of exports over the next month. When told that exports 
increased in the next month, the majority of subjects said that they would rather promote 
the economist that reported his or her forecast in the internal frame, and, alternatively, if 
exports actually decreased, the majority of subjects said that they would rather fire the 
economist that reported his or her forecast in the internal frame (Fox & Irwin, 1998). In 
summary, consumers were more likely to praise a forecaster that they thought made a 
correct forecast and punish a forecaster that they thought made an incorrect forecast when 
the forecast was framed as internal to the forecaster. 
Numeracy 
The Conceptualization and Measurement ofNumeracy 
Numeracy defined in the broadest sense is the ability to understand and use numbers. 
This would include an understanding of the real number line, the ability to compare 
numbers in magnitude, the understanding of time and money, measurement, estimation, 
and the ability to perform simple arithmetic. At a somewhat higher level, a broad 
definition might also include basic logic, performing multi-step operations, a fundamental 
understanding of chance and basic statistical principles, and comfort with proportions, 
fractions, probabilities, and risks. Researchers have defined and measured numeracy in 
various ways, often because of differences in their specific research interests and domain 
of study. For example, Paulos (1988) defines innumeracy as the "inability to deal 
comfortably with the fundamental notions of number and chance" (pg. 3). He discusses 
difficulties individuals have in understanding extremely large and small numbers, 
grasping infinity, correctly using combinations and permutations to calculate quantities, 
and understanding basic concepts involving chance and probability. Another example 
comes from the healthcare domain, where researchers are often interested in the ability of 
the public to understand the risks and benefits of particular medical treatments. These 
authors often define numeracy as the ability to understand proportions, risks, percentages 
and probabilities, since these are the forms in which risk and benefit information is most 
often presented to consumers (Burkell, 2004). 
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Much ofthe quantitative health information presented to the public involves 
communicating the risks associated with particular diseases or treatment options (Burkell, 
2004). Most of this information comes in the form of explicit probabilities, relative 
frequencies, and proportions, and it is assumed that people can interpret these different 
measures to make an assessment of the likelihood of different outcomes. Because of the 
importance and common use of this type of outcome likelihood information, researchers 
have developed numeracy measures specifically designed to assess these skills. 
Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch (1997) measured numeracy with three questions, 
which included a basic question assessing participants understanding of chance (i.e. how 
many heads would come up in 1000 tosses of a fair coin) and two questions asking the 
participants to convert a percentage to a proportion and a proportion to a percentage (Le. 
the chance ofwinning a car is 1 in 1000, what is the percentage ofwinning tickets for the 
lottery?). This measure proved popular among researchers, and several authors have 
developed expanded versions ofthe original3-item measure. 
One important addition to the literature was the expanded numeracy measure created 
by Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer (2001). They added eight questions to the items from the 
Schwartz et al. numeracy scale. The additional items were designed to assess a 
participant's ability to understand and compare risks (e.g. Which ofthe following 
numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease: 1%, 10%, or 5%?) and to move 
between decimal representations, proportions and fractions. Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon, et 
al. (2007) have also used an expanded version of the Lipkus numeracy scale, introducing 
four more difficult items. Among other things, these additional items test the 
understanding of base rates as well as the ability to make more complex likelihood 
calculations. 
Because the consumer of a probabilistic intelligence forecast is presented with very 
similar probabilistic estimates as consumers in the medical domain, numeracy defined as 
the ability to understand proportions, risks, percentages and probabilities is used in the 
present studies. Specifically, the expanded numeracy measure used by Peters et al. 
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(2007) is used in the studies reported below (see Appendix B for the expanded numeracy 
measure). 
Previous Findings Relating to Individual Difftrences in Numeracy 
Many researchers have tried to identify optimal methods ofpresenting numerical 
information to consumers (see Dieckmann, 2007). However, very little research has 
focused on how people with varying levels ofnumerical ability understand and use 
information presented in different formats. Fagerlin et al. (submitted) reviewed some of 
the literature on presenting risk and benefit information, but for the most part could only 
speculate about how individuals varying in numerical ability would deal with different 
presentation methods. 
Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, et al. (2006) conducted several experiments that examined 
how individuals varying in numerical ability were able to understand and use 
probabilities expressed in different formats and to what extent they were affected by 
information framing. In one study, Peters et al. (2006) examined whether numerical 
ability affected the perception of probability information. Participants were asked to rate 
the risk associated with releasing a hypothetical mental health patient. One half of the 
participants read the scenario in the frequency form ("Of every 100 patients similar to 
Mr. Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act ofviolence to others during the first several 
months after discharge") and the other half received the same information in percentage 
form ("Of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10% are estimated to commit an act of 
violence to others during the first several months after discharge"). High numerate 
participants did not differ in their risk ratings between the two formats. Low numerate 
participants, however, rated Mr. Jones as being less of a risk when they were presented 
with the percentage format. The authors speculate that the low numerate, because of 
limited numerical skills, have more difficulty transforming one representation to another 
(10/100 = 10%), and were therefore differently affected by the format. The low numerate 
may have reported a higher level of risk in response to the frequency format because in 
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this condition they generated more vivid images of the violent acts than in the percentage 
condition (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). 
In another study, researchers focused on trust and confidence in numerical 
information. Guarmankin, Baron, & Armstrong (2004) conducted a web survey in which 
they presented subjects with several hypothetical risk scenarios. The scenarios depicted a 
physician presenting an estimate of the risk that a patient had cancer in three different 
formats (verbal, numerical probability as percentage or numerical probability as fraction). 
Participants then rated their trust and comfort with the information, as well as whether 
they thought the physician distorted the level of risk. Numeracy was measured with a 
scale adapted from Lipkus et al. (2001). Overall, they found that participants were more 
trusting of the information in the numeric as compared to the verbal formats, although 
this effect interacted with numeracy. Even after adjusting for gender, age, and education, 
the results showed that those subjects with the lowest numeracy scores trusted the 
information in the verbal format more than the numeric, and those with the highest 
numeracy scores trusted the information in the numeric formats more than the verbal. 
In summary, low numerate participants tend to be worse at reading survival graphs, 
more susceptible to framing effects, more sensitive to the formatting of probability and 
risk reduction information, and tend to trust verbal more than numerical information 
(Dieckmann, 2007). 
Numeracy and Affective Processing 
Peters and colleagues conducted two experiments that examined whether numerical 
ability was related to affective evaluations of numbers (peters, et aI., 2006). In one study, 
they used the jellybean task developed by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994). Participants 
were presented with two hypothetical bowls ofjellybeans and were told that they would 
win $5 if they picked a colored jellybean. One bowl had a total of 100 jellybeans with 9 
colored jellybeans. This bowl was labeled "9% colored jellybeans". The second bowl 
had a total of 10 jellybeans with only one colored jellybean and was labeled "10% 
colored jellybeans". Participants were then asked to choose the bowl they would like to 
pick from. They also rated how they felt about the 9% chance associated with the first 
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bowl (affect question), rated the precision of that feeling ("How clear a feeling do you 
have about the goodness or badness of Bowl A's 9% chance ofwinning?"), and finally 
completed the expanded numeracy measure based on Lipkus et al. (2001). Participants 
lower in numeracy were more likely to choose from the bowl with the lower chance of 
winning (9% versus 10%) and they also reported less precise feelings about the 9% 
chance. The authors speculate that because the low numerate were not able to draw 
meaning from the percentage information, they were drawn to the objectively worse bowl 
by an irrelevant source of affective information - namely, the bowl with greater the 
number of winning beans. 
In a second study, these authors used a task developed by Slovic, Finucane, Peters & 
MacGregor (2004). Two groups ofparticipants are asked to rate the attractiveness of a 
simple gamble. The first group was given the following: 7/36 chances to win $9 and 
29/36 chances to win nothing. The second group was given a similar gamble but with a 
small loss: 7/36 chances to win $9 and 29/36 chances to lose 5¢. The initial findings 
from Slovic et al. (2004) were that participants rated the gamble with the small loss 
considerably higher than the gamble with no loss. Peters et al. (2006) had participants 
complete this same task, but also had them complete measures of affect and affective 
precision, as well as the expanded version of the Lipkus et al. (2001) numeracy scale. 
They found that high numerate participants rated the bet with the small loss as more 
attractive than the bet with no loss, whereas low numerate participants rated the two bets 
as equally attractive. In this case the high numerate participants were actually making 
objectively worse judgments than the low numerate participants. The authors explain this 
difference by pointing out that the high numerate are actually better able to deal with 
numbers and therefore draw more affective meaning from numbers. In fact, high 
numerate participants were shown to have more positive and more precise feelings 
toward the 7/36 chances ofwinning, as well as more positive feelings toward the $9. 
High numerate participants had particularly strong positive feelings toward the $9 when it 
was accompanied by the small 5¢ loss, suggesting that they were particularly sensitive to 
the comparison of the small loss and the comparatively much larger gain. In this case, it 
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is possible the ability of the high numerate decision makers to draw meaning from 
numbers and number comparisons actually led them astray. As a whole, this work 
suggests that people lower in numeracy do not draw as much affective meaning from 
numbers, and consequently, may be more influenced by other, sometimes irrelevant 
sources of affective information. 
In summary, previous work suggests that individuals lower in numeracy have 
difficulty judging risks and benefits, show larger framing effects, are sensitive to the 
formatting ofprobability information, trust verbal more than numerical information, and 
appear to not draw as much affective meaning from numbers. To my knowledge, 
individual differences in numerical ability have not been studied in the political 
forecasting domain, although there are many similarities between this domain and the 
experimental tasks that have been used in past research. Ofparticular relevance to the 
present studies is the sensitivity to the formatting ofprobability information, perceptions 
ofnarrative versus numerical information, and the finding that the low numerate may 
disregard any numerical probability information and focus on other sources of 
information when making judgments (e.g. narrative information in the forecast). 
Hindsight Bias 
In a series of experiments in the mid 1970's, Baruch Fischhoff (1975) demonstrated 
that people tended to overestimate the probability with which they would have correctly 
forecasted an event before it occurred when they were informed of the outcome of the 
event. In other words, once people know the outcome of an event they tend to 
overestimate how well they could have correctly predicted whether the event would 
happen or not without the outcome knowledge. For example, Fischhoff(1975) asked 
research participants to make a prediction about the outcome of a real world event, and 
then after the outcome of the event was known he asked them recall what they had 
predicted. On average, participants tended to be biased in the direction ofthe actual 
outcome of the event. Numerous follow-up studies have been conducted on a range of 
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related hindsight effects, and the hindsight literature has been reviewed by Hawkins and 
Hastie (1990). 
Further explorations of the hindsight bias phenomenon showed that, as suspected, it 
was not just probability estimates that were biased in the direction of the actual outcome 
of the event, but relevant facts and evidence relating to the event were also reinterpreted 
in light of the outcome knowledge. In fact, it may be the causal reinterpretation of the 
evidence on which the forecast is based that is primarily responsible for hindsight effects 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2001). For example, Wasserman, Lempert & Hastie (1991) 
demonstrated that hindsight effects were only present when causal explanations relating 
the evidence to the outcome could be readily generated. In other words, when given 
knowledge about the outcome of the forecasted event, people naturally go back and try to 
make sense of the evidence in light of the outcome, using what Fischhoff (200 1) calls a 
"heuristic ofmaking sense" (pg. 544). "However, like other heuristics, rapidly 
integrating new information provides its benefits at a price. Those images of once­
possible futures are no longer available when we need them. In their stead, we find 
pictures colored by our knowledge of what actually happened" (pg. 544). 
Hindsight biases are a potential problem whenever consumers, or the forecasters 
themselves, revisit forecasts after the occurrence or non-occurrence of the forecasted 
event is known. Heuer (1999) discusses the potential problems that can occur with 
respect to hindsight bias in the intelligence forecasting domain. As discussed in the 
introduction, the auditing of forecasts is a necessary part of the learning process for 
forecasters, and forecast consumers also revisit forecasts, particularly after the occurrence 
of an event with negative consequences (i.e. the intelligence memo written about Bin 
Laden before September 11 th, 2001). Fischhoff (2001) discusses the importance for 
forecasters to be precise in their forecasts, not only because this will help them learn from 
their mistakes, but also because ambiguous forecasts are more likely to result in hindsight 
bias on the part of future auditors. If the natural reaction is for people to take the relevant 
evidence and reinterpret it in light ofthe known outcome, then an ambiguous forecast 
may allow more opportunity for future auditors to see causal patterns in the set of 
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evidence that lead to the outcome. Fischhoff(2001) argues that more precise forecasts, 
preferably with numerical estimates of probability, are superior both in terms of 
forecaster learning and the reduction of the potential for gross hindsight reinterpretations 
of forecasts. These results suggest that in the intelligence forecasting tasks studied here, 
more ambiguous forecasts (pure narrative) would lead to larger hindsight effects than 
forecasts with probabilistic estimates (more precise). However, this hypothesis has so far 
not been tested. 
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CHAPTER III
 
A MODEL OF CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF SINGLE-EVENT INTELLIGENCE
 
FORECASTS AND PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 
A Model of Consumer Perceptions of Single-Event Intelligence Forecasts
 
Figure 1 shows a simple conceptual model of consumer perceptions of likelihood, 
potential harm and risk based on single-event intelligence forecasts that include both a 
discussion of narrative evidence and explicit estimates of likelihood and potential harm. 
This model is based on a conceptual analysis of the task of the intelligence consumer and 
the research literature reviewed in Chapter II. The properties of the intelligence forecast 
as well as the characteristics of the individual consumer are important in determining 
consumer perceptions of risk, as well as consumer feelings about the quality and 
usefulness of a forecast (e.g. source credibility, trust, competence, etc). Although the 
model depicted in Figure 1 is focused on consumer perceptions of likelihood, harm and 
risk, many of the same factors are expected to affect consumer feelings about the quality 
and usefulness of forecasts. 
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Figure 1. A simple model of consumer risk perceptions from simulated intelligence 
forecasts. 
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Risk perceptions are modeled as some unknown function of perceptions of the 
likelihood and the potential harm of the target event. The precise combination of 
likelihood and potential harm that compose risk perceptions is not known (and may vary 
depending on the particular characteristics of the task under study), and for this reason 
likelihood and potential harm are treated separately in the analyses presented below. In 
addition, global risk perceptions are also likely to depend on the characteristics of the 
particular hazard (e.g. the familiarity of the risk, or the amount of "dread" associated with 
the hazard) and the idiosyncratic perceptions of the individual consumer. 
2 Although the characteristics of the hazard and other idiosyncratic subject level effects are expected to 
affect individual perceptions of risk, they are not the focus of the present investigations and are not 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Next, perceived potential harm is modeled as a function of the stated potential harm 
information presented in the forecast (e.g. statements about the expected loss of life or 
property if the target event were to occur). The perceived likelihood of the target event is 
a function ofboth the properties of the narrative discussion ofthe evidence set and the 
explicit probability provided by the forecaster. As consumers perceive greater coherence 
and credibility in the narrative evidence, they will perceive the target event as more 
plausible and believable and will therefore perceive the event to be more likely. In 
addition, as the explicit probability stated in the forecast increases, consumers will 
perceive the event to be more likely. 
The relative reliance on the narrative evidence or the stated probability information is 
hypothesized to be moderated by the numerical ability of the consumer. Consumers that 
are higher in numerical ability will be able to evaluate and use the stated probability 
information, and will rely less on the narrative description for their perceptions of 
likelihood. Conversely, consumers lower in numerical ability will have more difficulty 
evaluating the probability information, and will therefore rely more on the narrative 
evidence for their perceptions of likelihood. 
Finally, the format of the stated probability is expected to moderate the effect of 
stated probability on perceptions of likelihood. As discussed in Chapter II, some 
probability formats have been shown to be more easily evaluated by consumers, 
particularly consumers that vary in numerical ability. 
Research Questions 
The primary purpose ofpresenting explicit estimates of likelihood and potential harm 
is to communicate, as faithfully as possible, the estimates of risk that are generated by the 
analyst to the intelligence consumer. Using the model of consumer perceptions of 
intelligence forecasts developed above as a guide, there are several reasons why explicit 
risk estimates may fail in that goal: 1) consumers may focus on the vivid narrative 
information to such an extent that the probability information is neglected when judging 
risk (Le. become overwhelmed by the vividness of the scenario information and 
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underweight the explicit probability information), 2) consumers lower in numeric ability 
may not understand the numerical information, and may just attend to the narrative 
information because they don't understand or want to avoid the numerical information, 3) 
even if consumers use the numerical probability information to some extent, they will not 
use it in the way that is intended (Le. at least ordinal differentiation between probability 
values - 5% chance perceived as lower than 10% chance, etc), 4) consumer's perceptions 
of risk may not be consistent and may depend on the format of probability information, 
and 5) when judging a forecast in hindsight, the inclusion of numerical estimates in 
intelligence forecasts will affect consumer perceptions of the quality ofthe forecast. The 
overarching goal of this dissertation is to address, empirically, these five points 
concerning the inclusion of numerical probability and threat information in intelligence 
forecasts. 
Below are the primary research questions that are the focus of this dissertation. 
Several specific hypotheses concerning specific manipulations (e.g. probability format) 
will be discussed in the context of each individual experiment. 
1.	 To what extent does the presence of a narrative summary of the evidence 
supporting a forecast affect perceived risk and perceptions of the quality and 
usefulness of the forecast? 
2.	 To what extent will perceptions of coherence in the narrative summary and 
credibility of the evidence affect perceived risk and perceptions of the quality 
and usefulness of the forecast? 
3.	 Will consumers be sensitive to numerical information concerning probability 
and threat in the presence of a narrative summary of evidence, and will the 
majority of consumers be able to make at least ordinal differentiations 
between the probability levels? In addition, will consumers find intelligence 
forecasts with numerical probability and threat estimates more useful as 
decision making aids and also find them to be of higher quality? 
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4.	 Will the ability of consumers to use the numerical probability information in 
judging risk be moderated by the format of the probability information? 
Differences between verbal probability estimates, percentage formats, 
frequency formats, percentage formats presented as an external probability 
versus a confidence rating, and probabilities presented with a confidence 
range will be tested. 
5.	 Will the numerical ability of the individual consumer affect the extent to 
which they rely on the numerical versus narrative information in a forecast? 
Also, will consumers with different levels of numeracy be able to use the 
probability information, and will they show different preferences for 
probability information in specific formats? 
6.	 Finally, how will consumers perceive forecasts in hindsight (i.e. after they 
know the outcome ofthe forecasted event)? How will consumers perceive 
the quality of the forecast and, when they perceive a forecast to be "wrong", 
will they place differing amounts of blame on the forecasters depending on 
whether numerical estimates of probability and threat were included in the 
forecast? 
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CHAPTER IV
 
THE SIMULATED INTELLIGENCE FORECASTS, THE SUBJECT POPULATION,
 
AND PRELIMINARY STUDY 1
 
The preceding chapters have detailed the conceptual task of the intelligence consumer 
and a model of the information sources and individual differences that affect perceptions 
of these forecasts. The development of the simulated intelligence forecasts and the 
subject population that was used in the primary experiments is discussed next. 
Development of the Simulated Intelligence Forecasts 
The simulated forecasts were modeled after a single-outcome indications and warning 
intelligence forecast, in which a narrative summary of pertinent evidence and explicit 
numerical information about the probability and potential harm of the event are 
presented. This type of forecast represents a relatively straightforward risk 
communication situation, with the assumption that if consumers have difficulty in this 
very simple case the problems would potentially be magnified in more complicated 
situations. 
Four different forecasts were created that outlined the evidence relating to a potential 
terrorist attack in a large city in the United States (see Appendix A). Each scenario is 
approximately one-page long and was roughly modeled after historical examples of 
intelligence reports available in the public domain (e.g. see http://www.foia.cia.gov/). 
The now famous August 6th Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) entitled "Bin Laden 
Determined to Strike in US" was also used as a rough template (see Appendix A). PDBs 
come in many forms but are generally relatively short intelligence products designed to 
alert and inform the president on matters of immediate import. The PDBs do not 
themselves include all of the information about how an analyst reached the conclusions 
that he or she did, although more information would be available in a separate more 
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detailed document or could be acquired through verbal questioning of the analyst, or 
other top managers and directors. 
Each of the terrorist scenarios was approximately the same length with roughly the 
same quantity of evidence. The first scenario depicted a potential explosive attack 
against a government building in Washington, D.C., the second report depicted an 
explosive attack against a railway system in Chicago, the third report depicted an 
explosive attack against a passenger ship in a New York harbor, and the fourth report 
depicted a potential explosive attack against a professional sporting event in Los Angeles. 
Experimental Participants 
Ideally, real consumers of intelligence forecasts would have been recruited as study 
participants. For obvious reasons it is difficult to use actual intelligence consumers, since 
they include high-ranking government officials and advisors, members of congress, or the 
president. Several different populations of subjects were used in the present studies. A 
large community sample was used in Study II. A sample of graduate/law students from 
the University of Oregon was used in Study III (and Preliminary Study I), and a mixed 
sample ofundergraduates from the University of Oregon and participants that had 
completed undergraduate degrees was used in Study IV. 
Preliminary Study I: Pretesting the Simulated Intelligence Forecasts 
Purpose 
There were two primary goals ofPreliminary Study 1. The first goal was to assess the 
plausibility of the different explicit probabilities assigned to the simulated intelligence 
forecasts. In the experiments that follow, each scenario will be presented with several 
different explicit probability estimates. This study was designed to identify a plausible 
range ofprobability values that could be assigned to each scenario. It is important to 
make sure that after reading the simulated scenarios the participants, as a whole, were not 
completely surprised by the assigned probability. The proposed range ofprobability 
levels was between 1%-20%. This intermediate probability range was picked because the 
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probabilities were low enough to be believable in terms of a potential terrorist attack, yet 
they were still high enough to be, potentially, comprehensible for consumers. The goal 
was to test the hypotheses of interest in this range ofprobability and, in future work, 
investigate different ranges ofprobability. For instance, many potential terrorist attacks 
are very unlikely on the order of 1/1,000, or 1/1,000,000, and these small probabilities 
should be investigated in future work. 
The second goal of this study was to explore consumer likelihood judgments 
concerning a target event when only a narrative description of evidence is available. It 
was expected that these likelihood judgments would be highly variable due to the 
idiosyncratic way in which consumers used the available evidence to make their 
judgments. 
Procedure and Design 
Participants read each simulated scenario and then rated whether they thought that 
each of the four possible assigned probabilities was a reasonable estimate of the 
likelihood of the target event. The assigned probabilities were 1%, 5%, 10% and 20%. 
Then they were asked to make their own estimates of the highest and lowest reasonable 
probability for the event. Each subject made ratings for all four scenarios. The order in 
which the subjects read the scenarios was counterbalanced, and the order in which they 
rated the probabilities was randomized. 
Results and Discussion 
A total of 17 psychology graduate students attending the University of Oregon 
participated in the study. Table 1 shows the percentage of participants who felt that the 
stated probability was a reasonable estimate, and Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for 
the subject-generated low and high probability ranges. 
It is not clear from the percentages displayed in Table 1 that participants found the 
stated probabilities to be reasonable estimates of the chance that the terrorist attack would 
occur. For instance, in some cases only 55-60% ofparticipants thought that a particular 
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probability was reasonable. Particularly concerning were the results for the 20% 
probability level for forecasts 3 and 4, which only a quarter of participants found 
acceptable. However, examination of the means and standard deviations for the high and 
low estimates for each forecast suggests that the stated probabilities are acceptable (see 
Table 2). For example, the mean low and high probability estimates for scenario 1 
roughly span 1-20%. Taking the results as whole, it seems reasonable to attach stated 
probabilities ranging from 1% - 15% to forecasts 3 and 4, and stated probabilities ranging 
from 1%-20% for forecasts 1 and 2. 
The second goal ofthis study was to explore the variance in perceived probability 
estimates. It is clear from the Table 2 that there is quite a bit ofvariability in perceived 
likelihood ranges between the subjects. For instance, some subjects reported likelihood 
ranges on the order of 20%-70%, while others reported likelihood ranges on the order of 
0%-.01 %. When only presented with narrative evidence, consumer perceptions of 
likelihood can vary widely. This demonstrates one of the disadvantages ofusing purely 
narrative reports, which tend to be ambiguous, to present risk information to consumers. 
Including explicit probability/risk information for consumers may help to alleviate this 
problem, and this hypothesis will be tested in the experimental work reported in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 1. Percentage ofparticipants who felt that each probability 
was a reasonable estimate of the probability that the event would 
occur. 
1%7 5%7 10%7 20%7 
Scenario 1 0.65 0.76 0.76 0.47 
Scenario 2 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.65 
Scenario 3 0.82 0.71 0.59 0.24 
Scenario 4 0.82 0.59 0.53 0.24 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for subject-
generated probability ranges. 
Low(%) High (%)
 
Scenario 1
 
Mean 1.54 21.71
 
SD 2.03 19.53
 
Mean 4.30 27.71
 
SD 7.15 21.86
 
Mean 1.13 14.36
 
SD 2.34 15.01
 
Mean 1.01 14.00
 
SD 2.37 15.62
 
Median 1 10
 
Extreme 0 50
 
Scenario 2
 
Median 1 30
 
Extreme 0 70
 
Scenario 3
 
Median 1 10
 
Extreme 0 50
 
Scenario 4
 
Median 0.1 10
 
Extreme 0 50
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CHAPTER V
 
PRIMARY EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
 
Overview of Primary Studies
 
Study 2. This study is an initial exploration of the effects ofexplicit estimates of 
likelihood and narrative scenario information on consumer risk perceptions. In addition, 
both the format of explicit likelihood information and the numerical ability of the 
consumers are explored as potential moderators of the effect of likelihood and scenario 
information on perceptions of risk. 
Study 3. This study was designed to further test the impact of explicit likelihood 
information and specific properties of the narrative scenario information on perceptions 
of likelihood and potential harm. As in Study 2, the format of the explicit likelihood 
information and the numerical ability of the consumers are explored as moderators. 
Study 4. The primary focus of Study 4 is to explore how consumers feel about 
intelligence forecasts in hindsight (with knowledge about the outcome of the forecasted 
event). Specifically, how do consumers feel about the usefulness and source credibility of 
these forecasts, and to what extent do they blame a forecaster when an event occurs that 
was given a relatively low likelihood in a forecast? Of particular interest are the types of 
information (Le. narrative or stated likelihood) that consumers use to make usefulness, 
source credibility and blame judgments in hindsight. 
Study 2 - Initial Explorations of the Effects of Explicit Likelihood and Scenario 
information on Perceptions of Risk 
Purpose 
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to determine whether consumers of simulated 
intelligence forecasts would be sensitive to stated likelihood information, particularly in 
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the presence of a narrative evidence summary. Another focus was whether consumers 
would be better able to use likelihood information in a particular format, and whether 
they would perceive particular likelihood formats to be higher in usefulness, knowledge 
and trust. In addition to assessing the information sources that consumers used to assess 
risk, it is also important to explore the types of forecasts that consumers are most 
comfortable using and feel are of the highest quality. Consumers are not likely to use 
forecasts that they have difficulty understanding or forecasts that they don't trust. 
Finally, the potential moderating influence of consumer numeracy was explored. 
In the model of consumer risk perceptions developed above (see Figure 1), the 
properties of the scenario information and the explicit estimates of likelihood and 
potential harm are modeled as direct effects ofperceived likelihood and perceived harm. 
Perceived likelihood and perceived harm then affect overall perceptions of risk. In this 
study, however, only global risk perceptions are measured. In Study 3, the effects of 
explicit likelihood, harm, and scenario information on perceptions of likelihood are 
studied directly. 
Method 
Participants 
A community sample from the Eugene/Springfield area was recruited to participate in 
Study 2. 
Procedure & Materials 
Study participants were paid $10 for approximately 1 hour of participation time. Each 
participant was asked to read one simulated intelligence report about a potential terrorist 
attack in Washington, D.C. (Scenario 1, discussed above). The report provided a 
narrative description of the evidence concerning the potential attack as well as a 
statement about the potential lives lost if the attack were to occur (see Appendix B). The 
statement about the potential lives lost was held constant for each participant. Since both 
stated probability and probability format were ofprime interest in this experiment, stated 
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threat was held constant so as to minimize the effect that perceived threat had on risk 
judgments. 
After reading the intelligence report participants then responded to a series of 
questions about what they read. In addition, participants completed the Lipkus numeracy 
scale and provided demographic information (see Appendix B). All study procedures 
were approved by the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
Experimental Design 
The experiment was run as a fully between subjects 4 (uncertainty format) x 2 
(probability) x 2 (evidence) design, with a total of 16 conditions. Uncertainty 
information was presented in four formats: verbal, frequency, percentage, and percentage 
w/range, and probability was presented as either highly unlikely (5%, 5 out of 100, Lo: 
1% Best: 5% Hi: 10%) or fairly unlikely (20%, 20 out oflOO, Lo: 10% Best estimate: 
20% Hi: 30%). The verbal and numerical probability statements for each probability level 
were roughly matched based on previous research (Kent, 1994; Hamm, 1991), where 
highly unlikely was found to roughly correspond to a 5% probability and fairly unlikely 
was found to roughly correspond to a 20% probability. Bisantz, Marsiglio & Munch 
(2005) have used a similar approach in matching verbal and numerical probability 
statements. Additionally, the intelligence report was presented with either a summary 
statement only, or with a narrative description of the evidence and then the summary 
statement. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables were designed to assess perceived risk and perceptions of the 
intelligence report. The primary measure of perceived risk was assessed with a single 
question: "How would you rate the risk associated with this possible attack?" Participants 
rated risk on a 0-10 scale ranging from "very low risk" to "very high risk". 
In addition to perceived risk, participants also rated their perceived value or 
usefulness of the report: "How valuable is this intelligence report? In other words, does it 
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provide useful information for determining future actions to take?" In addition, 
participants rated how knowledgeable they thought the analyst was about this potential 
attack: "How knowledgeable does this analyst seem about this potential attack?" Both 
value and perceived knowledge were rated on 0-10 rating scales, ranging from "not at all 
valuablelknowledgeable" to "extremely valuable/knowledgeable. Finally, participants 
rated perceived trust in the summary and conclusions in the report: "How much do you 
trust that this analyst is giving you complete and unbiased information/conclusions about 
this potential attack?" Trust was rated on a 0-10 scale, anchored by "very little trust" and 
"very high trust". 
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
There was a total ofn=305 participants (16-21 subjects per experimental condition) in 
a slightly unbalanced experimental design. Tables 3 and 4 show the sample 
characteristics. 
Table 3. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic n Mean (Median) SD 
Age 305 48.31 (49.00) 15.12 
~umeracya(0-15) 305 9.69 (10.00) 3.17 
a Distribution is moderately negatively skewed. 
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Table 4. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic n % 
Female 182 59.7% 
Education (n=304) 
8th grade or less 1 .3% 
Some HS 15 4.9% 
HS graduate 85 27.9% 
Vocational/trade school 11 3.6% 
Some college/2yr degree 107 35.1% 
4yr college graduate 39 12.8% 
More than 4yr college degree 46 15.1% 
Table 5 shows the Pearson correlations among the dependent variables in Study 1. 
Inspection of scatterplots for each variable pair confirmed that there were no non-linear 
associations between the variables. Thus, Pearson correlation coefficients were used as 
an appropriate index of the linear relationship between the variables. 
Table 5. Pearson correlations (wi 95% CI) between dependent variables (n=305). 
Risk Value Knowledge Trust 
Risk 1.00 
Value .358 1.00 (256, .452) 
Knowledge .238 
(129, .341) 
.649 
(579,.710) 1.00 
Trust .144 .605 .728 1.00 (032, .252) (529, .672) (671, .777) 
Perceived risk is moderately correlated with perceived value, and to a lesser extent 
with perceived knowledge and trust. Theoretically, one might expect roughly zero 
correlation between perceived risk and these variables. For example, regardless of 
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perceived risk a report may still be valuable or useful in terms of deciding on what to do 
about the risk. Because perceived risk is theoretically distinct from the other perception 
variables and the correlations are moderate, perceived risk will be analyzed in a 
univariate fashion. 
Perceived value, knowledge, and trust were highly correlated in this sample. This 
probably reflects the fact that all of these items are getting at a similar construct of 
perceived "quality". Due to the high correlations between these variables, it may be more 
parsimonious to treat them as indicators of a similar construct and analyze them together 
in multivariate analyses. See Appendix E for additional discussion of effect size 
measures, confidence intervals, and the statistical assumptions for analytic techniques 
used in Study 2. 
Perceived Risk 
The explicit likelihood estimates and the narrative discussion of the evidence were 
hypothesized to affect consumer risk perceptions. These effects may be moderated by the 
format of the likelihood estimates and the numerical ability of the consumers. Specific 
research questions are detailed below. 
1.	 Will consumer perceptions of risk be affected by the explicit likelihood 
information presented in the forecast, in that higher stated likelihood will lead 
to higher perceptions of risk? 
2.	 Will consumer perceptions of risk be affected by a narrative discussion of the 
evidence presented in the forecast, in that the presence of the narrative will 
lead to higher perceptions of risk? 
3.	 Will the format of the likelihood information moderate the effect of explicit 
likelihood on perceived risk? 
a.	 The sensitivity of consumers to the different levels of stated likelihood may 
be moderated by the format of the likelihood information. 
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b.	 In addition, previous research suggests that expressing likelihood in a 
frequency format results in higher estimates of risk than equivalent 
expressions of likelihood in decimal or percentage form. 
4.	 Will consumers lower in numeracy have more difficulty using the explicit 
probability information to inform their risk judgments, and will their 
judgments be moderated by the format of explicit likelihood? 
Tables 6 and 7 show the effects ofexplicit likelihood information and uncertainty 
format on perceptions of risk both with and without a narrative description of the 
evidence. 
Table 6. The effect of explicit likelihood estimates and uncertainty format on risk 
perceptions without a narrative description ofevidence. 
Verbal Frequency Percentage Percentage 
w/range Total 
Highly Unlikely 
(5%,5/100) 
4.55 (2.44) 
n=20 
4.05 (1.99) 
n=21 
3.85 (2.48) 
n=20 
3.82 (1.70) 
n=17 
4.08 (2.17) 
n=78 
Fairly Unlikely 
(20%, 20/1 00) 
5.40 (1.60) 
n=20 
5.17 (2.46) 
n=18 
4.75 (1.97) 
n=20 
4.82 (2.43) 
n=17 
5.04 (2.10) 
n=75 
Total 4.98 (2.08) 
n=40 
4.56 (2.26) 
n=39 
4.30 (2.26) 
n=40 
4.32 (2.13) 
n=34 
Note: Mean (SD) and sample size (n) are reported. 
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Table 7. The effect of explicit likelihood estimates and uncertainty format on risk 
perceptions with a narrative description of evidence. 
PercentageVerbal Frequency Percentage Total
w/range 
Highly Unlikely 5.67 (2.35) 5.24 (2.36) 4.20 (2.73) 4.89 (1.91) 4.99 (2.38) 
(5%,5/100) n=18 n=21 n=20 n=18 n=77 
Fairly Unlikely 5.05 (1.85) 5.32 (2.81) 5.40 (2.48) 5.38 (2.85) 5.28 (2.46) 
(20%, 20/1 00) n=20 n=19 n=20 n=17 n=75 
5.34 (2.10) 5.28 (2.55) 4.80 (2.64) 5.12 (2.38) Total 
n=38 n=40 n=40 n=34 
Note: Mean (SD) and sample size (n) are reported. 
Consistent with the first two hypotheses, both higher stated probability, F(I,299) = 
5.74, P = .017, r = .136 (95% CI = .245, .024), and the presence of a narrative summary 
of the evidence, F(l,299) = 4.99, P = .026, r = .126 (95% CI = .235, .014), resulted in 
higher perceptions ofrisk3• In addition, the frequency format elicited slightly higher risk 
perceptions than the percentage format, t(299) = 1.08. P = .28, r = .062 (95% CI = .173, ­
.051), although this effect was small and not statistically significant. 
Consumers, averaging across the format condition, were sensitive to the stated 
likelihood information when judging the risk of the potential terrorist attack. Simple 
effects were used to test whether this difference in perceived risk was present for each 
likelihood format. Figure 2 shows the mean perceived risk between the two levels of 
stated probability for each probability format. Effect sizes are also presented for the 
difference between the stated probability conditions for each format (* indicates a 
contrast is significant at p<.05). Consumers did not show substantially different 
perceptions of risk when likelihood was expressed in a verbal form. However, risk 
perceptions did differ in the expected direction in each of the numerical likelihood 
formats, although only the percentage format elicited a significant effect. It is also 
3 See Appendix E for a discussion of the General Linear Model (GlM) used to model consumer 
perceptions of risk, as well as a discussion of the r effect size measure. 
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interesting to note that there were virtually no differences between the probability formats 
in terms ofperceived risk at the higher probability value, while at the lower probability 
level there were substantial differences between the formats. 
Figure 2. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived risk. 
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Note: * indicates that the contrast was significant at p<.05. 
To explore the last set of hypotheses, individual differences in numeracy were used to 
predict perceived risk. There was a small to medium effect ofnumeracy, F(l, 298) = 
6.47, P = .011, r = .148 (95% CI = .256, .036), such that consumers lower in numeracy 
reported higher perceptions of risk. In addition, numeracy level interacted with the 
format of the likelihood information to affect perceptions of risk. Figure 3 shows the 
mean perceived risk for the format conditions split by high and low numeracy. A median 
split for numeracy is used for simplicity of display. 
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Figure 3. The effect of format condition and numeracy level on perceptions of risk. 
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There was a significant interaction between numeracy and the contrast between the 
verbal probability condition and the numerical conditions combined, t(295) = 2.27, P = 
.029. The low numerate showed little difference between the verbal probability condition 
and the numerical conditions (r = -.05, 95% CI = .106,-.204) while the high numerate 
showed higher perceived risk in the verbal condition and decreased perceptions of risk in 
the numerical conditions (r = .252, 95% CI = .398, .093). The high numerate were 
sensitive to the numerical probability information and showed a decrease in perceived 
risk compared to the verbal, while the low numerate perceived roughly the same level of 
risk in the verbal condition as compared to the numerical conditions. However, the low 
numerate do show a trend toward higher average risk ratings in the frequency condition 
as compared to the other conditions (r = .124, 95% CI = .274, -.032), which is consistent 
with previous findings reviewed above. 
Since consumers lower in numeracy have more difficulty evaluating numbers, it 
follows that the explicit likelihood information may not affect their perceptions of risk in 
r=-. 
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a consistent manner (i.e. higher perceptions of risk with higher stated likelihood 
regardless of the format of the likelihood information). 
Figures 4-7 show the relationship between uncertainty format and stated likelihood by 
numeracy (median split for display purposes) and evidence condition. Note that due to 
the sample size there are only 8-12 participants included in each of the means displayed 
in these graphs. Statistical power is a definite concern when testing the simple effects for 
these subgroups. Effect size measures are presented in the figures. 
Figure 4. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived risk with 
summary only, for consumers low in numeracy. 
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Figure 5. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived risk with 
summary only, for consumers high in numeracy. 
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Figure 6. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived risk with 
summary plus evidence, for consumers low in numeracy. 
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Figure 7. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived risk with 
summary plus evidence for consumers high in numeracy. 
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In the summary only condition, the low numerate show the expected pattern ofhigher 
risk ratings in the higher probability condition under all formats except for the percentage 
w/range format, while the high numerate show the expected pattern in all formats. When 
the evidence is present as well, however, the patterns change for both the high and low 
numerate. The low numerate show the expected pattern for the percentage and 
percentage w/range conditions, show no differentiation in the frequency format, and 
show a large effect in the opposite direction in the verbal condition. The high numerate 
show a relatively large effect in the expected direction with the percentage format, and 
show a flat trend or slightly opposite effect in the frequency and percentage w/range 
formats. To summarize, only the percentage format showed the predicted relationship at 
both levels of the evidence condition for both the high and the low numerate participants, 
although these effects clearly need to be replicated in a more powerful experimental 
design. These results also suggest that the presence of the narrative evidence summary 
has a strong effect on how consumers use the stated likelihood information to inform 
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their risk judgments. The competition between the narrative evidence summary and the 
stated likelihood information will be examined in more detail in Study 3. 
Perceived Usefulness ofthe Forecast and Perceptions ofKnowledge and Trust 
Perceptions of the forecast were explored as a function of the format of explicit 
likelihood information, the presence of the narrative description and the numerical ability 
of the consumer. Specific research questions are outlined below: 
1.	 Will the presence of a narrative discussion of the evidence affect consumer 
perceptions of the usefulness of the forecast and/or perceived knowledge and 
trust? 
2.	 Will the format ofthe likelihood information affect consumer perceptions of 
the usefulness of a forecast and/or perceived knowledge and trust? 
a.	 Because of the difficulty in interpreting verbal probability estimates, verbal 
probability statements will be perceived as less useful, and the forecaster 
will be perceived as less knowledgeable and trustworthy. 
b.	 Previous research also suggests that consumers may perceive a forecaster 
that presents a probability point estimate with a range as less 
knowledgeable than one that presents a point estimate only. Point 
estimates with a range may also be perceived as less useful because there is 
not a single number on which a consumer can use to help assess the risk of 
the target event. 
3.	 Will consumers varying in numeracy prefer likelihood information in different 
formats? 
a.	 Previous research suggests that the low and the high numerate may prefer 
probability information in different formats. The low numerate will 
perceive greater usefulness, knowledge and trust in forecasts with 
frequency representations of likelihood as compared to percentage 
representations. 
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Because of the high intercorrelations between the perception variables, a multivariate 
general linear modeling framework was used to assess the effects of the independent 
variables on the linear combination of the three perception variables. 
As hypothesized, participants who read a narrative summary of the evidence with the 
forecast reported higher levels of perceived usefulness, knowledge and trust, Pillai's = 
.053, F(3,296) = 5.49, P = .001, r = .230 (95% CI = .334, .121) 4. The standardized 
discriminant function coefficients for the linear combination of the perception variables 
were -.709, -.509 and .145 for usefulness, knowledge and trust, respectively. This 
indicates that all of the perception variables contributed to the differentiation of the 
evidence groups, although perceived usefulness made the largest contribution. 
To address the second set ofhypotheses, differences in consumer perceptions among 
the different likelihood formats were explored next. The first contrast compared the 
verbal probability condition to the average of the numerical conditions, and although it 
was not statistically significant, Pillai's = .013, F(3,296) = 1.31, p = .271, r = .11 (95% CI 
= .220, -.002) the effect was in the expected direction, with lower ratings of value, 
knowledge and trust in the verbal likelihood condition. However, there was virtually no 
difference between the percentage with range condition and the average of the other 
numerical likelihood conditions, Pillai's = .001, F(3,296) = .11, P = .957, r = .031 (95% 
CI = .143, -.082). This is inconsistent with previous findings in which forecasters who 
presented likelihood estimates with ranges were perceived as less knowledgeable than 
those who presented likelihood point estimates only. 
The final set ofhypotheses concern the potentially moderating influence of consumer 
numeracy. Figure 8 shows the effect of uncertainty format and consumer numeracy on 
perceptions of usefulness, knowledge and trust. 
4 Details of the multivariate analyses are discussed in Appendix E. 
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Figure 8. The effect of uncertainty format and consumer numeracy on perceptions of 
usefulness, knowledge and trust. 
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As a main effect, participants lower in numeracy reported greater perceptions of 
usefulness, knowledge and trust, Pillai's = .07, F(3,296) = 7.16, p<.OOI, r =.26 (95% CI 
= .362, .152). The standardized discriminant function coefficients were -.442, -.524, and 
-.166 for value, knowledge and trust, respectively. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the 
difference in perception ratings between the frequency format and the percentage format 
was moderated by the numeracy level ofthe consumer, Pillai's = .029, F(3,294) = 2.89, P 
= .036, r = .170 (95% CI = .277, .059), and perceived trust was the main variable driving 
this effect (standardized discriminant function coefficients were -.416, .158, and -.818 for 
value, knowledge, and trust, respectively). The low numerate rated the frequency 
condition higher than the percentage condition, and the opposite was true for the high 
numerate. Overall, the high numerate found a forecast with a percentage likelihood 
estimate to be more useful, and higher in knowledge and trust than a forecast with the 
other uncertainty formats. The low numerate found a forecast with a frequency and 
__
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percentage with range likelihood estimate to be more useful, and higher in knowledge 
and trust than a forecast with a percentage or verbal likelihood estimate. 
However, additional exploratory analysis revealed that the preference for the 
percentage format by the high numerate and the frequency format for the low numerate 
were moderated by stated likelihood, Pillai's = .04, F(3,287) = 3.58, p = .014, r = .20 
(95% CI = .305, .090). Figures 9 and 10 show the effect of uncertainty format and 
numeracy at each level of stated likelihood. The figures show that the preference for the 
frequency format by the low numerate and the preference for the percentage format by 
the high numerate is only present at the lower level of likelihood. 
Figure 9. The effect of uncertainty format and numeracy on perceptions ofusefulness, 
knowledge and trust at low stated likelihood (i.e. 5%, 5/1 00). 
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Figure 10. The effect of uncertainty format and numeracy on perceptions of usefulness, 
knowledge and trust at high stated likelihood (Le. 20%, 20/1 00). 
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In addition, collapsing across numeracy, stated likelihood moderated the effect of 
uncertainty format on perceptions of usefulness, knowledge and trust. Figure 11 shows 
the effect of uncertainty format and stated likelihood on perceptions of usefulness, 
knowledge and trust. Perception ratings were roughly equal for each likelihood format 
except for the percentage with range condition. The percentage with range condition was 
rated substantially higher in the high probability condition than in the low probability 
condition, Pillai's =.03, F(3,298) =2.95, P =.033, r =.341 (95% CI =.536, .112), and 
perceived usefulness was the main variable driving this effect (standardized discriminant 
function coefficients were -.822, -.502, and .332 for value, knowledge and trust, 
respectively). It appears that consumers only found the percentage with range condition 
useful in the high probability condition, and it is possible that when the probability values 
get too low consumers can no longer use the range information. 
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Figure 11. The effect of uncertainty fonnat and stated likelihood on perceptions of 
usefulness, knowledge and trust. 
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Summary and Discussion 
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to detennine whether consumers of simulated 
intelligence forecasts would be sensitive to stated likelihood infonnation, particularly in 
the presence of a narrative evidence summary. Another primary focus was whether 
consumers would be better able to use likelihood infonnation in a particular fonnat, and 
whether they would perceive particular likelihood fonnats to be higher in usefulness, 
knowledge and trust. Finally, the potential moderating influence of consumer numeracy 
was explored. 
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The Effect ofStated Likelihood and Narrative Information 
On average, the magnitude of the stated likelihood had an effect on perceived risk, 
suggesting that participants were sensitive to the explicit likelihood information in the 
forecast. The presence of a narrative summary of the evidence also resulted in increased 
perceptions of risk. Presumably, the narrative information formed a more compelling 
story and elicited more compelling imagery from consumers. The compelling story 
likely made the attack seem more plausible, which led to the higher ratings of risk. The 
effect sizes were roughly equal for the explicit likelihood and narrative conditions 
suggesting that including a description of the evidence underlying a forecast has roughly 
the same effect on perceived risk as a stated probability shift from 5%-20%. In addition, 
not only did the narrative information increase risk ratings, but consumers also found the 
forecast to be more useful and the forecaster more knowledgeable and trustworthy. 
The Effects ofLikelihoodFormat 
The results so far have provided evidence that consumers are sensitive to the 
probability information in the forecast. As expected, however, the extent to which 
consumers were sensitive to the stated likelihood was moderated by the format of the 
likelihood information. 
Verbal Likelihood Format. Because of the lack of specificity of verbal probability 
statements, consumers were not, as a whole, sensitive to changes in verbal stated 
likelihood. Consumers also tended to rate forecasts with verbal estimates of likelihood 
lower in terms of usefulness, knowledge, and trust compared to the numerical formats. 
This result adds to the long list of indictments against verbal probability statements. It is 
clear from these findings and previous research discussed in Chapter II that verbal 
probability statements without a reference scale are not particularly helpful in 
transmitting risk information from analyst to consumer. 
Numerical Likelihood Formats. In general, consumers were sensitive to the changes 
in explicit likelihood in each numerical condition, although the percentage format showed 
the largest effect. One primary effect of interest was whether both high and low 
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numerate participants were sensitive to the stated likelihood information (higher 
perceived risk in the higher likelihood condition) for each of the likelihood formats. 
Inspection of the mean perceived risk for each condition revealed inconsistent risk ratings 
in several conditions (see discussion above). Consumers appeared to be particularly 
insensitive to the stated likelihood information when they read a narrative about the 
evidence, presumably because they were not focusing on the likelihood information as 
much in the presence of the narrative summary. Without the narrative summary, 
however, the low and the high numerate showed roughly consistent patterns of risk 
perception across stated likelihood for each numerical likelihood format (except for the 
range condition for the low numerate). In the end, however, only the percentage 
likelihood format consistently showed the expected pattern across the likelihood levels 
for both high and low numerate consumers with and without a narrative summary of the 
evidence. 
Frequency versus Percentage Likelihood Formats. Consumers also reacted 
differently to the likelihood formats based on stated likelihood and numerical ability. The 
low numerate perceived greater usefulness, knowledge, and trust in the frequency 
condition as compared to the percentage condition, and the opposite was true for the high 
numerate. This pattern of results, however, was only present at lower stated probability, 
possibly because people generally have more difficulty dealing with these probabilities 
and are therefore more sensitive to format. In addition, it is noteworthy that although the 
low numerate expressed higher ratings of usefulness, knowledge and trust for likelihood 
information in frequency form, they did not, on average, consistently perceive higher risk 
when presented with higher stated likelihood in frequency form. 
Percentage with Range Format. Consumers rated the percentage w/range likelihood 
format higher in usefulness, knowledge and trust when the forecast involved higher 
likelihood values (Le. best estimate 20%) as compared to lower likelihood values (Le. 
best estimate 5%). Considering the difficulty that many people have understanding low 
probabilities, ranges ofplausible likelihood values in the low probability range may not 
be useful for consumers. 
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In addition, risk perceptions in the percentage w/range condition were not as 
consistent (i.e. consistency would be higher risk perceptions for higher stated likelihood 
ranges) as risk perceptions in the percentage fonnat. Although the range fonnat actually 
provides more infonnation than the other numerical fonnats (i.e. high, low, and best 
estimates of probability), the additional infonnation may make it difficult to use the 
estimates to infonn perceived risk. For example, a particular consumer could be a 
pessimist and focus on the high end of the range when judging risk or could focus on the 
low or best estimate depending on his or her inclination. In many ways the range 
condition is superior to the point estimate fonnats, in that the consumer is also given an 
idea of the certainty that the forecaster has in the estimate. Because of the present 
interest in the risk communication and forecasting literature on sensitivity analysis and 
reporting ranges ofparameters, I focus on the percentage with range condition again in 
Studies 3 and 4. 
Study 3 - Further Investigations of Including Numerical Estimates of Likelihood and
 
Hann in Forecasts
 
Purpose 
Study 3 was designed to address two primary issues. The first issue was the direct 
comparison of purely narrative intelligence forecasts to forecasts with narrative as well as 
numerical estimates of likelihood and potential hann. Although people recommending 
probabilistic analyses often assume that providing numerical estimates is superior to 
purely narrative forecasting (e.g. Fischhoff, 2001), this has not been shown empirically in 
the intelligence domain. Providing numerical estimates of likelihood, for instance, 
should facilitate the communication of probability infonnation from analyst to consumer 
in a more accurate, consistent manner than verbal probability statements or purely 
narrative descriptions of evidence. However, as was discussed in Chapter II, numerical 
estimates of likelihood can still be affected by contextual factors (e.g. a narrative 
evidence summary accompanying a quantitative forecast), and may not be consistently 
· --- .._-_._---------­
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interpreted by different consumers. Thus, it is important to empirically explore the effects 
of including quantitative estimates in intelligence reports as compared to purely narrative 
reports. In Study 2, the verbal condition included verbal probability statements that were 
used in the place of quantitative estimates. The use of verbal labels in place of 
quantitative probability estimates is an interesting issue in its own right, but the more 
fundamental question is whether purely narrative reports (with no quantitative or verbal 
probability summary) are different from reports with quantitative estimates. 
The second issue was to more directly assess consumer's use ofnarrative and explicit 
likelihood information when forecasts include both of these information sources. 
Specifically, the goal was to determine the impact of explicit likelihood information and 
specific properties of the narrative on perceptions of likelihood. Unlike Study 2, in which 
perceived risk was the primary dependent measure, the impact of explicit likelihood and 
narrative information is related directly to perceptions of likelihood. Perceived likelihood 
and perceived potential harm are thought to be two of the sources of information that 
affect global perceptions of risk (see Model of Consumer Perceptions of Forecasts in 
Chapter III). 
Additionally, as in Study 2, both the numerical ability of the consumers and the 
format of explicit likelihood information were explored as potential moderators (see 
Model of Consumer Perceptions of Forecasts in Chapter III). Based on experimental 
results reported by Fox and Malle (1997), in which the internal or external framing ofa 
subjective probability estimate affected consumers perceptions of the forecaster, internal 
and external framing of likelihood were explored as a potential moderator variable. In 
addition to these point estimate likelihood formats, the percentage with a range format 
was explored as well. 
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Method 
Participants 
The experimental sample consisted of graduate and law students attending the 
University of Oregon. 
Procedure and Materials 
Study participants were paid $14 for approximately 1 hour of participation time. 
Participants were presented with simulated intelligence forecasts warning of a possible 
terrorist attack. Four separate terrorism scenarios were generated. The scenarios were 
very similar in terms of written length and the number and types of evidence used. 
Participants then responded to a series of questions about each scenario, filled out the 
numeracy individual difference measure and provided demographic information. All 
study procedures were passed through the University ofOregon Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). 
Experimental Design 
Unlike Study 2, this study was designed to test the specific hypotheses of interest 
with sufficient statistical power and in a manner that is more representative of the real 
environment in which consumers may view intelligence forecasts. Real consumers will 
most likely be looking at multiple intelligence forecasts in close proximity or directly 
comparing them. Therefore, a potentially better way to present the intelligence forecasts 
to consumers is in a within subject design. 
In Study 2, consumers were sensitive to the explicit likelihood information stated in 
the forecasts, although consumer numeracy and the format of the likelihood information 
moderated these effects. However, explicit likelihood was only presented at two levels 
(5% and 20%) in Study 2. To further test the sensitivity of consumers to explicit 
statements of likelihood in intelligence forecasts, and to allow more detailed analysis of 
the function relating explicit to perceived likelihood, 3 levels of likelihood (i.e. 1%, 5%, 
10%) were presented to consumers in Study 3. Since many forecasts in the intelligence 
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domain are likely to involve relatively low probability events, a lower probability range 
was used in this study. 
In addition, explicit likelihood was not presented in a frequency format in Study 3. 
Understanding likelihood as a relative frequency is very natural when one is presented 
with an event that is repeated, like the spinning of a roulette wheel. For example, stating 
the probability that a particular mental patient will commit an act of violence in the next 6 
months as 1/1 00 is clear as long as we can visualize the set to which this patient belongs: 
out of 100 mental patients with identical symptoms only 1 will commit an act of violence 
in the next 6 months. However, for many situations in which a probability value is 
assigned to a single event, a frequency representation of probability and therefore a 
frequency format is not clearly applicable. The probability of a particular act of terrorism 
becoming reality is a good example (see discussion in Chapter II). In addition, results 
from the Study 2 indicate that in the presence of a narrative description of the evidence, 
the frequency format did not elicit consistent ratings of risk (i.e. higher risk ratings for 
higher stated likelihood). 
This experiment was run as a 3 (probability format/framing) x 4 (probability level) 
mixed experimental design with probability level as the within subject factor. The four 
levels of stated probability were narrative-only (no probability), 1%, 5%, 10%. The 
probability format factor varied as follows: 1) point estimate ofprobability framed as an 
external estimate (The probability that this event will occur is ... ), 2) point estimate of 
probability framed as a rating of how confident the analysts are that the event is going to 
occur (We are x% sure that this event will occur ... ) and 3) a point estimate of the 
probability framed as an external estimate with a confidence range around the estimate 
(Our best estimate of the probability that this event will occur is x%, but the probability 
could be as low as x% or as high as x%). The third condition is a bit different from the 
other two in that it includes two pieces of information - namely, the estimated external 
probability of the event, and an interval that gives the consumer information about how 
confident the analyst is in that estimate. The wider the confidence interval the less 
confident the analyst is in their best estimate, the narrower the interval the more 
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confident. Also, the pairing of scenario to probability level as well as the order of 
presentation were randomized to control for incidental effects. 
Unlike Study 1, all of the intelligence reports were presented with a narrative 
description of the evidence supporting the forecast. For the evidence-only report, there 
was no stated probability information and there was no mention ofthe potential harm that 
could result ifthe attack were to occur. For the narrative reports in the probability 
conditions, there was a statement about the numerical probability of the event (in 
different formats depending on condition) as well as a statement about the potential threat 
or harm that would result ifthe attack were to occur. The statement about potential harm 
was held constant for all of the reports (except the narrative-only, which had no harm 
information): "If the attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would be 1000 deaths 
and injuries and 50 million dollars in property damage." Since explicit likelihood and 
potential harm were not reported in the narrative-only forecasts, any differences between 
the narrative-only and numerical forecasting conditions must be interpreted as resulting 
from the addition of both likelihood and potential harm information. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were designed to capture the perceived likelihood and 
potential harm of the forecasted terrorist plot, as well as perceptions of the usefulness and 
source credibility of the intelligence forecasts. As in Study 2, the first question asked 
about the consumer's global perceptions of risk: "How would you rate the risk associated 
with this possible attack?". In addition to this global question, separate questions were 
asked about the perceived likelihood and impressions of the overall harm or threat 
associated with the attack: "What is your impression ofthe chance that this attack will 
occur over the next 6 months?", "Focus on the potential outcome of the described 
terrorist attack. If this attack did occur, what is your impression of the overall harm that 
would be inflicted on people, property, the economy, etc?" In addition, consumers were 
asked about the perceived value or usefulness of the forecast for decision making. 
Finally, source credibility was assessed with a scale used by McComas & Trumbo 
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(200 I). This measure was used to assess how consumers generally felt about the source 
of the intelligence forecast. The source credibility scale is made up of five questions 
asking the extent to which consumers trust the conclusions of the forecast, whether they 
feel the forecast is accurate, whether it is fair, whether it tells the whole story, and 
whether it is biased. Each consumer responded to the dependent variables discussed 
above for each of the four intelligence forecasts. Consumers responded to these 
dependent variables directly after reading each intelligence forecast. 
After reading each of the four intelligence reports and responding to the dependent 
variables, the consumers were asked to make two additional ratings concerning the 
evidence described in each scenario. The narrative summary of the evidence had a strong 
influence on perceptions of the intelligence forecast presented in Study 2. In this study, 
consumers will be asked about specific aspects of the scenario information presented in 
each intelligence forecast. The first was a global rating of the overall credibility of the 
evidence, and the second was a rating of the how well the evidence could be formed into 
a coherent story. Again, these ratings were made for each of the four scenarios after the 
participants had finished the primary dependent variables. Numeracy was explored as an 
additional covariate that is stable across subjects, and the additional ratings of credibility 
and coherence were explored as time-dependent covariates (or within subject covariates). 
Participants responded to all questions on II-point rating scales. See the Appendix C for 
Dependent variables. 
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
There was a total of n=87 participants, resulting in 29 subjects in each between 
subject condition. Participants all had 4-year college degrees and the majority were 
current graduate/law students attending the University of Oregon. These advanced 
students were from a variety of departments, including biology, business, chemistry, 
computer science, economics, education, engineering, geological science, international 
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studies, law, mathematics, philosophy, physics, political science, and psychology. Tables 
8 and 9 show the sample characteristics. 
Table 8. Sample Characteristics. 
Characteristic n Mean (Median) SD 
Age 87 28.05 (27.00) 6.32 
~umeracya(0-15) 87 12.29 (13.00) 2.11 
a Distribution is moderately negatively skewed. 
Table 9. Sample Characteristics. 
Characteristic n 
Female 46 52.9 
Education (n=87) 
4yr college graduate 11 12.6 
Current Graduate or Law Student 76 87.4 
The relationships between the dependent variables were examined before proceeding 
with the formal analysis. First, reliability analysis was conducted on the five items 
making up the source credibility scale (McComas & Trumbo, 2001). Inspection of 
scatterplots for each item pair confirmed that associations between the variables were 
roughly linear in nature. Reliability analyses were conducted separately for responses at 
each level of the within subjects variable (i.e. pure narrative, and the three numerical 
forecast conditions). Both the alpha coefficients (a = .850-.887) and average inter-item 
correlations (average r = .539-.592) were sufficiently high to justify averaging the items 
to create a composite source credibility measure. 
Table 10 shows the average Pearson correlations (averaged across the four levels of 
the within subjects factor) between the dependent variables related to perceptions of 
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chance, harm and risk in Study 3. Inspection of scatterplots for each variable pair 
confirmed that all of the variables were roughly linearly related. 
Table 10. Average Pearson correlations wi 95% CI's between dependent variables 
related to risk perception (n=87). 
Risk Likelihood Harm Credibility Coherence 
Risk 1.00 
Likelihood .587 
(.710, .429) 1.00 
Harm .398 .220 1.00 
(.562, .204) (.412, .010) 
Credibilityl .351 .267 .092 1.00 
(.527, .146) (.456, .054) (.302, -.126) 
Coherencel .352 .207 .138 .601 1.00 (.528, .148) (.405, -.009) (.343, -.080) (.723, .443) 
I Four cases were missing data on this variable, n=83. 
Judging by the pattern of correlations in Table lO, global perceptions of risk were 
more strongly associated with perceptions of likelihood than perceptions ofpotential 
harm. Perceptions of the credibility and coherence of each narrative evidence summary 
are also significantly related to perceived risk. The focus of this study, however, is 
perceptions of likelihood and perceptions of global risk will not be explored further. 
Conceptually, there should be roughly zero correlation between perceived likelihood and 
harm, but a small to moderate correlation is evident in these data. Since many of the 
hypotheses involve expected changes in perceptions due to manipulations of stated 
likelihood, perceived likelihood will be the primary dependent variable. 
The ratings of story coherence and evidence credibility are highly correlated. In 
addition, coherence and credibility show small to moderate correlations with perceptions 
of likelihood. Importantly, coherence and credibility correlate only weakly with potential 
harm, which is consistent with the theoretical model presented in the Chapter II. This 
makes sense because theoretically the credibility and coherence of the evidence set is 
pertinent to the likelihood or plausibility of the event occurring, not the potential harm. 
76 
Perceived Likelihood 
The two primary goals of this study were to compare consumer perceptions of purely 
narrative intelligence forecasts to forecasts with explicit estimates of likelihood and 
potential harm, and to assess the impact of narrative and explicit likelihood information 
on consumer perceptions when both of these sources of information are available in a 
forecast. These research questions will be addressed separately below. 
Pure narrative versus numerical forecasts. Two primary research questions will be 
explored in the analysis below: 
1.	 Will pure narrative forecasts result in higher estimates of likelihood than forecasts 
with narrative and numerical estimates? Research suggests (see Chapter II) that 
people use scenario-based reasoning strategies that tend to inflate perceptions of 
likelihood when only presented with a narrative summary of the evidence relating 
to the target event. When numerical estimates of likelihood are presented, 
however, initial likelihood perceptions due to the narrative should be pulled down 
toward these numerical estimates. 
2.	 Because consumers will have more difficulty evaluating likelihood in pure 
narrative forecasts (e.g. consumers may use idiosyncratic strategies of evaluating 
likelihood) than when numerical estimates are included, consumers in the pure 
narrative condition are expected to show more variance in perceptions of 
likelihood than consumers in the numerical estimate conditions. This increased 
variance in likelihood perceptions is an indication that the transferal of likelihood 
information from analyst to consumer is not as consistent in pure narrative 
forecasts. 
Table 11 shows the effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on consumer 
perceptions of likelihood. Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences 
in the variance of likelihood ratings between the narrative-only and numerical conditions. 
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This implies that the presence of numerical estimates of likelihood and potential harm do 
not necessarily result in more consistent perceptions across consumers. Although there 
were no significant differences in the variance of likelihood ratings between the pure 
narrative and numerical forecasts, the distribution of the likelihood ratings were affected 
by the presence of the explicit numerical estimates. 
Table 11. The effect of explicit numerical estimates of likelihood and potential harm and 
uncertainty format on consumer perceptions of likelihood. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Totala 
Probability 25.60 (21. 71) 19.03 (24.78) 25.17 (25.30) 23.97 (24.83) 22.72 
(external) TB=J2.99 TB=5.52 TB=8.20 TB=9.71 TB=10.09 
Probability 28. 62 (24.7J) 22.33 (24.77) 23.10 (22.66) 26.90 (23.77) 24.11 
(internal) TBc=26.9U TB=3.22 TB=5.00 TB=8.74 TB=19.40 
Probability 30.00 (22.4-1) 24.60 (21.55) 22.76 (20.47) 26.38 (20.13) 24.58 
w/range T1328.82 TB=21.85 TB=13.06 TB=24.08 TB=20.09 
Total 28.07 TB=24.97 
21.99 
TB=4.87 
23.68 
TB=7.43 
25.75 
TB=14.57 
Note: There are n=29 participant ratings per cell, with N=87 total. Participants responded on a 0-100%
 
scale. Mean (SD) and Tukey's Biweight (TB) robust measures of central tendency are reported above.
 
Tukey's Biweight measures of central tendency provide a more robust measure of location than the mean in
 
cases of extreme skewness and/or kurtosis (Wilcox, 2005).
 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability format are made up of only those
 
observations in the numerical conditions. The responses in the pure narrative condition were not included
 
in these means because there was no explicit likelihood information present in this condition. This is
 
necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed.
 
Figure 12 shows the distributions of consumer likelihood ratings for the narrative 
only condition and each level of stated likelihood by likelihood format. In the narrative 
condition (which was identical for each level of likelihood format because no likelihood 
information was displayed), the distributions are slightly positively skewed, indicating 
that ratings tended to bunch up slightly at the low end of the probability scale. For these 
distributions, the mean estimates presented in Table 11 are likely to be good measures of 
the central tendency of the distributions. This is confirmed when comparing the mean to 
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the Tukey's Biweight robust measure of central tendency. Robust measures of central 
tendency give better estimates of central tendency in distributions with severe skewness 
and/or kurtosis. 
Figure 12. Boxplots showing the distribution of likelihood ratings at each level of 
likelihood and likelihood format. 
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However, inspection of the boxplots for the numerical forecasting conditions reveals 
extreme positive skewness, particularly for the internal and external point estimate 
formats. For these distributions the mean is pulled sharply toward the outliers at the high 
end of the likelihood scale and is not a representative measure of central tendency. This 
is evident by comparing the means with the robust estimates of central tendency in Table 
11 for these distributions. The means for these distributions are not appropriate measures 
of location. 
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This pattern of results shows that the manipulations ofprobability format and 
probability level not only changed the central tendency of the distributions but also the 
shape of the distributions. In addition, the shape of the pure narrative and numerical 
forecasting distributions are drastically different, making it very difficult to compare the 
means of these distributions or use any mean based statistical methods to compare the 
groups. For example, looking at the pattern ofmeans in Table 11 paints a different 
picture than the pattern of robust measures of central tendency, the later of which is a 
more accurate representation of location in the distributions. Because of the complexity 
introduced by the pattern of distributional changes, bootstrapping methods based on 
robust measures of central tendency were used to compare the pure narrative and the 
numerical forecasting conditions (Wilcox, 2005)5. 
It was hypothesized that the pure narrative condition would result in higher ratings of 
perceived likelihood than the numerical conditions, particularly in the point estimate 
conditions. Inspection of the robust measures of central tendency in Table 11 shows a 
large difference between the narrative and numerical condition in the point estimate 
conditions (probability and confidence), and a smaller difference in the range conditions. 
In the point estimate conditions (average ofprobability and confidence), the narrative 
elicited substantially higher likelihood ratings than the 1% (Diff = 20.77, 95%CI: 1.28, 
26.67),5% (Diff= 17.32, 95%CI: -4.69, 24.14), and 10% (Diff= 16.01, 95%CI: -2.60, 
21.84) numerical conditions. In the range condition the differences between the narrative 
and numerical conditions were much smaller, 1% (Diff= 7.01, 95%CI: -0.76, 24.64), 5% 
(Diff= 14.38, 95%CI: 2.62, 24.82), and 10% (Diff= 5.18, 95%CI: -4.96, 18.28)6. 
5 It is difficult to transform the distributions of likelihood ratings to a more normal shape because the 
skewness is not consistent across the distributions. For example, a log transformation to correct the 
skewness of the likelihood ratings at one condition will bias distributions that are relatively normal in the 
opposite direction, and since all of the scales on the repeated measures factor must be consistent, different 
transformation cannot be applied to different distributions. 
6 In general, bootstrap methods tend to be less powerful as compared to standard mean-based statistics, and 
although the differences reported are substantial in magnitude, some comparisons were not significant at 
alpha=.05 (although all p's<.10). These same comparisons were also conducted with standard mean-based 
methods, and although the mean is not an accurate measure of location in these distributions (discussed 
above), all group comparisons were significant at alpha=.05. 
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Overall, pure narrative forecasts resulted in greater consumer perceptions oflikelihood 
than forecasts with 1%, 5%, and 10% numerical likelihood estimates. This suggests that 
consumers were sensitive to the explicit likelihood information in the forecasts and they, 
consequently, lowered their ratings of likelihood from what would be estimated from the 
narrative information alone. In the next section, precisely how consumers used both the 
explicit likelihood and narrative information is explored in more detail. 
The impact ofexplicit likelihood and narrative information on perceptions of 
likelihood Several research questions are explored in this section: 
1.	 In the presence of a narrative evidence summary, to what extent will 
consumers use the explicit likelihood information to inform their perceptions 
of likelihood? Forecasts that include higher explicit estimates of likelihood 
should result in higher perceived likelihood on the part of consumers. 
2.	 In the presence of explicit numerical estimates of likelihood, to what extent 
will consumers use the coherence and credibility of the evidence in the 
narrative summary to inform their perceptions oflikelihood? Consumers that 
perceive greater coherence and credibility in the narrative summary will 
perceive greater likelihood. 
3.	 To what extent will the format of the likelihood information moderate the 
effect of explicit likelihood and narrative information on perceptions of 
likelihood? 
•	 Does presenting the likelihood as an internal confidence rating as 
compared to an external likelihood affect consumer's sensitivity to this 
information? 
•	 Consumers may show less sensitivity to the explicit likelihood information 
when likelihood is presenting with a range ofplausible value. The results 
from Study 2 suggest that this may be the case. 
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4. To what extent will consumer numeracy moderate the effect of explicit 
likelihood and narrative information on perceptions of likelihood? 
•	 Consumers lower in numeracy may not be as sensitive to numerical 
likelihood information and may focus more on the narrative summary 
when making likelihood judgments. The opposite may be true for 
consumers higher in numeracy. 
Explicit likelihood: One of the primary research questions in this study was how 
consumers used the explicit likelihood information to inform their perceptions of 
likelihood. For example, if consumers completely ignored the scenario information and 
directly translated the explicit likelihood estimates to their rated perceptions oflikelihood 
(Le. 1% stated, 1% reported; 5% stated, 5% reported, etc), the slope relating stated to 
perceived likelihood should be roughly equal to 1 (assuming that consumers were using 
the best estimate in the point estimate w/range format). This assumes, however, that 
participants were using the rating scale as a percentage likelihood scale, and they were 
not using it as a more generic scale in which they tried to scale their feelings of likelihood 
in terms of relative magnitude7. Examination of the distributions of the likelihood ratings 
in Figure 5.11 shows that consumers were clearly not directly translating stated 
likelihood into rated perceived likelihood. The linear function relating stated likelihood 
to rated perceived likelihood had an intercept = 21.58 and a slope = 0.417 (significantly 
different from b = 1, P < .05). 
It is clear that consumers were not directly translating stated likelihood into perceived 
likelihood. This either indicates that these consumers were interpreting the probability 
scale appropriately (0-100% chance) and they were simply using other information from 
the forecast to make their likelihood ratings, or they were not using the probability scale 
in the strict sense and simply using it as a generic rating scale, in which they tried to scale 
7 In addition, the likelihood rating scale was presented in 5-point steps (Le. 0-5-10-15 etc), and although 
many consumers reported values between the steps (e.g. 1%), the crudeness of the scale may have affected 
how consumers reported perceptions of likelihood. 
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their feelings of likelihood in terms of relative magnitude. However, even if consumers 
were using the rating scale as a generic scale in which they tried to scale their feelings of 
likelihood, they should still make ordinal differentiations between the levels of stated 
likelihood. One would expect a 10% stated likelihood to be rated higher than a 5% stated 
likelihood which would be rated higher than a 1% likelihood. Thus, even if consumers 
were not all using the likelihood rating scale in the same way, the extent to which 
consumers adhere to a monotonic relationship between stated and perceived likelihood 
will be an indication of their sensitivity to the stated likelihood information. 
Only 39.08% of consumers showed a consistent monotonic relationship among their 
rated perceptions of likelihood as stated likelihood increased8• Thus, approximately 60% 
of the consumers in this sample were not consistently perceiving higher likelihood as the 
stated likelihood increased. Perhaps the stated likelihood values of 1% and 5% were too 
small and close together to be distinguished by many consumers, and the requirement for 
sensitivity to the explicit likelihood should be loosened even more - namely, that only a 
stated likelihood of 10% must result in higher perceptions of likelihood than a stated 
likelihood of 1%. A much larger percentage of consumers, 67.82%, perceived greater 
likelihood in forecasts with a 10% stated likelihood as compared to a 1% stated 
likelihood. Although the consumers were, to some extent, using stated likelihood to 
inform their perceptions of likelihood, they appeared to be using other information as 
well. In the next section, the extent to which consumers also use the properties of the 
narrative evidence summary to inform their perceptions of likelihood is explored. Also 
of interest are the potential moderating effects of the format of the likelihood information 
and consumer numeracy level. 
8 As discussed above, the likelihood rating scale was presented to consumers in 5-point intervals (Le. 0%­
5-10-15, etc). Although some consumers reported values in between these 5-point intervals (e.g. 1%), this 
crude measurement scale may have affected ratings of perceived likelihood. For example, a consumer may 
have tried to directly translate stated likelihood (e.g.! %,5%,10%) to rated perceived likelihood, but 
because there was not an explicit 1% on the rating scale, he or she may have reported 5%, 5%,10%. Thus, 
if a consumer reported this pattern of likelihood ratings they were given credit for having made an ordinal 
differentiation (Le. monotonic function) among the levels of stated likelihood. 
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Explicit likelihood and narrative information: The next set of hypotheses were 
tested in the context of several multilevel mixed models, with the repeated measures 
represented at level 1 (i.e. within subject manipulations and covariates varying within 
subjects), and the between-subject data represented at level 2 (i.e. between subject 
manipulations, and subject-level covariates). See Appendix E for statistical details 
concerning the multilevel models used to estimate effects in Study 3 and Study 4. 
The primary goals of this analysis are to test the hypothesized effects of stated 
likelihood information and properties of the narrative summary on perceptions of 
likelihood. In addition, the potentially moderating influence of likelihood format and 
consumer numeracy will be explored. These hypothesized relationships were discussed 
in Chapter III (see Model of Consumer Perceptions of Intelligence Forecasts). The direct 
effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood has already been discussed above, 
although in these analyses likelihood format and numeracy will be explored as 
moderators of this effect. In these analyses, the effect of stated likelihood is represented 
as the linear slope across the stated probability levels (higher order polynomial effects 
were not significant), which indexes the extent to which consumers perceived greater 
likelihood as stated likelihood increased. As noted above, credibility and coherence 
ratings were highly correlated with one another, and including them in the multilevel 
models resulted in moderate multicollinearity problems. Several models were fit with 
coherence and credibility modeled separately, and the results were comparable. On the 
basis of the similar pattern of relationships between the variables and model parsimony, 
the credibility and coherence ratings were averaged to create a composite variable that 
will be called "evidence properties". This composite variable can be conceptualized as 
the extent to which each consumer found the evidence in each scenario to be credible and 
coherent. In addition, the likelihood ratings were log transformed in all analyses to 
reduce the skewness problems discussed above. 
In the first model, ratings of perceived likelihood were modeled as a function of 
stated likelihood and likelihood format. The linear function relating stated likelihood to 
perceived likelihood was positive, as detailed above, and significantly different from 0, 
--
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slope = 0.239, t(255) = 3.996, p < .001, ES = .539. The primary goal of this analysis, 
however, was to test if the format of the likelihood information moderated this effect. 
The likelihood format did reliably explain some of the variance in the slopes relating 
stated to perceived likelihood, t(255) = -1.859, p = .06, ES = .16, such that consumers in 
the range condition showed flatter slopes than consumers in the point estimate conditions 
(i.e. internal and external point estimates). Consumers in the range condition showed less 
differentiation between the levels of stated likelihood. There were no significant 
differences between the internal and external point estimate conditions. Figure 13 shows 
the effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood for the point estimate and range 
conditions. 
Figure 13. The effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood for the point estimate 
and range conditions. 
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Stated Likelihood 
This result demonstrates that stated likelihood had a larger linear effect on perceived 
likelihood in the point estimate conditions than in the range condition. Overall, however, 
there was still quite a bit of variability in perceived likelihood that was not accounted for 
9 See Appendix E for discussion of the effect size metric used for the HLM results. 
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by stated likelihood or likelihood format. In the next set of models the coherence and 
credibility of the narrative evidence and individual differences in numeracy were added 
as further predictors ofperceived likelihood. 
In the full model, perceptions of likelihood were modeled as a function of stated 
probability and perceptions of credibility and coherence of the narrative summary at the 
first level. At the second level, contrasts comparing the likelihood format conditions and 
consumer numeracy were added. Table 12 shows the results for the full multilevel 
model. Each effect will be described in more detail below. 
The first hypothesis tested was that consumer perceptions of the credibility and 
coherence of the narrative evidence summary would relate to perceptions of the 
likelihood of the target event. Higher ratings of coherence and credibility were found to 
relate to higher perceived likelihood, t(237) = 4.740, P < .001, ES = 1.06. As above, 
there was also a significant linear effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood, 
t(237) = 3.245, P = .002, ES = 0.54. These results suggest that the perceived properties of 
the narrative evidence had a larger effect on perceived likelihood than the manipulations 
of stated likelihood (i.e. 1%, 5%, 10%). 
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Table 12. Multilevel model results for perceived likelihood. 
Fixed Effect Coefficient SE t p-value 
Mean likelihood (Intercept) 
Mean intercept (Intercept) 2.64 0.09 29.10 <.001 
Range vs Point estimates 0.10 0.06 1.583 .117 
Prob vs Confidence 0.05 0.11 0.430 .668 
Numeracy -0.15 0.05 -2.90 .005 
Stated Likelihood (Slope) 
Mean slope (Intercept) 0.17 0.05 3.245 .002 
Range vs Point estimates -0.04 0.03 -1.383 .168 
Prob vs Confidence -0.04 0.07 -0.601 .548 
Numeracy 0.10 0.02 4.162 <.001 
Evidence Properties (Slope) 
Mean slope (Intercept) 0.15 0.03 4.740 <.001 
Range vs Point estimates -0.04 0.02 -2.237 .026 
Prob vs Confidence 0.04 0.04 1.030 .305 
Numeracy -0.03 0.01 -2.095 .037 
Note: The three levels of likelihood fonnat were tested as two orthogonal helmert contrasts. Contrast I 
compared the range condition to the average of the two point estimate conditions. Contrast 2 compared the 
two point estimate conditions to each other (probability as an external estimate versus probability as an 
internal, subjective confidence statement). 
In addition, the format of the likelihood information significantly moderated the 
effect of evidence properties on perceived likelihood. Consumers in the point estimate 
conditions used the evidence properties to rate perceived likelihood more than the 
consumers in the range condition, t(237) = -2.237, P = .037, ES = 0.23. This is counter to 
expectation, in that one might expect the consumers to use the evidence properties more 
in the range condition because there was no single probability from which to judge 
likelihood. In fact, previous research has suggested that when presented with a 
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confidence range, participants are more likely to ignore that information and focus on 
other information to make the judgment at hand. Figure 14 shows the effect of 
perceptions of coherence and credibility on perceived likelihood for consumers in the 
point estimate and range conditions. 
Figure 14. The relationship between perceived credibility/coherence and perceived 
likelihood for consumers in the point estimate and range conditions. 
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The Effect ofNumeracy: Participants higher in numeracy reported greater levels of 
perceived likelihood, t(79) = -2.902, P = .005, ES = .37. In Study 2, a similar relationship 
was observed between numeracy and perceived risk. Numeracy also moderated the 
effect of the stated likelihood and the evidence properties on perceived likelihood. The 
effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood was smaller for consumers lower in 
numerical ability, t(237) = 4.162, P < .001, ES = .56, and the relationship between the 
ratings of the evidence and perceived likelihood was higher for consumers lower in 
numeracy, t(237) = -2.095, P = .037, ES = .22. These results suggest that consumers 
lower in numeracy were more sensitive to the perceived properties of the narrative 
---------------
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information and less sensitive to the stated probability information, which follows if the 
stated probability information was not as evaluable and more difficult to use for those 
lower in numerical ability. Figures 15 and 16 show the effects of stated likelihood and 
evidence properties on perceived likelihood for consumers with different levels of 
numeracy. 
Figure 15. The effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood for consumers with 
different levels of numeracy. 
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Figure 16. The relationship between perceived credibility/coherence and perceived 
likelihood for consumers with different levels of numeracy. 
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Credibility and Coherence 
Perceived usefulness and source credibility 
The primary research questions concerning perceived usefulness and source 
credibility are presented below: 
1.	 Will consumers feel that a forecast is more useful and has higher source 
credibility when explicit numerical estimates of likelihood and potential harm 
are presented? 
2.	 Will consumers feel that a forecast is more useful and has higher source 
credibility when they perceive there to be greater coherence and credibility in 
the narrative evidence summary? 
3.	 Will the format of the likelihood information affect perceived usefulness and 
source credibility? 
4.	 Will numeracy affect the perceived usefulness and source credibility of 
intelligence forecasts? 
90 
The source credibility composite measure and perceptions of usefulness showed a 
moderate to strong correlation, r = .534, 95% CI (.669, .364). Perceived usefulness and 
source credibility are modeled separately belowlO• 
Perceived Usefulness. Ratings of perceived usefulness, or how valuable the 
intelligence forecasts were for decision making, were modeled as a function of stated 
likelihood, likelihood format, perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the narrative 
and numeracy. As expected, the pure narrative condition elicited lower perceived 
usefulness than the numerical conditions, t(319) = -1.978, P = .048, ES = .23, and the 
internal (confidence) likelihood format tended to elicit lower levels ofusefulness than the 
probability and range conditions combined, t(79) = -1.735, P = .086, ES = .17. 
Additionally, as hypothesized, consumers who rated the evidence set as more coherent 
and credible reported higher levels ofperceived usefulness, t(319) = 11.950, P < .001, ES 
= 2.78. Finally, consumers higher in numeracy reported lower levels ofperceived 
usefulness than consumers lower in numeracy, t(79) = -2.623, p = .011, ES = .30. 
10 Since these two variables are correlated, a multivariate analytic framework would be ideal for this 
analysis. Since multivariate multilevel models are still relatively new and difficult to estimate at this point, 
other analyses were conducted to assess the independent effects of these variables (Le. removing the shared 
variance). For example, a separate multilevel model was estimated for the residualized source credibility 
measure (i.e. the variance in the source credibility measure that could not be explained by perceived value, 
acquired by regressing source credibility on perceived value and saving the residuals). There were no 
substantive differences between the results with the residualized variables and the results with the full 
variables reported below. 
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Table 13. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived usefulness. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Totala 
Probability 4.36 (2.60) 4.64 (2.54) 4.93 (2.51) 4.57 (2.28) 4.71
 
(external) tF=28 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=28
 
,., ~ ~ --) Of)Probability .,.)) ~"-' ) 3.83 (2.29) 4.45 (2.05) 4.45 (2.18) 4.24
 
(internal) n'29 n=29 n=29 n=29 n=29
 
Probability 4.93 (1.98) 4.93 (1.72) 4.61 (1.64) 4.82 (1.63) 4.78
 
w/range n:::::28 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=28
 
4.27 4.46 4.66 4.61Total 
n=85 n=85 n=85 n=85 
Note: Mean (SD) and sample size (n) are reported. 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability format are made up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. In other words, the responses in the pure narrative condition 
were not included in these means because there was no explicit probability information present in this 
condition. This is necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed. 
Source Credibility. Perceived source credibility was modeled as a function of stated 
likelihood, likelihood format, perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the narrative 
and numeracy. The first hypothesis tested was that consumers would perceive greater 
source credibility in the numerical forecasting conditions as opposed to the pure narrative 
condition. There was virtually no difference between these conditions (see Table 14). 
The next hypothesis was confirmed, that consumers who perceived greater coherence and 
credibility in the evidence set would also perceive greater overall source credibility, 
t(322) = 9.847, P < .001, ES =1.84. Individual differences in numeracy were not 
significantly related to perceptions of source credibility. 
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Table 14. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived source 
credibility. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Totalft 
Probability 5.23 (1.74) 5.18 (1.96) 5.60 (1.80) 5.11 (2.00) 5.30 
(external) n''''':28 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=28 
Probability 4.78 (2.06) 5.20 (2.02) 4.92 (1.97) 5.14 (2.14) 5.09 
(internal) n=29 n=29 n=29 n=29 n=29 
Probability 5.29 (1.59) 5.08 (1.50) 4.77 (1.48) 4.98 (1.48) 4.94 
w/range noc::28 n=28 n=28 n=28 n=28 
5.09 5.16 5.10 5.08Total 
n=85 n=85 n=85 n=85 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability format are make up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. In other words, the responses in the pure narrative condition 
were not included in these means because there was no explicit probability information present in this 
condition. This is necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed. 
Summary and Discussion 
Overall, the results from this experiment reveal important differences in likelihood 
perception and perceptions ofusefulness and source credibility between narrative-only 
forecasts and those with explicit probability and potential harm information added to the 
narrative forecast. In addition, when presented with both narrative and numerical 
information with which to judge likelihood and harm, consumers appeared to be more 
greatly affected by their perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the narrative than 
the explicit likelihood information (narrative, ES = 1.06; stated likelihood, ES = 0.54), 
and these effects were moderated by the format of the probability information and the 
numerical ability of the consumer. 
Pure narrative forecasts versus numericalforecasts 
There are two potential communication problems when communicating risk 
information from analyst to consumer. The first is that different consumers may not 
perceive the same levels of likelihood or risk in a forecast (i.e. there will be large amount 
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ofvariance in judgment), and the second is that consumers may be systematically biased 
in their judgments (e.g. consistently perceiving more likelihood or risk than the analyst 
intended). It was hypothesized that the presence of explicit estimates oflikelihood would 
facilitate more consistent transfer of likelihood information from analyst to consumer and 
reduce the idiosyncratic ways in which likelihood is estimated from a narrative evidence 
summary. Contrary to expectation, there were no differences in the variance of 
likelihood ratings between the pure narrative and numerical forecasting conditions, 
although there were other effects on central tendency and the shape of the distributions of 
likelihood ratings. The narrative-only condition resulted in higher estimates of likelihood 
than the numerical forecasting conditions. Presumably, when given only narrative 
information with which to judge risk or likelihood, estimates tend to be inflated due to the 
scenario-based reasoning processes that pure narrative forecasts elicit. For example, 
consumers may judge the likelihood of the target event by the plausibility of the terrorist 
scenario, using representative and simulation type heuristics that overwhelm statistical 
thinking about the problem (discussed in Chapter II). When given the explicit numerical 
likelihood and harm information, however, these figures act as an anchor or frame with 
which to judge the likelihood of the scenario. Thus, consumers initial perceptions of 
likelihood based on the narrative summary of the evidence were pulled down toward the 
explicit likelihood estimates presented in the forecast. In addition, and as expected, 
forecasts with only a narrative summary were judged as less useful for decision making 
than forecasts with numerical estimates of likelihood and potential harm. 
The relationship between stated likelihood andperceived likelihood 
We have seen that consumers were sensitive to the explicit likelihood information in 
the forecasts, but how did they use this information to inform their perceptions of 
likelihood? It is clear from examining the distributions of perceived likelihood that the 
majority of consumers were not directly transferring stated likelihood into perceived 
likelihood. One would expect, however, that the explicit likelihood estimates presented 
by the analyst were at least differentiated in an ordinal fashion in consumer's perceptions 
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of likelihood. However, only 39.08% of consumers showed a monotonic relationship 
between stated and perceived likelihood (Le. perceptions likelihood for stated 
10%>5%>1%), and 67.82% of consumers showed greater perceptions of likelihood for 
forecasts with 10% stated likelihood as opposed to 1% stated likelihood. In addition, the 
general trend for consumers to perceive greater likelihood as the stated likelihood 
increased was moderated by the format of the likelihood information. This effect was 
stronger in the point estimate conditions then in the range condition. Presumably, in the 
point estimate condition there is a single number that consumers could use to inform 
perceptions of likelihood, while in the range condition this was not the case. In summary, 
consumers were sensitive to the explicit likelihood information presented in the forecasts, 
although many consumers appeared to be using other information to inform their 
perceptions of likelihood as well. 
The effect ofboth statedprobability andproperties ofthe narrative summary 
Even in the presence of explicit likelihood estimates, consumers that perceived 
greater coherence and credibility in the narrative summary reported greater perceptions of 
likelihood. In fact, perceptions of credibility and coherence had a larger effect on 
perceived likelihood than the manipulation of stated likelihood (l%, 5%, 10%). In 
addition, higher perceived coherence and credibility also related to higher perceived 
usefulness and source credibility of the forecast. 
This result fits in well with previous research showing that the interpretation of 
numerical expressions of likelihood are affected by contextual information (Windschitl 
and colleagues, see Chapter II). Even though one might expect numerical expressions of 
likelihood to be unambiguously interpreted because they are precise, many consumers 
have trouble evaluating these estimates to inform their perceptions of likelihood. In this 
case, consumers also used the narrative evidence summary to inform their perceptions of 
likelihood. In addition, one might expect consumers who are better able to evaluate 
numerical estimates of likelihood to use the stated likelihood estimates and be less 
affected by the narrative evidence summary. Conversely, consumers who have difficulty 
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evaluating numbers will not be able to use the stated likelihood to inform their 
perceptions of likelihood and will focus more on other contextual information like the 
narrative evidence summary. The results showed precisely this effect. Consumers lower 
in numeracy tended to use the narrative evidence summary to judge likelihood and 
showed less sensitivity to the stated likelihood information. Consumers higher in 
numeracy showed the opposite pattern. 
Other effects oflikelihoodformat 
Consumers presented with the probability point estimates showed a larger 
relationship between ratings of the narrative evidence and likelihood judgments than 
those presented with the range condition. This result was contrary to expectation. 
Previous research suggests that when participants are presented with a range of values, 
they will tend to ignore the information and use other more easily evaluated information 
to make the judgment at hand (Hsee, 1995; see Chapter II). In this case, one might 
expect that consumers would be more likely to use the narrative information in the range 
condition as compared to the point estimates conditions. It fact, it appears that consumers 
were less influenced by their perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the evidence 
in the range condition. 
In addition, when probabilities were expressed as a confidence rating (i.e. " ...we are 
x% sure that this attack will occur over the next six months), consumers found them to be 
less valuable than when they were presented as external probabilities (i.e. " ... the 
probability of this attack occurring over the next six months is x%") or as external 
probabilities with a range. 
Study 4 - Exploring Consumer Perceptions of Intelligence Forecasts in Hindsight. 
Purpose 
The primary focus of Study 4 is to explore how consumers feel about the source 
credibility and usefulness of intelligence forecasts in hindsight, and to what extent 
consumers assign blame to forecasters after knowing the outcome of a forecasted event. 
96 
Of particular interest are the types of information that consumers use to make source 
credibility, usefulness, and blame judgments in hindsight. For example, when evaluating 
a forecast in hindsight, will consumers still be sensitive to the stated likelihood 
information and credibility and coherence ofthe narrative evidence summary? 
One ofthe factors that might make the intelligence community reluctant to attach 
numerical probability estimates to their analytic judgments is that they feel they could be 
more readily blamed if a forecasted low likelihood event occurs or a high likelihood 
event does not occur. For example, consumers may blame the analyst for providing a 
poor forecast if an event assigned a likelihood of 5% occurs. The analysts may feel more 
insulated from blame if they keep things vague and non-falsifiable, which could be one 
reason why current intelligence reporting is primarily narrative in nature (Schrage, 2005). 
When forecasting potential terrorist threats, it seems that an analyst would be more 
afraid of the perceived "error" in which they make a forecast with a low probability and 
then the attack occurs. The opposite "error", a high probability forecast of an attack that 
does not occur, would likely receive less attention precisely because the feared event did 
not occur. In this study, the focus is on consumer perceptions of intelligence reports in 
which an analyst assigns a relatively low probability to an event that eventually does 
occur within the specified timeframe of the forecast. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were a mix ofundergraduate students from the University ofOregon and 
members of the community with undergraduate college degrees. 
Procedure and Materials 
Study participants were paid $14 for approximately 1 hour ofparticipation time. 
Participants were presented with the same simulated intelligence reports used in Study 2 
(see Appendix D for materials). In this study, however, consumers first read a brief 
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passage about a terrorist attack that occurred a few weeks ago. A passage from one of the 
scenarios is presented below: 
"Summary of the attack: 
Several weeks ago, a bomb was detonated on a passenger ship in New 
York City killing over 900 people and wounding hundreds more. It has 
become clear that militant group ZZZ was responsible for the attack. The 
attack would most likely have been stopped if additional security had been 
assigned to protect targets in New York City. A special congressional 
committee has been formed and several politicians have begun criticizing 
the intelligence community. 
Turn to the next page to read an intelligence report that was 
submitted to senior decision makers three weeks before this attack. You 
will then be asked to make a series ofjudgments about this intelligence 
report." 
Participants then read an intelligence report that was written a few weeks before 
the attack occurred. They then made a series ofjudgments about the report. All study 
procedures were passed through the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board 
(lRB). 
~xperi1nentallJesign 
This experiment was run as a 3 (probability format/framing) x 4 (probability level) 
mixed experimental design with probability level as the within subject factor. The 
experimental design was identical to the design used in Study 3. 
lJependent variables 
For the most part, the dependent variables were identical to Study 3, although in this 
study they are framed in hindsight (see Appendix D). However, there was one additional 
question that asked participants to rate the amount ofblame that they felt the forecasters 
deserved - "Think about both the intelligence report and the terrorist attack that occurred 
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three weeks later. Some people are blaming the intelligence community for not doing a 
goodjob predicting whether this attack would occur. How much blame do you think 
should be placed on the analysts that produced the intelligence report?" Participants 
responded to all questions on II-point rating scales. 
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
There was a total of n=81 participants, resulting in 27 subjects in each between 
subject condition. The majority of the participants were undergraduate students, although 
approximately 25% were either current graduate students or had 4-year college degrees. 
Tables 15 and 16 show the sample characteristics. 
Table 15. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic n Mean (Median) SD 
Agea 80 23.43 (21.00) 7.73 
~umeracyb(0-15) 81 11.43 (12.00) 2.20 
a One participant did not report age. 
b Distribution is moderately negatively skewed. 
Table 16. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic n % 
Femalea 40 49.4 
Educationa (n=80) 
Some College 60 74.1 
4yr college graduate 18 22.2 
Current Graduate/Law Student 2 2.5 
a There was one case that did not indicate sex or education level. 
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Before proceeding with the formal analysis, the relationships between the dependent 
variables were examined. First, reliability analysis was conducted on the five items 
making up the source credibility scale (McComas, 2001). Reliability analyses were 
conducted separately for responses at each level of the within subjects variable (i.e. pure 
narrative, and the three numerical forecast conditions), and as in Study 3, both the alpha 
coefficients (a = .839-.903) and average inter-item correlations (average r = .523-.668) 
were sufficiently high to justify averaging the items to create a composite source 
credibility measure. 
Table 17 shows the average correlations (averaged across the four levels of the within 
subjects factor) between perceived blame, perceived value, and source credibility. Table 
18 shows the average Pearson correlations between the dependent variables related to 
perceptions of likelihood, potential harm and risk. Inspection of scatterplots for each 
variable pair confirmed that all of the variables were roughly linearly related. 
Table 17. Average Pearson correlations wi 95% CI's between blame, usefulness, and 
source credibility (n=81). 
Blame Usefulness Source Cred 
Blame 1.00 
Usefulness .092 
(304, -.129) 1.00 
Source Cred -.157 .586 1.00 
(064, -.363) (713, .422) 
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Table 18. Average Pearson correlations wi 95% CI's between dependent variables 
related to risk perception (n=87). 
Risk Chance Harm Credibility Coherence 
Risk 1.00 
Chance .683 
(.784, .546) 1.00 
Harm .487 .360 1.00 
(.638, .301) (.536, .154) 
Credibilityl .519 .420 .220 1.00 
(.664, .337) (.585, .222) (.418, .002) 
Coherencel .462 .357 .205 .733 1.00 
(.619, .270) (.534, .150) (.405, -.014) (.820, .613) 
I Two cases were missing data on this variable, n=79. 
Overall, the pattern of correlations is roughly consistent with those reported in Study 
3. Again, perceived likelihood was more highly correlated with global perceptions of 
risk than perceptions ofpotential harm. In addition, there was a small to moderate 
correlation between perceived likelihood and perceived harm. 
The ratings of story coherence and evidence credibility are highly correlated, and 
coherence and credibility show moderate correlations with perceptions of chance, which 
is consistent with the theoretical model presented in Chapter III. As in Study 3, 
coherence and credibility show smaller correlations with perceived potential harm. 
Finally, the correlation between perceived usefulness and source credibility was 
consistent with the pattern observed in Study 3. Perceived blame was not significantly 
correlated with the other perception variables. 
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Perceived Blame 
Several research questions were explored below: 
1.	 The primary comparison of interest is between the pure narrative and 
numerical estimate conditions. Will the purely narrative forecast elicit less 
blame than a forecast with a low probability estimate assigned to an event that 
eventually occurs? 
2.	 Within the numerical forecasting conditions, consumers may assign more 
blame the lower the estimated probability of the attack, perceiving these 
forecasts to be more "wrong". 
3.	 The probability point estimate (which appears more precise) may elicit more 
blame than the point estimate with range. In addition, consistent with 
previous research (Fox and Malle, 1995), participants may assign more blame 
when the probability point estimate is framed as a confidence rating (internal) 
as opposed to an external probability. 
4.	 Participants may also use their perceptions of the credibility and coherence of 
the narrative evidence summary to inform their perceptions of blame. 
Table 19 shows the effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceptions of 
blame. The distributions of perceived blame ratings were not skewed, and there were no 
missing data. 
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Table 19. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceptions of blame. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% TotalS 
Probability 5.19 (3.07) 5.19 (2.40) 5.11 (2.55) 4.85 (2.43) 5.05 
(external) n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 4.17 (2.97) 5.13 (2.50) 4.80 (2.63) 4.41 (2.31) 4.78 
(internal) ll'c=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 4.67 (3.17) 4.69 (2.64) 3.70 (2.33) 4.04 (2.78) 4.14 
w/range n::::::27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
4.67 5.00 4.54 4.43Total 
n=81 n=81 n=81 n=81 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability fonnat are made up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. 
Effects ofexplicit likelihood The analysis proceeded in a similar manner as Study 2, 
in which multilevel models were used to model the effect ofthe experimental 
manipulations, perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the evidence summary and 
numeracy. The first research question of interest was whether perceived blame differed 
between the pure narrative and the average of the numerical forecasting conditions. 
There was no significance difference between these conditions in terms ofperceived 
blame. Within the numerical forecasting conditions, however, there was a significant 
linear trend across the probability levels, t(237) = -1.974, P = .049, ES = .48, such that 
consumers reported less blame as stated likelihood increased. The numerical probability 
information was perceived as a relevant source of information for judging blame, and 
they were interpreting the forecasts with the lower probabilities as more "wrong". 
Effects oflikelihoodformat. There was also a trend for consumers to report less 
blame in the range condition than in the two point estimate conditions, t(78) = -1.661, P = 
.10, ES = .14. However, since consumers were sensitive to the stated likelihood 
information when making judgments of blame, this effect may be due to the fact that the 
range format provided a range that included higher estimates of likelihood (e.g. in the 
10% condition it ranged to as much as 30% at the high end). However, the range 
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condition elicited lower perceived blame even as compared to point estimates that 
equaled the high end of the provided range (e.g. compare the mean blame in the point 
estimate conditions for 10% with the mean blame in the 5% condition for the range 
conditions, which provided the following interval, High: 10%, Best: 5%, Low: 1%). In 
other words, the observed difference between the point estimate and range conditions 
cannot be fully explained by the range format providing higher estimates of probability 
within the provided intervals. In addition, there were no significant differences in 
perceived blame between the internal and external framing of likelihood, t(78) = 0.491, P 
= .625. 
Evidence properties, perceived harm, and numeracy. Contrary to expectation, ratings 
of the coherence and credibility of the narrative evidence did not significantly relate to 
perceived blame, t(308) = -1.309, p = .192. However, perceptions of potential harm were 
significantly related to perceptions of blame, t(308) = 2.883, P = .005, ES = .55, such that 
greater perceptions of harm were associated with greater ratings of blame. Numeracy had 
an overall effect on perceived blame, t(77) = -2.399, P = .019. ES = .29, such that 
consumers lower in numeracy reported that more blame should be placed on the analysts. 
Perceived Usefulness and Source Credibility 
The research questions explored in this section are detailed below: 
1.	 When examining an intelligence forecast in hindsight, will participants 
perceive different levels of usefulness and/or source credibility between 
reports with only narrative versus those with numerical estimates? 
2.	 Will consumers be sensitive to the stated likelihood and properties of the 
narrative summary when judging usefulness and source credibility in 
hindsight? 
3.	 Will numeracy or the format of the stated likelihood affect perceptions of 
usefulness or source credibility? 
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As in Study 3, perceived usefulness and source credibility are modeled separately. 
The distributions of perceived value and source credibility were not grossly skewed, and 
there were no missing data for perceived value and one missing case on the source 
credibility measure. Tables 20 and 21 show the effects of stated likelihood and 
likelihood format on perceptions of usefulness and source credibility. 
Table 20. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived usefulness. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Totat 
Probability 6.00 (2.39) 5.37 (1.86) 5.81 (2.13) 5.59 (2.61) 5.59 
(external) Jl""'27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 6.35 (2.62) 5.20 (2.29) 6.52 (2.36) 6.33 (2.29) 6.01 
(internal) n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 6.46 (2.13) 6.04 (2.65) 5.93 (2.63) 6.96 (1.97) 6.31 
w/range n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
6.27 5.54 6.09 6.30Total 
n=81 n=81 n=81 n=81 
•Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability fonnat are make up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. In other words, the responses in the pure narrative condition 
were not included in these means because there was no explicit probability infonnation present in this 
condition. This is necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed. 
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Table 21. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceived source 
credibility. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Total8 
Probability 5.58 (1.91) 4.97 (1.50) 5.16 (1.58) 5.55 (1.76) 5.23 
(external) n::::::27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 5.68 (1.92) 5.06 (1.60) 5.83 (1.77) 6.41 (1.35) 5.77
 
(confidence) n=26 n=26 n=26 n=26 n=26
 
Probability 6.85 (1.76) 6.33 (1.94) 6.44 (1.85) 6.89 (1.63) 6.55 
w/range 11":::27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
6.04 5.46 5.81 6.28Total 
n=80 n=80 n=80 n=80 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability fonnat are make up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. In other words, the responses in the pure narrative condition 
were not included in these means because there was no explicit probability infonnation present in this 
condition. This is necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed. 
Perceived usefulness. 
Explicit likelihood and narrative information: The pure narrative and the average of 
numerical forecasting conditions did not differ in perceived usefulness, t(318) =1.145, P 
=.254. Within the numerical forecasting conditions, there was a significant linear trend 
across stated likelihood, t(237) =2.434, P =.016, ES =.53, such that consumers rated 
forecasts with higher stated likelihood as more useful for decision making. Inspection of 
the means shows that consumers actually thought the pure narrative report was more 
valuable than forecasts with 1% or 5% probabilities (averaging across format), and 
roughly equal in value to forecasts in the 10% condition. This makes sense if consumers 
were judging the forecasts with lower stated likelihood as more "wrong" in hindsight, and 
a forecast that is wrong is not as useful as a forecast that says nothing at all about 
likelihood (pure narrative condition). 
In addition to using the stated likelihood information to judge how useful the report 
would have been for decision making, there was also an association between ratings of 
the credibility and coherence of the evidence and perceptions of usefulness, t(225) = 
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9.353, P < .001, ES = 2.42, such that consumers found a forecast to be more useful the 
greater they perceived the credibility and coherence of the narrative evidence summary to 
be. 
The effect of likelihood format: There were no significant differences due to 
likelihood format, although there was a trend for the range condition to be rated as more 
useful than the external point estimate condition, t(78) = 1.611, p = 0.11, ES = .25. 
Numeracy: As in Study 2, consumers higher in numeracy rated the forecasts lower in 
value overall, t(75) = -2.793, P = .007, ES = .41. 
Source Credibility. 
The results for source credibility were very similar to the results for perceived 
usefulness. 
Explicit likelihood and narrative information: There was a significant linear trend 
across stated likelihood, t(236) =3.976, P < .001, ES =.76, such that consumers rated 
forecasts with higher stated likelihood higher in source credibility. There was also an 
association between ratings of the credibility and coherence of the evidence and 
perceptions of usefulness, t(227) = 9.500, P < .001, ES = 3.50, such that consumers found 
a forecast to have more source credibility the greater they perceived the credibility and 
coherence of the narrative evidence summary to be. 
The effect of likelihood format: There was a significant difference between the range 
condition and point estimate conditions, t(78) = 3.463, P = .001, ES = .55, such that 
consumers rated the range condition higher in source credibility than the point estimate 
conditions. 
Numeracy: There were no significant effects of consumer numeracy. 
Perceived Likelihood 
Specific research questions are detailed below: 
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1. In hindsight, will the pure narrative forecast elicit higher perceptions of 
likelihood than the numerical conditions? In other words, will consumers be 
sensitive to the explicit likelihood estimates in the numerical forecasting 
conditions, even though they already know the outcome of the forecasted 
event? 
2.	 Will consumers use the stated likelihood and the properties ofthe narrative 
summary to make likelihood judgments in hindsight? 
3.	 Will the format of the likelihood information or consumer numeracy affect 
perceptions of likelihood in hindsight? 
In this experiment, consumers were asked to look back at the intelligence forecast 
written before the eventual attack and to rate how they would have rated the likelihood of 
the attack if they had been given this forecast before the attack occurred. Table 22 shows 
the effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceptions of likelihood in 
hindsight. 
Table 22. The effect of stated likelihood and likelihood format on perceptions of 
likelihood. 
Narrative 1% 5% 10% Totala 
Probability 63.70 (23.40) 43.70 (27.76) 51.48 (26.52) 51.48 (30.47) 48.89 
(external) n c=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 59.54 (25.65) 43.80 (27.57) 48.80 (30.25) 51.39 (30.00) 48.00 
(internal) n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
Probability 60.93 (17.65) 40.56 (27.15) 45.00 (27.98) 56.57 (24.41) 47.38 
w/range n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 n=27 
61.39 42.69 48.43 53.15Total 
n=81 n=81 n=81 n=81 
a Mean totals for the between subject condition of probability fonnat are made up of only those 
observations in the numerical conditions. In other words, the responses in the pure narrative condition 
were not included in these means because there was no explicit probability infonnation present in this 
condition. This is necessary because the experimental design is not fully crossed. 
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Unlike Study 3, where consumers judged the likelihood of potential terrorist plots 
from these intelligence forecasts without the benefit of hindsight, the distributions of 
likelihood ratings were not drastically skewed. Figure 17 shows the distributions of 
hindsight likelihood ratings by stated likelihood and likelihood format. 
Figure 17. The distributions of hindsight likelihood ratings by stated likelihood and 
likelihood format. 
Canci 
• Probability 
• Confidence 
fi]]lRange 
Narrative 1'1(, 5'1(, 10% 
Probability Level 
Additionally, it is clear from Table 22 that the likelihood ratings are much higher in 
this experiment than when these same forecasts were judged without hindsight (Study 3). 
This is an example of a classic hindsight effect, in that even when told to make a 
judgment with the information that was only available before the outcome of an event, 
the knowledge of the outcome biased likelihood estimates in the direction of the outcome. 
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Thus, in this case because the event did occur consumers judged that they would have 
thought that the attack was very likely. In addition, hindsight likelihood ratings were 
higher in the narrative condition as opposed to the numerical conditions, t(318) = 5.568, p 
< .001, ES = 1.57. 
In the next set of analyses, hindsight likelihood judgments were modeled as a 
function of stated likelihood, likelihood format, ratings of the credibility and coherence of 
the evidence, and consumer numeracy. 
Stated likelihood andproperties ofthe narrative summary. As in Study 3, consumers 
showed sensitivity to the stated likelihood in the forecasts, reporting higher perceptions 
of likelihood as the stated likelihood increased, t(231) = 2.798, P = .006, ES = .49. In 
addition, higher ratings of the credibility and coherence of the narrative summary were 
associated with higher perceived likelihood in hindsight, t(231) = 7.692, P < .001, ES = 
2.77. As in Study 3, perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the narrative 
summary had a larger effect of perceptions of likelihood than the stated likelihood 
manipulation (1%,5%,10%). Unlike Study 3, however, the numeracy level of the 
consumer did not significantly moderate the use of the evidence properties or the stated 
probability information, although the effects were in the same direction. 
Numeracy. There was a relatively small effect for numeracy, t(77) = -1.916, P = .059, 
ES = .26, such that consumers lower in numeracy reported higher perceived likelihood. 
Summary and Discussion 
This study was designed to explore consumer perceptions of intelligence forecasts in 
hindsight. Specifically, consumers were given the details of a terrorist attack that 
occurred and then they were asked to examine an intelligence forecast that was produced 
before the attack. In these situations people have shown what has been called a hindsight 
bias, in that they tend to overestimate the likelihood or the ease to which the event could 
have been predicted. In other words, the knowledge about the eventual outcome of the 
forecasted event biases perceptions of what was known or what could have been 
predicted before the event occurred. This effect is important because this is exactly the 
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situation that intelligence analysts may find themselves in if a terrorist attack were to 
occur, particularly an attack that they had previously assigned a relatively low likelihood 
in an intelligence forecast. As stated above, this is one of the reasons that analysts may 
prefer purely narrative forecasts, so as not to look like they are making deterministic 
predictions. Strictly speaking, a probabilistic forecast can never be wrong because, by 
definition, the forecaster is not making a deterministic claim about whether an event will 
occur or not. However, a consumer looking back at a forecast in hindsight (already 
knowing that the forecasted attack did occur) may perceive forecasts with smaller 
probabilities as more "wrong" than those with higher probabilities. Previous research 
discussed in Chapter II suggests that some consumers do tend to look at probabilistic 
forecasts injust such a deterministic manner. 
Pure narrative forecasts versus numerical forecasts 
Does presenting a more ambiguous pure narrative forecast reduce perceptions of 
blame as compared to numerical forecasts when a negative target event occurs? Overall, 
pure narrative forecasts did not result in significantly lower perceptions ofblame than 
forecasts with explicit estimates of likelihood and potential harm. This was somewhat 
surprising because the numerical forecasts all had relatively low estimates of likelihood 
for the event (l%, 5%, 10%). One might expect that the forecaster in the pure narrative 
forecast would not have been blamed for making a poor forecast because there was no 
likelihood value on which to base this judgment. However, the mean rating of blame was 
lower in the pure narrative condition as compared to the 1% and 5% numerical 
forecasting conditions, and if the likelihoods were estimated to be much lower there 
would likely be a significant difference between pure narrative and numerical estimates. 
As will be discussed below, consumers were sensitive to the stated likelihood when 
assigning blame. 
In addition, the pure narrative forecast was perceived to have more usefulness and 
source credibility than the forecasts with the lowest levels ofprobability. This is most 
likely because consumers were sensitive to the likelihood information when assessing the 
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quality of the forecasts in hindsight and the low estimates of likelihood were perceived to 
be more "wrong", and therefore not as valuable or credible. 
The effect ofboth stated likelihood andproperties ofthe narrative summary 
The results suggest that participants do tend to assign more blame to a forecaster that 
assigned a smaller likelihood to a terrorist attack that eventually occurred. Interestingly, 
this effect was not moderated by numeracy. It appears that consumers at all levels of 
numerical ability take likelihood into account when judging intelligence forecasts in 
hindsight. In addition, perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the evidence set 
were not found to significantly predict perceptions ofblame. It appears that consumers 
focus more on the stated likelihood information and ignore the narrative evidence 
summary when making judgments of blame. However, consumer perceptions of the 
potential harm of the attack were also associated with perceived blame, such that 
consumers that perceived greater potential harm in the forecasted event assigned more 
blame to the forecaster. 
In terms ofperceived usefulness and source credibility, consumers found the forecasts 
with lower stated probabilities and forecasts that were perceived to have a less credible 
and coherence evidence set to have less usefulness and source credibility. 
Effects oflikelihoodformat 
Within the numerical probability conditions, the range condition elicited slightly less 
blame than the point estimate conditions. The increased blame in the point estimate 
conditions may be due to the fact that they appear more precise, and are therefore 
perceived as being more "wrong". In the range condition, by contrast, the analyst is 
communicating a certain amount of uncertainty in the analysis, and may appear less 
blameworthy. Finally, the range condition was thought to have more value and source 
credibility than the point estimate conditions in hindsight. 
Previous research suggested that consumers would assign more blame to forecasters 
that made incorrect forecasts when they expressed likelihood in an internal format 
----- ------------
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(confidence) as opposed to an external format (Fox and Malle, 1995). No significant 
differences were found between internal and external likelihood formats. 
Perceptions oflikelihood in hindsight 
Consumers showed clear hindsight effects in their perceptions of the likelihood of the 
forecasted event after already knowing the outcome. The mean likelihood ratings were 
substantially higher than the likelihood ratings for the same forecasts in Study 3. 
Although consumer likelihood judgments were much higher in hindsight, consumers 
were still sensitive to the stated probability information and perceptions of the credibility 
and coherence ofthe evidence set. As in Study 3, perceptions of the narrative summary 
had a larger effect on perceived likelihood in hindsight than the stated probability 
manipulation (l %,5% to 10%). Previous research suggests that when causal or scenario­
based information is present in hindsight, this information will be reevaluated in light of 
the outcome knowledge (see Chapter II: Hindsight Effects). Participants did use the 
properties of the narrative evidence to make their hindsight likelihood judgments, and a 
reevaluation of the narrative evidence summary is a likely explanation for the drastically 
increased perceptions of likelihood in hindsight. 
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CHAPTER VI
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
 
Conclusions and Implications
 
The main goal of many political and intelligence forecasts is to communicate risk to 
decision makers. These forecasts should be communicated in a way that effectively 
transmits risk information from analyst to consumer. However, standard reporting 
methods in policy and intelligence analysis rarely involve explicit, numerical estimates of 
uncertainty, even though several experts have argued that the explicit treatment of 
uncertainty will lead to improved analysis and risk communication. Standard reporting 
methods for intelligence forecasts most often involve a scenario-based or narrative 
discussion of the evidence and possible future states of the world, and any numerical 
estimates of uncertainty would likely accompany this narrative presentation. 
The primary purpose of presenting numerical estimates of uncertainty is to 
communicate, as accurately as possible, the risk estimates generated by the analyst to the 
intelligence consumer. For example, numerical estimates oflikelihood are more precise 
than narrative descriptions ofevidence and it has been presumed that they allow more 
consistent interpretation by consumers. Although much previous research has focused on 
the analytic techniques that can be used to estimate these numerical quantities, how these 
analytic results should be reported for the benefit of consumers has received less 
attention. The work in this dissertation has focused on risk communication in 
intelligence forecasts from the consumer's perspective. 
Perceptions ofIntelligence Forecasts with Numerical Likelihood and Narrative 
Information 
The intelligence consumer is faced with a difficult task because both the numerical 
estimates of uncertainty and the narrative supporting evidence could be used to inform 
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perceived likelihood and risk. In the present studies, consumers did perceive forecasts 
with explicit likelihoods as more useful than forecasts with only a narrative evidence 
summary. However, the maj ority ofconsumers did not consistently use stated likelihood 
to inform their perceptions of likelihood, and the properties of the narrative summary had 
a strong influence on perceptions of likelihood. These results shows that even "precise" 
explicit statements of likelihood are not necessarily evaluable by consumers and the 
perception of likelihood is affected by the contextual information available to the judge 
(see Windschit et aI., 1999,2002; Hsee, 1995; Hendrickx et aI., 1989, 1992; Yates et aI., 
1996). 
One of the reasons that analysts may be reluctant to assign numerical likelihood 
estimates to forecasts is that they feel they may be blamed if a relatively small likelihood 
is attached to an event that eventually occurs. Strictly speaking, a probabilistic forecast 
can never be wrong because, by definition, the forecaster is not making a deterministic 
claim about whether an event will occur or not. Looking at a series of forecasts is the 
only way to assess the skill or calibration of a forecaster. Some consumers, however, did 
tend to think of these single-event forecasts in a deterministic manner by assigning more 
blame to a forecaster who assigned a smaller likelihood to a terrorist attack that 
eventually occurred. When evaluating forecasts in hindsight consumers were found to be 
sensitive to stated likelihood but not the properties of the narrative evidence summary 
(although perceptions ofharm were also predictive of blame judgments). These results 
suggest that at least some of the consumers in the sample did not fully appreciate the 
nature ofprobabilistic statements. These consumers may perceive these statements as 
ratings of event propensity, with probabilities above 50% being correct and those below 
50% being incorrect and probabilities further away from the correct side of the 
distribution as more "wrong" (e.g. 10% is more "wrong" than 30%). Unfortunately, this 
is exactly the type ofhindsight interpretation ofprobabilistic estimates that analysts may 
fear. It is unclear how best to deal with this issue, although it is possible that simple 
educational interventions focused on the nature ofprobabilistic statements could help 
(see discussion ofNumeracy below). 
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In addition, there did appear to be benefits of presenting numerical likelihood 
estimates in these forecasts. Consumer's sensitivity to the stated likelihood helped to 
control hindsight likelihood judgments as compared to narrative-only forecasts. 
Consumer judgments of the likelihood of an attack in hindsight were much higher when 
presented with narrative-only forecasts as compared to forecasts accompanied by a 
relatively low stated likelihood. 
Implications 
Reporting explicit estimates of uncertainty in a forecast does not necessarily mean 
that this information will be consistently interpreted or used by consumers of the forecast, 
particularly when presented with supporting narrative evidence. Consumers may more 
consistently use the numerical estimates to inform their perceptions of risk and likelihood 
if supporting information is not presented (see results from Study 2), but it is unlikely that 
consumers would trust or feel comfortable using a purely numerical forecast in this 
domain. If an analyst presented a report consisting of only numerical estimates of 
likelihood and potential harm, the consumer would most likely want to know on what 
basis the analyst came to that conclusion. For example, Yates et al. (1996) reported 
several experiments in which consumers evaluated forecasts concerning the outcome of 
lawsuits. In these experiments consumers were presented with only numerical forecasts. 
However, consumers often expressed an interest in having more justification about the 
methods and evidence that the forecasters used to make their judgments. Yates et al 
(1996) note that" ... it should be irrelevant how a consultant arrives at his or her 
assessments, only that those judgments are reliably good in a statistical sense. But that is 
apparently not good enough for many consumers." (pg. 45). Forecasting events in the 
domain of politics and human affairs may not be perceived in the same way as the 
engineer reporting the likelihood of an in flight engine failure on the commercial airliner. 
Consumers may be far more likely to take the numerical estimate of the engineer at face 
value, and not press him or her for details about how this estimate was generated. In the 
political and intelligence domain, however, consumers may intuitively understand the 
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difficulties and uncertainties involved in forecasting human events, and they may not be 
likely to take a probability point estimate at face value without inquiring about the 
evidence behind this judgment. 
Consumers willingness to accept numerical forecasts at face value may be limited to 
forecasting situations where statistical information ofpast performance or deterministic 
laws governing the phenomenon are perceived to be important to the estimation of the 
likelihood. In forecasting situations that are perceived to be based on the examination of 
evidence and reasoning processes such as analogy and scenario generation, consumers 
will most likely want to see supporting evidence (Yates, 1996). The present results 
suggest that any supporting information presented to consumers may have a large impact 
on perceptions of the likelihood and risk of the event, potentially overwhelming, or at 
least greatly affecting, the numerical likelihood estimates that are generated by the 
forecaster. This may result from the fact that the layperson is well practiced in "sense 
making" and reasoning processes based on scenario generation and the examination of 
evidence, and these consumers may automatically engage in this type of reasoning when 
presented with narrative evidence-based information. In contrast, if the engineer 
described above presented the technical information about engine reliability, these 
common reasoning processes would not be clearly applicable, and the non-expert 
consumer would most likely use the engineer's likelihood estimate. 
The supporting evidence underlying a forecast been shown to have a large impact on 
consumer perceptions of risk and likelihood. Thus, forecasters must be extremely careful 
in choosing the types of information that are reported and the format of that information, 
even when numerical estimates of likelihood or risk are reported as well. Ideally, the 
explicit estimates of likelihood and potential harm would work in concert with any 
supporting narrative information, providing the consumer with a complete picture of the 
risk associated with the forecasted event. 
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The Formatting ofNumerical Likelihood in Intelligence Forecasts 
The fonnat of the stated likelihood infonnation moderated the impact of stated 
likelihood on perceived risk, likelihood and perceptions of the "quality" of the report. 
The use ofverbal probability estimates was found to be a poor method of transferring 
likelihood infonnation from analyst to consumer. Consumers judged forecasts with 
verbal probability estimates to be less useful and the forecaster that reported them as less 
knowledgeable and less trustworthy. 
Among the point estimate numerical fonnats, consumers were more consistent in 
using stated likelihood to inform perceived likelihood in the percentage fonnat as 
compared to the frequency format. Previous research has focused on the benefits of 
frequency infonnation over single-event probability fonnats (i.e. percentage and decimal 
fonnats; see Chapter II), but this may be restricted to situations when statistical reasoning 
is involved. In the forecasting situation, the likelihood estimate is only meant to transmit 
infonnation to the consumer and it appears that the frequency fonnat may actually be 
more confusing. When likelihood is represented as a ratio (i.e. frequency fonnat), both 
the numerator and the denominator must be evaluated in relation to one another, while in 
the percentage fonnat there is just a single number that needs to be evaluated. In 
addition, the representation of likelihood as a relative frequency may not be readily 
understood when it is attached to a single, non-repeating event. 
Perfonning sensitivity analysis and reporting a range of plausible parameter estimates 
in an important topic in risk communication and forecasting. This is mainly because of 
the complexity present in many policy/intelligence domains and the sensitivity of the 
results to changes in the initial conditions and inputs. Ranges ofplausible values are also 
useful for reporting second-order uncertainty to consumers and reducing the perceived 
precision of these estimates that results when only point estimates are presented. 
Risk and likelihood perceptions were not as consistent in the range condition (i.e. 
higher risk and likelihood perceptions for higher stated likelihood ranges) as they were in 
the point estimate conditions. The range of likelihood estimates allows more flexibility 
in the interpretation of the estimate (i.e. Does one focus on the best estimate or the low or 
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high end of the range?), and likely decreases the consistency with which consumers use 
this information. However, consumers found the range format to be more useful and the 
forecaster more knowledgeable and trustworthy than the point estimate format, but only 
at higher stated likelihood (i.e. 20% versus 5%). Consumers were also less affected by 
the narrative evidence summary when judging likelihood in the percentage with range 
condition. This result was unexpected. Previous research suggests that when participants 
are presented with a range of values, they will tend to ignore the information and use 
other more easily evaluated information to make the judgment at hand (Hsee, 1995). 
Thus, one might expect that consumers would be more influenced by the narrative 
information in the range condition as compared to the point estimates conditions. It is 
unclear why the opposite effect was observed here, but it suggests that presenting a range 
of values will not necessarily force consumers to focus on other information to make a 
judgment or decision. 
In addition, when evaluating an intelligence forecast in hindsight, consumers assigned 
lower levels of blame to forecasters when they presented their forecasts with a range of 
estimates. Consumers also rated the range format higher in usefulness and source 
credibility. The increased blame in the point estimate conditions may be due to the fact 
that they appear more precise, and are therefore perceived as being more "wrong". In the 
range condition, by contrast, the analyst is communicating a certain amount of 
uncertainty in the analysis, and may appear less blameworthy 
Implications 
As discussed by many researchers, expressing uncertainty in verbal form is not likely 
to be an effective method of communication between analyst and consumer, at least not 
without some kind of reference scale accompanying the forecast (and at that point one 
might as well use a numerical scale). In addition, representing likelihood as a single­
event probability (e.g. in percentage form) appears to be a better choice than a frequency 
representation. 
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These results suggest that presenting likelihood as a range has both positive and 
negative repercussions. Consumers may not clearly differentiate forecasts as well when a 
range of likelihood values is reported, although they seem to be less affected by the 
supporting narrative information. In addition, less blame is assigned in hindsight when a 
range ofvalues is reported. Consumers also find range formats to be more useful and 
believe the forecaster is more knowledgeable and trustworthy, at least at higher 
probabilities. 
Presenting ranges and confidence intervals may turn out to be the only plausible 
method of quantitative forecasting in the political and intelligence domains. Analysts are 
unlikely to be comfortable reporting point estimates in many situations, both because of 
the complexity of the problems and the insufficient data on which these judgments are 
often based, and that they do not want consumers to perceive these estimates as "precise". 
Consumers will also benefit from the additional information provided by confidence 
ranges. Schrage (2005) notes this as one of the important advantages to reporting 
uncertainty in intelligence forecasts, in that consumers will have more information about 
the confidence that a forecaster has in his or her conclusions. If the reporting of 
confidence ranges becomes standard practice in intelligence forecasting, additional 
research will be needed to more fully understand the positive and negative effects that 
this approach will have on consumers. 
Individual Differences in the Numerical Ability ofConsumers 
Individual differences in numerical ability also had an effect on how consumers 
perceived and used quantitative forecasts. Consumers lower in numeracy focused more 
on the properties ofthe narrative summary and did not use the stated likelihood to inform 
their perceptions of risk as much as higher numerate consumers. In addition, consumers 
with different levels of numeracy also perceived particular likelihood formats to be more 
useful for decision making, and found the forecaster that reported these likelihoods to be 
more knowledgeable and trustworthy. 
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These results add to a series of recent findings that connect differences in numerical 
ability, or how well people can evaluate and use numbers, to judgment and decision 
making behavior (see Dieckmann, 2007 for a review). Whenever ajudgment or decision 
making task involves the evaluation of numbers, consumers may choose very different 
reasoning strategies for completing these tasks depending on numerical ability. This 
effect will likely be magnified when there are other sources of information, beside the 
numbers, that may be more easily used to make the judgment or decision at hand. 
Intelligence forecasts with both explicit numerical information and a narrative evidence 
summary are an excellent example ofjust such a situation. 
Implications 
Consumers of political and intelligence forecasts will vary in their comfort with 
numbers and their ability to use and evaluate numerical information. These differences in 
numeracy may greatly affect how consumers view the conclusions of the forecast and 
how well numerical information (in this case probabilistic information) can be used to 
transfer risk information from analyst to consumer. One way to alleviate this problem is 
for forecasters to find methods of reporting numerical information that is evaluable to 
consumers at all levels ofnumerical ability. The results from several recent studies 
suggest that alternative presentations of health-related information may make this 
information more evaluable for consumers lower in numerical ability (Peters, 
Dieckmann, et aI., 2007; Peters, Dieckmann, Vastjall, Mertz, et aI., 2006). For example, 
simplifying information displays to ease the cognitive burden of a task and providing 
verbal category labels to facilitate the evaluability of numerical information have been 
shown to improve judgment and choice. Methods similar to these or new methods could 
be developed to help consumers of intelligence forecasts evaluate and understand 
quantitative forecasts. 
A second way to address this problem is to teach consumers about the evaluation and 
interpretation of any numerical quantities presented in a forecast. For example, this could 
take the form of short written tutorials describing the interpretation and suggested use of 
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any numerical information. It is unclear, however, how effective short tutorials will be in 
improving the understanding ofprobabilistic information and eventually improving the 
use of this information by those lower in numeracy. 
If there is a question about how any numerical information will be understood by 
consumers, a forecaster should consider alternative formats for quantitative information 
to improve evaluability. The forecaster may also consider including a short tutorial 
describing the interpretation of any numerical information included in the forecast. 
However, additional research is needed to assess the effectiveness ofthese interventions. 
Limitations 
Each of the experiments in this study used simulated intelligence forecasts of 
potential terrorist plots involving explosive devices in the United States. As discussed in 
Chapter III, the characteristics of the particular hazard under study will affect laypersons 
perceptions of risk (e.g. the controllability or dread risk of the hazard; Slovic, 1987). 
Thus, it is possible that the results described in this dissertation are in some part restricted 
to hazards relating to terrorism. Ideally, a representative sample of hazards from the 
intelligence domain could be tested in future studies to show the generality of the effects 
that have been described. It may even be possible to use real, unclassified intelligence 
reports from US government archives. 
The sample of research participants may also limit the generalization of these results. 
Real consumers of intelligence forecasts may have specialized knowledge and 
backgrounds that may make them respond differently to intelligence forecasts. The 
recruitment of more educated participants for studies 3 and 4 was done to simulate the 
likely education level of real intelligence consumers, although there are clearly other 
contextual factors that were not simulated in the current studies (e.g. worldview, political 
pressure that may affect a consumer's perception of a forecast, etc). 
Another limitation to the generalizability of the results was the relatively narrow 
range of numerical likelihood that was manipulated (l%-20%). The extent to which 
consumers are sensitive to the numerical likelihood information and narrative summary 
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information may depend on the range oflikelihood values presented. For example, 
probability neglect maybe a particularly important problem whenever small likelihoods 
are communicated in a forecast (e.g. on the order of 1/1000 to 1/1000000; see Sunstein, 
2003 for a discussion ofprobability neglect). For example, consumers may ignore the 
likelihood estimates because they are too difficult to understand and focus on other 
information in making their likelihood judgments (e.g. the narrative evidence). More 
research is needed on how consumers make judgments of likelihood when presented with 
a wider spectrum of explicit likelihood values. 
Finally, the findings relating perceived likelihood to perceptions of the credibility and 
coherence of the narrative evidence summary are purely correlational in nature. Thus, 
one should be cautious in any causal interpretation of these findings. For example, it is 
not clear that perceptions of the coherence and credibility of the evidence set actually 
lead to greater perceptions of likelihood, or if the increased perceptions of likelihood lead 
to greater perceptions of the credibility and coherence of the evidence. Ideally, the 
properties of the narrative evidence summary could be experimentally manipulated to 
provide a more rigorous test of the causal relationship between these constructs. 
Future Research Directions 
There are several potentially fruitful future research directions focused on risk 
communication and intelligence forecasting from the perspective of consumers. These 
recommendations are based both on the experimental results presented above and a 
review of the literature in forecasting, risk communication, and intelligence analysis. 
There are several different levels ofuncertainty that are present in the risk analysis 
and intelligence forecasting domains. When analyzing a particular problem or set of 
events there may be uncertainty about the quality or credibility of the evidence, 
uncertainty about the structural model of situation (how the evidence fits together), 
uncertainty about the likelihood that particular events will occur in the future, and 
uncertainty about the potential harm that would result if these events occur (see Chapter 
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II). Ideally, the forecaster accounts for these different types ofuncertainty during the 
analytic process. It is an open question, however, whether consumers should also be 
presented with estimates of uncertainty at these different levels. Would consumers be 
able to interpret this information, and would it improve the judgments and decisions that 
are eventually based on these forecasts? The results of the present experiments begin to 
address how consumers would respond to uncertainty relating to the likelihood of future 
events, with or without second order uncertainty around these estimates. Although some 
authors suggest presenting additional levels of uncertainty in intelligence forecasts (e.g. 
Schrage, 2005), future work should explore how feasible it will be for analysts to 
estimate this uncertainty, and how well consumers could use this information when 
interpreting a forecast and making subsequent judgments and decisions. 
Although single event forecasts are likely to be reported to consumers in the 
intelligence community, there are also situations in which consumers will need to be 
informed about numerous potential threats simultaneously. Ideally, these threats could be 
reported in a format that facilitates trade-offs and comparisons among them. Future 
research could be aimed at identifying the optimal methods ofpresenting multiple 
potential threats simultaneously (see Horowitz & Haimes, 2003). Researchers and 
practitioners should be sensitive to the psychological limitations of consumers who will 
need to understand and make use of these forecasts. 
As long as quantitative intelligence forecasts are accompanied by a narrative evidence 
summary, consumer's perceptions of the risk and quality of forecasts will be greatly 
dependent on the nature of this supporting information. Future research should focus on 
the specific characteristics of this supporting information that affect consumer 
perceptions of risk and quality. I will also be very important to explore how the 
characteristics of the supporting information interact with explicit estimates of 
uncertainty. For example, perceptions of the coherence and credibility of the narrative 
evidence summary were found to be predictive of consumer perceptions. These 
characteristics will need to be studied in more rigorous experimental designs in the 
future, and there are several other potentially important characteristics that may affect 
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consumer perceptions. For example, the completeness of the explanation, the presence of 
alternative explanations (either implicit or explicit), and the vividness of the description 
are all interesting factors of the supporting information that may have strong effects of 
how a forecast is perceived by consumers. 
Future research should also focus on ways of presenting intelligence forecasts that 
makes them interpretable to consumers with a range of numerical abilities. Probabilistic 
forecasts are likely to be lost on consumers who do not have the basic numerical skills to 
interpret the uncertainty information presented by the forecaster. As discussed above, 
this research could focus on the ways of making numerical information more evaluable to 
consumers or on ways of teaching consumers about the meaning and interpretation of the 
numerical information presented. 
Hindsight effects in the intelligence forecasting domain is also a very interesting 
research direction considering the recent high profile intelligence "failures" and the 
intelligence reports and forecasts that are now being scrutinized after the fact. Future 
research should further explore how both the quantitative and qualitative properties of 
intelligence forecasts affect judgments in hindsight. Ideally, future research will identify 
the types of information that should be included and specific formats for intelligence 
forecasts that minimize hindsight effects. 
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APPENDIX A 
SCENARIOS TESTED IN PRELIMINARY STUDY 1 
Note: Below are the four intelligence scenarios that were tested in Preliminary Study 1. 
In addition, one example of an actual Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) is also included 
("Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US"). The simulated intelligence forecasts were 
roughly modeled after historical PDBs and other intelligence reports available in the 
public domain. 
126 
Intelligence Report #1 
Intelligence Report: 
Yesterday afternoon a foreign newspaper printed a statement from the militant 
group XXX warning of an attack on the US. 
Four months ago, an informant warned that the militant group XXX had tried to 
purchase a quantity of an unknown explosive. Whether they succeeded in 
purchasing the explosives is unknown. 
The FBI intercepted a cellular telephone call between individuals with suspected 
links to the militant group xxx. Washington, DC was mentioned repeatedly in 
the conversation, although they did not reveal any information about an 
impending attack. The call was intercepted last week and originated within the 
US. 
The FBI has also reported suspicious activity consistent with the surveillance of 
federal buildings in Washington, DC. This activity has been observed on 
numerous occasions over the last several months. 
The militant group XXX has used explosives against government buildings in 
foreign countries in the past. 
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Intelligence Report #2 
Intelligence Report: 
A tip from an anonymous informant recently led the FBI to the apartment of two 
men suspected ofworking for the militant group YYY. When the FBI arrived the 
men had already left, but investigators did discover simple maps and timetables of 
the railway systems in Chicago, IL. 
Several months ago, a videotaped statement by the leader of the militant group 
YYY appeared on the Internet. Among other things, the leader alluded to a recent 
train bombing in Portugal and warned that the United States would be next. 
Three months ago, analysts doing routine satellite monitoring of a known YYY 
training camp reported an increase in activity. It appeared that members ofYYY 
were experimenting with explosive devices. 
The YYY militant group has been implicated in several train bombings over the 
last several years. The most recent attack in Portugal was powerful enough to 
completely destroy one train car filled with passengers and completely derail the 
train. 
Both the FBI and the Chicago Police have reported suspicious activity around 
train stops in the city. This activity has been observed on numerous occasions 
over the last several months. 
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Intelligence Report #3 
Intelligence Report: 
On a few different occasions port authorities have stopped and questioned pairs of 
men trespassing in New York City ports. Each time the men were in the areas of 
the port where passenger ships dock. 
A few weeks ago, a website with ties to the militant group ZZZ posted a statement 
that warned of attacks on the US. It specifically mentioned that the next attacks 
would be aimed at a vulnerable place, since so much security has been focused on 
air travel. 
On a tip from an undercover agent, the FBI recently captured a wanted member of 
the militant group ZZZ. He revealed that group leaders had discussed attacking a 
port in New York City. He claimed to not know of any details concerning an 
attack and seemed unsure that members of the group had acquired the necessary 
explosives. 
The FBI has also bugged the apartment oftwo suspected members of ZZZ. The 
men have been overheard discussing the technical details ofprevious terrorist 
attacks, as well as discussing preparations for leaving the city in the near future. 
The ZZZ militant group has used explosives to attack targets in the past. 
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Intelligence Report #4 
Intelligence Report: 
Several national security experts have predicted a terrorist attack during a large 
sporting event in US. The high concentration ofpeople in a relatively small area 
is the obvious draw of this type of attack. 
A member of the militant group VVV was recently apprehended abroad. He 
revealed that the leadership ofVVV had discussed several different plans to use 
explosives in the US. One plan was to coordinate several simultaneous explosive 
attacks in a highly populated area. Members of VVV have carried out attacks of 
this nature before. 
In the last several months, both local authorities and the FBI have increased 
surveillance of professional basketball, baseball, football, and hockey events in 
the Los Angeles area. On one occasion, a suspicious package was left in a 
crowded area at a professional basketball game. The package turned out to be a 
hoax, but several authorities reported suspicious persons possibly observing the 
response. There is no way to be sure, but the hoax package could have been used 
to test the response of security and law enforcement. 
Last week, the FBI confiscated financial statements and froze the bank accounts 
of a Los Angeles lawyer suspected ofpartially supporting members ofVVV in 
the US. In the financial statements were records of a recent purchase of"military 
materials". It is unknown what exactly was purchased or where the materials are 
located now. 
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Declassified and ~roved 
for Release, IB April 2004 
Bin Ladln Determined To Strike in US 
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladln 
since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin 
implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 199B Ihal his followers would 
follow Ihe example of World Trade Center bomb.er Aamzi Youser and "bring 
the fighting to America." 
After US missile slrlkes on his base In Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin 
lold followers he wanted to relaliate in Washington, according to 
a , service. 
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative lold an' service 
at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning 10 exploh the operative's 
access to the US to mount a terrorist strike. 
The millennium plotting In Canada In 1999 may have been part of 
Bin Ladin's first serlaus attempt to Implement a terrorist strike In the 
US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBllhat he conceived the 
idea 10 alt€lck Los Angeles International Airport himself, but th~r;elr .. 
Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and h~lpet;l faclI~ate {he 
operation. Aessam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was plannln.g.: his 
Own US attack. '. 
Ressam says Bin Ladln was aware of the Los Angeles operation. 
Although Bin Ladln has nat succeeded, his attacks against the US 
Embassies In Kenya and Tanzsnlllin 1998 demonstrate that he prepares 
operations years In advance and Is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin 
associates surveilled our Embassies In Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early 
as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings w&re 
arrested and deported In 1997. . 
AI-Oa'ida members-Including same who are US Citizens-have resided 
In or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a 
support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Oa'ida members found guilty 
In the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a 
senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s. 
A clandestine source said In 19.98 that a Bin Ledin cell in New York 
was recruiting Muslim-American youth forallacks. 
We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensation61 
threat reporting, such as that from a , Fservice in 
1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a USaircralt to gain the 
release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd a/-Rahman and other US-held 
extremists. 
conrinued 
For 'he President Only Declassified and APJproved•
 for Release, 10 April 20046 Auausl 2001 
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Declassified and Approved
for Release, 10 April 2004 
- Nevertheless, FBI information since thai time indicales patlerns of 
suspicious acllvlty In this country consistent with preparations lor 
hijackings or other types 01 at1acks. inclUding reCent surveillance of 
lederal buildings in New York. 
The FBI is conducting approximalely 70 'ulilieid invesllgations 
Ihroughout the US thai it considers Bin Ladin-relaled. CIA and the 
FBI are investigating a call 10 our Embassy in the UAE In May saying 
that a group 01 Bin Ladin supporteJs was in the US planning at1acks 
with explosives. 
For rhe Prssident Only Declassified and ~roved 
6 Augu 51 2001 for Release, 10 Apr1.1 2004 
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APPENDIXB 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 2 
Note: Because ofthe fully between subjects design, there were 16 different experimental 
conditions. The two scenarios below are the summary only and summary with narrative 
evidence conditions in the verbal probability condition for the low level of probability. 
The additional manipulations ofprobability level and probability format are displayed in 
brackets. Only the information in the sentence in bold was manipulated across the 
probability level and format conditions. The dependent variables and the numeracy 
measure used in Study 2 follow the scenarios. 
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Evaluating an Intelligence Report 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the next page you will make a 
series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
The militant group XXX might use explosives to attack a federal building in 
Washington, DC. If the attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would be 
1000 deaths and injuries and 50 million dollars in property damage. 
Based on the evidence outlined above and our professional judgment and 
experience, we estimate that this attack is highly unlikely over the next six 
months. 
High verbal: [ ... we estimate that this attack is fairly unlikely over the next 
six months.] 
Low percentage: [ ... we estimate that the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 5%.] 
High percentage: [ ... we estimate that the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 20%.] 
Low frequency: [ ... we estimate that the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 5 out of 100.] 
High frequency: [ ... we estimate that the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 20 out of 100.] 
Low range: [ ... our best estimate of the probability that this attack will occur 
over the next six months is 5%, but the probability could be as low as 1% or 
as high as 10%.] 
High range: [ ... our best estimate of the probability that this attack will occur 
over the next six months is 20%, but the probability could be as low as 10% 
or as high as 30%.] 
134 
Evaluating an Intelligence Report 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the following pages you will 
make a series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
Yesterday afternoon a foreign newspaper printed a statement from the militant 
group XXX warning of an attack on the US. 
Four months ago, an informant warned that the militant group XXX had tried to 
purchase a quantity of an unknown explosive. Whether they succeeded in 
purchasing the explosives is unknown. 
The FBI intercepted a cellular telephone call between individuals with suspected 
links to the militant group XXx. Washington, DC was mentioned repeatedly in 
the conversation, although they did not reveal any information about an 
impending attack. The call was intercepted last week and originated within the 
US. 
The FBI has also reported suspicious activity consistent with the surveillance of 
federal buildings in Washington, DC. This activity has been observed on 
numerous occasions over the last several months. 
The militant group XXX has used explosives against government buildings in 
foreign countries in the past. 
Summary 
The militant group XXX might use explosives to attack a federal building in 
Washington, DC. If the attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would be 
1000 deaths and injuries and 50 million dollars in property damage. 
Based on the evidence outlined above and our professional judgment and 
experience, we estimate that this attack is highly unlikely over the next six 
months. 
[The same manipulations outlined above were applied to this condition]. 
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Questions about the Intelligence Report 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions about the intelligence report on 
the previous page. 
1.	 How would you rate the risk associated with this possible attack? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very low Moderate Very 
Risk Risk high 
Risk 
2.	 How valuable is this intelligence report? In other words, does it provide useful 
information for determining future actions to take? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Fairly Extremely 
valuable valuable valuable 
3.	 How knowledgeable does this analyst seem about this potential attack? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Fairly Extremely 
knowledgeable knowledgeable knowledgeable 
4.	 How much do you trust that this analyst is giving you complete and unbiased 
information/conclusions about this potential attack? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very little Moderate Very 
Trust Trust high 
Trust 
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Additional Questions 
5. How knowledgeable are you about politics and world affairs? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Fairly Extremely 
knowledgeable knowledgeable knowledgeable 
6. Please rate yourself along the liberal/conservative political spectrum? 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Extreme Moderate Extreme 
Liberal Conservative 
---------
---------
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[Numeracy Measure] 
NUMBERS - you may not use a calculator for any of these questions. 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up as an even number? 
Answer:
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
Answer:	 people 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent oftickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
Answer:	 % 
4.	 Which ofthe following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 in 100 1 in 1000 1 in 10 
5.	 Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1% 10% 5% 
6. IfPerson A's risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B's risk is 
double that of A's, what is B's risk? 
Answer: % in	 years 
7. If Person A's chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B's risk 
is double that of A, what is B' s risk? 
Answer: In	 years 
-------
---------
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8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease: 
A: Out of 100? Answer: people 
B: Out of 1000? Answer: people 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 
__% chance of getting the disease. 
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how 
many of them are expected to get infected? 
Answer: people 
11. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 chance in 12 1 chance in 37 
12. Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammography. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant tumor 
and 90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the 
mammography indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates 
incorrectly that 1 of them does not have a tumor. Of the 90 women who do not have 
a tumor, the mammography indicates correctly that 81 of them do not have a tumor 
and indicates incorrectly that 9 of them do have a tumor. The table below 
summarizes all of this information. Imagine that your friends tests positive (as if she 
had a tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually has a tumor? 
Tested 
positive 
Tested 
negative 
Totals 
Actually has a tumor 9 1 10 
Does not have a tumor 9 81 90 
Totals 18 82 100 
Answer: 
-------
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13.	 Imagine that you are taking a class and your chances of being asked a question in 
class are 1% during the first week of class and double each week thereafter (i.e., you 
would have a 2% chance in Week 2, a 4% chance in Week 3, an 8% chance in Week 
4). What is the probability that you will be asked a question in class during Week 7? 
Answer:	 %
14.	 Suppose that lout of every 10,000 doctors in a certain region is infected with the 
SARS virus; in the same region, 20 out of every 100 people in a particular at-risk 
population also are infected with the virus. A test for the virus gives a positive result 
in 99% of those who are infected and in 1% of those who are not infected. A 
randomly selected doctor and a randomly selected person in the at-risk population in 
this region both test positive for the disease. Who is more likely to actually have the 
disease? 
_ They both tested positive for SARS and therefore are equally likely to have the 
disease 
_	 They both tested positive for SARS, and the doctor is more likely to have the 
disease 
_	 They both tested positive for SARS and the person in the at-risk population is 
more likely to have the disease. 
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APPENDIXC 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 3 
Note: In Study 3, consumers responded to four different scenarios, which were randomly 
assigned to one level of the probability level within subject factor (i.e. narrative, 1%,5%, 
10%). Participants were also randomly assigned to one of three levels of the probability 
format (i.e. probability, confidence, probability w/range). Below are the four different 
scenarios used in Study 3 at each level of the probability factor. In the actual experiment 
each scenario was matched with each level of probability in a counterbalanced design. 
The different levels of the between subject factor ofprobability format are displayed in 
brackets. The dependent variables for Study 3 follow the experimental materials. Also, 
the same numeracy measure used in Study 1 was used in Studies 3 and 4. 
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Intelligence Report #1 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the following pages you will 
make a series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
Yesterday afternoon a foreign newspaper printed a statement from the militant 
group XXX warning of an attack on the US. 
Four months ago, an informant warned that the militant group XXX had tried to 
purchase a quantity of an unknown explosive. Whether they succeeded in 
purchasing the explosives is unknown. 
The FBI intercepted a cellular telephone call between individuals with suspected 
links to the militant group XXX. Washington, DC was mentioned repeatedly in 
the conversation, although they did not reveal any information about an 
impending attack. The call was intercepted last week and originated within the 
US. 
The FBI has also reported suspicious activity consistent with the surveillance of 
federal buildings in Washington, DC. This activity has been observed on 
numerous occasions over the last several months. 
The militant group XXX has used explosives against government buildings in 
foreign countries in the past. 
Summary 
The militant group XXX might use explosives to attack a federal building in 
Washington, DC. 
[The pure narrative forecast condition was identical at each level ofthe 
probability format factor.] 
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Intelligence Report #2 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the following pages you will 
make a series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
A tip from an anonymous informant recently led the FBI to the apartment of two 
men suspected ofworking for the militant group YYY. When the FBI arrived the 
men had already left, but investigators did discover simple maps and timetables of 
the railway systems in Chicago, IL. 
Several months ago, a videotaped statement by the leader of the militant group 
YYY appeared on the Internet. Among other things, the leader alluded to a recent 
train bombing in Portugal and warned that the United States would be next. 
Three months ago, analysts doing routine satellite monitoring of a known YYY 
training camp reported an increase in activity. It appeared that members ofYYY 
were experimenting with explosive devices. 
The YYY militant group has been implicated in several train bombings over the 
last several years. The most recent attack in Portugal was powerful enough to 
completely destroy one train car filled with passengers and completely derail the 
train. 
Both the FBI and the Chicago Police have reported suspicious activity around 
train stops in the city. This activity has been observed on numerous occasions 
over the last several months. 
Summary 
The militant group YYY might use explosives to attack a train in Chicago. If the 
attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would be 1000 deaths and injuries 
and 50 million dollars in property damage. 
Based on the evidence outlined above and our professional judgment and 
experience, we estimate that the probability that this attack will occur over 
the next six months is 1% 
Confidence condition: [...we are 1% sure that this attack will occur over the next 
six months.] 
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Range condition: [... our best estimate of the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 1%, but the probability could be as low as .1 % 
or as high as 5%.] 
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Intelligence Report #3 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the following pages you will 
make a series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
On a few different occasions port authorities have stopped and questioned pairs of 
men trespassing in New York City ports. Each time the men were in the areas of 
the port where passenger ships dock. 
A few weeks ago, a website with ties to the militant group ZZZ posted a statement 
that warned of attacks on the US. It specifically mentioned that the next attacks 
would be aimed at a vulnerable place, since so much security has been focused on 
air travel. 
On a tip from an undercover agent, the FBI recently captured a wanted member of 
the militant group ZZZ. He revealed that group leaders had discussed attacking a 
port in New York City. He claimed to not know of any details concerning an 
attack and seemed unsure that members of the group had acquired the necessary 
explosives. 
The FBI has also bugged the apartment of two suspected members ofZZZ. The 
men have been overheard discussing the technical details of previous terrorist 
attacks, as well as discussing preparations for leaving the city in the near future. 
The ZZZ militant group has used explosives to attack targets in the past. 
Summary 
The militant group ZZZ might use explosives to attack a passenger ship in New 
York City. If the attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would be 1000 
deaths and injuries and 50 million dollars in property damage. 
Based on the evidence outlined above and our professional judgment and 
experience, we estimate that the probability that this attack will occur over 
the next six months is 5% 
Confidence condition: [...we are 5% sure that this attack will occur over the next 
six months.] 
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Range condition: [... our best estimate of the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 5%, but the probability could be as low as .5% 
or as high as 10%.] 
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Intelligence Report #4 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you receive the following intelligence report about a 
possible terrorist attack. Read the report carefully. On the following pages you will 
make a series ofjudgments about this report. 
Intelligence Report: 
Several national security experts have predicted a terrorist attack during a large 
sporting event in US. The high concentration ofpeople in a relatively small area 
is the obvious draw of this type of attack. 
A member of the militant group VVV was recently apprehended abroad. He 
revealed that the leadership ofVVV had discussed several different plans to use 
explosives in the US. One plan was to coordinate several simultaneous explosive 
attacks in a highly populated area. Members ofVVV have carried out attacks of 
this nature before. 
In the last several months, both local authorities and the FBI have increased 
surveillance ofprofessional basketball, baseball, football, and hockey events in 
the Los Angeles area. On one occasion, a suspicious package was left in a 
crowded area at a professional basketball game. The package turned out to be a 
hoax, but several authorities reported suspicious persons possibly observing the 
response. There is no way to be sure, but the hoax package could have been used 
to test the response of security and law enforcement. 
Last week, the FBI confiscated financial statements and froze the bank accounts 
ofa Los Angeles lawyer suspected ofpartially supporting members ofVVV in 
the US. In the financial statements were records of a recent purchase of"military 
materials". It is unknown what exactly was purchased or where the materials are 
located now. 
Summary 
The militant group VVV might use explosives to attack a professional sporting 
event in Los Angeles. If the attack occurs, a plausible worst-case scenario would 
be 1000 deaths and injuries and 50 million dollars in property damage. 
Based on the evidence outlined above and our professional judgment and 
experience, we estimate that the probability that this attack will occur over 
the next six months is 10% 
Confidence condition: [...we are 5% sure that this attack will occur over the next 
six months.] 
147 
Range condition: [... our best estimate of the probability that this attack will 
occur over the next six months is 10%, but the probability could be as low as 1% 
or as high as 20%.] 
----------------- ---
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Questions about the Intelligence Report 
[These were asked after each scenario] 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions about the intelligence report on 
the previous page. Feel free to look back at the intelligence report when making your 
ratings. 
1.	 How would you rate the risk associated with this possible attack? 
Very low Moderate Very 
risk risk high risk 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2.	 What is your impression of the chance that this attack will occur over the next 6 
months? 
No chance As likely as 
unlikely Certain 
0% 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100% 
3.	 Focus on the potential outcome of the described terrorist attack. If this attack did 
occur, what is your impression of the overall harm that would be inflicted on 
people, property, the economy, etc? 
Not Moderately Extremely 
hannful hannful harmful 
at all 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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4.	 How valuable is this intelligence report? In other words, if you had to decide 
what should be done about this attack, how useful or valuable is this report for 
detennining future actions to take? 
Not at Fairly Extremely 
all valuable valuable 
valuable 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.	 Below are several questions about how you feel about the information and 
conclusions presented by the analysts. Please circle the number between the pair 
ofwords that best describes how you feel about the infonnation and conclusions 
presented in the intelligence report. 
Can't be 
trusted 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Can be trusted 
Is 
inaccurate 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is accurate 
Is unfair 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is fair 
Doesn't tell 
whole story 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Tells whole story 
Is biased 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is unbiased 
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FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE REpORTS 
[These questions were asked at the end ofthe experiment.] 
1.	 Now focus specifically on the evidence that is presented in each intelligence 
report. How credible is the evidence overall? By "credible" we mean the ability 
to trust or believe the evidence. For example, people often feel that something 
they have "seen with there own two eyes" is more credible than a rumor they 
heard from a stranger. 
How would you rate the overall credibility of the evidence presented in each report? 
Make a separate rating for each ofthe four intelligence reports. Feel free to go back 
and look at the reports again. 
Very little Moderate Very high 
credibility credibility credibility 
Report #1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very little Moderate Very high 
credibility credibility credibility 
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2.	 Again, focus specifically on the evidence that is presented in each intelligence 
report. How well does the evidence fit into a coherent story? By a "coherent 
story" we mean the ease to which you can form a good story or scenario from the 
evidence. For example, if all of the evidence fits into a believable story and there 
are not any other plausible explanations for the evidence, then you would rate the 
evidence as being very coherent. If, on the other hand, some pieces of evidence 
fit into a story but others do not, or there is more than one plausible story that fits 
the evidence, then you would make a lower rating for the coherence of the 
evidence. 
How would you rate the overall coherence of the evidence presented in each report? 
Make a separate rating for each of the four intelligence reports. Feel free to go back 
and look at the reports again. 
Very	 Moderate Very high 
little coherence coherence 
coherence 
Report #1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
little 
Moderate 
coherence 
Very high 
coherence 
coherence 
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APPENDIXD 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 4 
Note: The experimental design and the terrorist scenarios were the same as those used in 
Study 3. In Study 4, however, there was an additional brief summary detailing how each 
terrorist attack had occurred several weeks earlier. This brief summary preceded each 
intelligence forecast. Below are each of these summaries. The dependent variables for 
Study 4 were nearly identical to those used in Study 3, however the wording is slightly 
changed because the judgments are taking place in hindsight. 
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TERRORIST ATTACK: SCENARIO #1 
Instructions: Please read the following paragraph about a terrorist attack that occurred 
several weeks ago. 
Summary of the attack: 
Several weeks ago, a bomb was detonated on a passenger train in Chicago killing over 
900 people and wounding hundreds more. It has become clear that militant group YYY 
was responsible for the attack. The attack would most likely have been stopped if 
additional security had been assigned to protect targets in Chicago. A special 
congressional committee has been formed and several politicians have begun criticizing 
the intelligence community. 
Tum to the next page to read an intelligence report that was submitted to senior decision 
makers three weeks before this attack. You will then be asked to make a series of 
judgments about this intelligence report. 
[Participants then read an intelligence forecast that was submitted to decision makers 
before this attack occurred] 
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TERRORIST ATTACK: SCENARIO #2 
Instructions: Please read the following paragraph about a terrorist attack that occurred 
several weeks ago. 
Summary of the attack: 
Several weeks ago, a bomb was detonated outside of a federal building in Washington, 
DC killing over 900 people and wounding hundreds more. It has become clear that 
militant group XXX was responsible for the attack. The attack would most likely have 
been stopped if additional security had been assigned to protect targets in Washington, 
DC. A special congressional committee has been formed and several politicians have 
begun criticizing the intelligence community. 
Turn to the next page to read an intelligence report that was submitted to senior decision 
makers three weeks before this attack. You will then be asked to make a series of 
judgments about this intelligence report. 
[Participants then read an intelligence forecast that was submitted to decision makers 
before this attack occurred] 
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TERRORIST ATTACK: SCENARIO #3 
Instructions: Please read the following paragraph about a terrorist attack that occurred 
several weeks ago. 
Summary of the attack: 
Several weeks ago, a bomb was detonated in a crowd at a sporting event in Los Angeles 
killing over 900 people and wounding hundreds more. It has become clear that militant 
group VVV was responsible for the attack. The attack would most likely have been 
stopped if additional security had been assigned to protect targets in Los Angeles. A 
special congressional committee has been formed and several politicians have begun 
criticizing the intelligence community. 
Tum to the next page to read an intelligence report that was submitted to senior decision 
makers three weeks before this attack. You will then be asked to make a series of 
judgments about this intelligence report. 
[Participants then read an intelligence forecast that was submitted to decision makers 
before this attack occurred] 
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TERRORIST ATTACK: SCENARIO #4 
Instructions: Please read the following paragraph about a terrorist attack that occurred 
several weeks ago. 
Summary of the attack: 
Several weeks ago, a bomb was detonated on a passenger ship in New York City killing 
over 900 people and wounding hundreds more. It has become clear that militant group 
ZZZ was responsible for the attack. The attack would most likely have been stopped if 
additional security had been assigned to protect targets in New York City. A special 
congressional committee has been formed and several politicians have begun criticizing 
the intelligence community. 
Turn to the next page to read an intelligence report that was submitted to senior decision 
makers three weeks before this attack. You will then be asked to make a series of 
judgments about this intelligence report. 
[Participants then read an intelligence forecast that was submitted to decision makers 
before this attack occurred] 
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Questions about the Intelligence Report 
[These questions were asked after each scenarioJ 
INSTRUCTIONS: Imagine that you had read the intelligence report 3 weeks before the· 
eventual attack. Please answer the following questions about this intelligence report on 
the previous page. Feel free to look back at the intelligence report when making your 
ratings. 
1.	 Judging from the intelligence report, what would have been your impression of 
the risk associated with this possible attack? 
Very low Moderate Very 
risk risk high risk 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2.	 Judging from the intelligence report, what would have been your impression of 
the chance that this attack would occur over the next 6 months? 
As likely as No chance	 Certain
unlikely 
0% 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 % 
3.	 Focus on the potential outcome of the terrorist attack described in the intelligence 
report. Judging from the intelligence report, what is your impression of the 
overall harm that would be inflicted on people, property, the economy, etc, if the 
attack occurred? 
Not Moderately Extremely 
hannful hannful hannful 
at all 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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4.	 How valuable was this intelligence report? In other words, if you had to decide 
what should have been done about this possible attack, how useful or valuable 
would this report have been to you? 
Not at Fairly Extremely 
all valuable valuable 
valuable 
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5.	 Below are several questions about how you feel about the information and 
conclusions presented in the intelligence report. Please circle the number between 
the pair of words that best describes how you feel about the information and 
conclusions presented in the intelligence report. 
Can't be 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Can be trusted 
trusted 
Is 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is accurate
 
inaccurate
 
Is unfair 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is fair 
Doesn't tell 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Tells whole story 
whole story 
Is biased 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Is unbiased 
6.	 Think about both the intelligence report and the terrorist attack that occurred three 
weeks later. Some people are blaming the intelligence community for not doing a 
good job predicting whether this attack would occur. How much blame do you 
think should be placed on the analysts that produced the intelligence report? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very little Moderate Great
 
Blame Blame amount
 
of
 
Blame
 
10 
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FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE REpORTS 
[These questions were asked at the end ofthe experiment] 
1.	 Now focus specifically on the evidence that is presented in each intelligence 
report. How credible is the evidence overall? By "credible" we mean the ability 
to trust or believe the evidence. For example, people often feel that something 
they have "seen with there own two eyes" is more credible than a rumor they 
heard from a stranger. 
How would you rate the overall credibility of the evidence presented in each report? 
Make a separate rating for each of the four intelligence reports. Feel free to go back 
and look at the reports again. 
Very little Moderate Very high 
credibility credibility credibility 
Report #1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very little Moderate Very high 
credibility credibility credibility 
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2.	 Again, focus specifically on the evidence that is presented in each intelligence 
report. How well does the evidence fit into a coherent story? By a "coherent 
story" we mean the ease to which you can form a good story or scenario from the 
evidence. For example, if all of the evidence fits into a believable story and there 
are not any other plausible explanations for the evidence, then you would rate the 
evidence as being very coherent. If, on the other hand, some pieces of evidence 
fit into a story but others do not, or there is more than one plausible story that fits 
the evidence, then you would make a lower rating for the coherence of the 
evidence. 
How would you rate the overall coherence of the evidence presented in each report? 
Make a separate rating for each of the four intelligence reports. Feel free to go back 
and look at the reports again. 
Very	 Moderate Very high 
little coherence coherence 
coherence 
Report #1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Report #4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very 
little 
Moderate 
coherence 
Very high 
coherence 
coherence 
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APPENDIXE 
DETAILS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Study 2 
Assumptions ofthe Univariate General Linear Model 
A univariate general linear modeling framework was used to test the hypothesized 
effects on perceived risk. There were no missing data on the variables of interest. In 
addition, several ofthe assumptions of the univariate general linear model were assured 
by proper sampling practices and the roughly equal sample sizes within groups. These 
assumptions include independence and an identical within group error distribution. The 
univariate general linear model is robust against violations ofthe homogeneity of 
variance assumption with relatively large sample sizes and roughly equal sample sizes 
among the groups (i.e. less than 2:1). Finally, residual plots for each model were 
examined for nonlinearities and other indicators ofpoor model fit, as well as 
confirmation of a roughly normal distribution of errors and equal variance of errors 
across levels of the independent variables. No concerning violations of the assumptions 
were found. 
Effect Size, Power, and Confidence Intervals 
In general, I have tried to focus on effect sizes and the precision of estimation (Le. 
reporting confidence intervals), as opposed to null hypothesis significance testing. 
However, p-values are reported for the bulk of the statistical results. In addition, r is used 
as an effect size measure in Study 2. There are several other alternatives, for example 
Cohen's d, but r has several advantages over standardized difference measures of effect 
size. The primary benefit or r is the generality of interpretation as a measure of the linear 
relationship between two variables (Rosenthal, 1994). For example, r makes conceptual 
sense whether the variables of interest are both continuous in nature (Pearson's r), or one 
is dichotomous and one is continuous (Point-biserial). Mean difference indexes (e.g. 
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Cohen's d) make sense in the later case, but are not intuitively meaningful when both 
variables are continuous. Although the interpretation of any effect size must be 
understood within the context of the particular application, Cohen (1988) has developed 
general guidelines for interpreting r effect sizes: Small: F.1, Medium: F.3, Large: F.5. 
The concept of statistical power is a very important, and often ignored, aspect of 
statistical analysis. Rough power analyses were conducted to assure sufficient power for 
the primary effects of interest during the design of this experiment. Like any study, 
however, additional a priori hypotheses are often developed after the study design is 
finalized, and additional post-hoc research questions are often of interest once the 
analysis stage begins. In these cases, precise post-hoc power estimates are often difficult 
to compute. Thus, 95% confidence intervals are included to give the reader a general 
idea ofthe precision of estimation (i.e. statistical power) in the parameters of interest 
(Loftus, 2004). In general, the smaller the confidence intervals the greater the precision 
and the higher the statistical power. 
Multivariate GLMAssumptions 
As in the univariate case, a large sample size and roughly equal cell sizes ensure 
robustness of the multivariate solution against the violation of the multivariate normality 
and homogeneity ofvariance-covariance matrices assumptions. Scatterplots were used to 
assess the linearity assumption - namely, that all of the dependent variables are linearly 
related. Examination of the scatterplots revealed no nonlinear relationships of concern. 
Multivariate Effect Size and Confidence Intervals 
There are several different ways to represent the magnitude of individual model 
effects within the context of the multivariate general linear model (Kline, 2004). Pillai's 
V or Wilks' lambda are common choices and represent the proportion of explained and 
unexplained variance, respectively. In an effort to keep the effect size measures 
comparable across the univariate and multivariate analyses in Study 1, r effect sizes are 
reported for the multivariate effects. The r effect size can be computed in several 
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different ways - namely, by taking the square root of the Pillai's V statistic for the effect 
of interest, or by calculating a discriminant function score for each participant and then 
calculating the r effect size from these scores in the same manner as in the univariate 
case. For the majority of the effects of interest the two methods of computation 
converged, but in some cases there were discrepancies (e.g. when conducting simple 
effect tests). In those cases the r effect size calculated from the discriminant function 
scores is reported because I feel it is a more accurate representation of the effect size for 
specific simple effects. The Pillai's V in the simple effect procedure in SPSS is 
controlling for all other comparisons in the model, and consequently, produces a slightly 
different Pillai' s V that when raised to the power of 1/2 is not a good representation of 
the effect size for the contrast of interest. 
Study 3 & Study 4 
Multilevel Models 
Repeated measures designs are not optimally modeled with the General Linear 
Modeling (GLM) framework that was used to analyze the fully between subjects data in 
Study 2. A further generalization of the GLM called a Linear Mixed Model is more 
appropriate for data structures with repeated measurements. The subspecies of linear 
mixed models are known as multilevel mixed models, hierarchical linear models (HLM), 
or random-effects models. 
There are several reasons why a multilevel framework is considered superior to a 
GLM for repeated measures data: 1) Multilevel models are more flexible in terms of data 
requirements (e.g. the repeated measures do not need to be measured at the same time for 
each subject), 2) multilevel models permit more control over the covariance structure, 
and 3) it is easier to work with time-varying covariates in the context ofmultilevel 
models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For these reasons, a multilevel framework was used 
164 
to model the effects of the experimental manipulations, as well as the effects of the 
subject-level and time-varying covariates. 
General Specification ofMultilevel Models and Model Building 
Two-level models 
All of the multilevel models used in Studies 3 and 4 were two-level models with 
the repeated measures data modeled at level 1 and the between subjects data model at 
level 2. For example, the following model was fit to assess the impact of stated 
likelihood, properties of the narrative evidence summary, and the moderating influence of 
stated likelihood format and consumer numeracy on perceptions of likelihood in Study 3 
(the results of this model are presented in Table 5.10): 
LEVEL 1 MODEL (bold: group-mean centering; bold italic: gr 
CHANCE_L = 13() + 131(UNEAR_1) + 132(EVI_PROP) + r 
LEVEL 2 MODEL (bold italic: grand-mean centering) 
130 = 100 + 'Y01(H1_COND) + 10z(H2_COND) + "I03(NUMTOT) + I}o 
13 , = "110 + 'Y11(H1_COND) + 1,z(H2_COND) + "I,3(NUMTOT) 
132 = "120 + YZ1(H1_COND) + 'Yz2(H2_COND) + Y23(NUMTOT) 
At levell, the dependent variable is the likelihood ratings from each consumer for 
each of the three intelligence forecasts that they read. Therefore, each consumer 
expressed his or her perceived likelihood to a forecast with a stated likelihood of 1%, a 
forecast with a stated likelihood of 5%, and a forecast with a stated likelihood of 10% 
(the pure narrative forecast is not included in this analysis). These perceptions of 
likelihood are then modeled as a function of a linear trend across the levels of stated 
likelihood (Linear_T in the figure above). Consumers also rated the coherence and 
credibility of each of the three forecasts that they read. Thus, perceptions of likelihood 
are also modeled as a function ofconsumer's ratings of the credibility and coherence of 
each forecast (Evi_Prop in the figure above). Three parameters are then estimated from 
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this level I model: ~o= the intercept, or the mean level of perceived likelihood averaging 
across stated likelihood and at the mean level of credibility and coherence; ~l=the extent 
to which likelihood perceptions show a linear trend across stated likelihood at the mean 
level ofcredibility and coherence; ~2=the linear relationship between perceptions of 
credibility and coherence and perceptions oflikelihood averaging across stated 
likelihood. 
At level 2, these three parameters become dependent variables and variance in these 
parameters for each consumer are modeled as a function of the between subject variables. 
In this case, the between-subject variables are the format of the stated likelihood in the 
forecast, which are represented as two helmert contrasts (HI =contrast between the range 
condition and the two point estimate conditions; H2=contrast between the point estimate 
conditions, internal and external framing oflikelihood), and the total score on the 
numeracy individual difference measure. The goal of the level 2 model is to see if the 
variance in the parameters estimated at level 1 can be predicted by the between subject 
variables represented at level 2. For instance, parameter Y13 at level 2 is an estimate of 
the extent to which the effect of stated likelihood on perceived likelihood (averaging 
across likelihood format) can be predicted by the numeracy level of the consumer. In 
other words, this is a test ofa cross-level interaction. 
Model building 
In general, all of the multi-level models used in studies 3 and 4 were specified to test 
specific hypotheses of interest. However, exploratory analyses were also conducted to 
test for higher-order interaction effects that would clarify the effects found elsewhere in 
the models. Higher order interactions that were not significant were removed and the 
more parsimonious model results are reported. 
Assumptions ofMultilevel Models and Standard Error 
Each of the models reported above were fit with Restricted Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (REML). Similar statistical assumptions underlie parameter estimation in 
multilevel models and multiple regression analysis, although in the case of multilevel 
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models there is multilevel data structure. Violations of critical assumptions can 
negatively influence standard errors and inferential tests (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Residual plots for each model were examined for nonlinearities, outliers, and other 
indicators of poor model fit, as well as confirmation of a roughly normal distributions of 
errors and equal variance at each level of the multilevel model. No concerning violations 
of the assumptions were found in any of the models fit above. Furthermore, all 
inferential tests are conducted with robust standard errors, which further guard against the 
influence ofviolating critical assumptions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, pg. 276). 
Random versus Fixed Coefficients 
In a two level model, predictors at level-l and level-2 are modeled as fixed 
effects. However, the intercepts and slopes that are estimated at level-l can be modeled 
as fixed, non-randomly varying, or randomly varying (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, 
Congdon & du Toit, 2004). A fixed intercept or slope means that the parameter is 
assumed to be equal for each level two unit, which in this case is the individual 
consumers. A non-randomly varying intercept or slope means that the parameter is 
expected to vary across level-2 units with respect to level-2 predictor variables, but does 
not vary randomly for each individual. For example, in Study 2 one of the primary 
predictions was that the linear effect across probability levels on perceived likelihood 
would be moderated by the consumer numeracy (a level-2 variable). Randomly varying 
intercepts or slopes means that these parameters are a function of overall population 
effects as well as a "random", or unique contribution for each person. Of course, an 
intercept or a slope can also be modeled as having contributions from unique, non­
random sources (e.g. numeracy) as well as unique, random effects for each person. 
In each of the multilevel model estimates above, the intercept is modeled with 
both random and non-randomly varying components. The intercepts were modeled as 
random because I wanted to capture the idiosyncratic (random) way in which consumers 
may be using the ratings scales. For example, some consumers may show similar slopes 
across the within subject factor in terms of perceived likelihood, but they just start at 
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different places on the rating scale. This might happen if, for instance, the likelihood 
scale was interpreted as a more general rating scale to which consumers scaled their 
responses in an idiosyncratic way. However, the slope terms were modeled as only non­
randomly varying (Le. as functions of the level-2 variables), without random error terms. 
This was done because I had no a priori reason to assume random variation in the slopes, 
and practically, with only 3-4 levels of the within subject factor in a given model it was 
often impossible to estimate all of the random effects (i.e. there were not enough degrees 
of freedom). 
Not allowing the slope coefficients to vary randomly introduces a potential 
misspecification problem, if in fact the slope coefficients do have substantial random 
variance components. On way to assess the impact of the potential misspecification of 
random effects it to compare model-based and robust estimates of standard error in the 
model without the random variance component (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). If the 
standard error estimates are substantially different from one another, then this is an 
indication that the fixed coefficients may need to be specified as random. The model­
based and robust standard errors were not substantially different in any of the models 
reported above. In addition, the specification of slope coefficients as random (in models 
with adequate degrees of freedom) did not result in any substantive differences in the 
interpretation of effects from a non-randomly varying specification. 
Centering 
It is very important in multilevel modeling that each of the level-1 and level-2 
predictors are represented in a way that makes the coefficients scientifically interpretable. 
As in standard regression analyses, this is achieved through centering, or specifying the 
location for, the level-1 and level-2 variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). There are 
several different ways to center predictor variables, with grand mean centering or group 
mean centering as the most common options. In the models reported above, each of the 
continuous and categorical variables (often represented by contrast coded dummy 
variables) are grand mean centered. This results in a similar interpretation as the standard 
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ANCOVA model, for instance, where the intercept in the level-l model is interpreted as 
the grand mean adjusted for any covariates in the model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
For example, grand mean centering is useful in specific cases where "main effect" type 
analyses are of interest, like a specific contrast on the probability format variable 
averaging across level of the other experimental factor (probability level). 
Effect Size 
Ideally, every effect estimated in the multilevel models could be represented by a 
common effect size measure, like Cohen's d or r. However, since multilevel modeling is 
a relatively new statistical approach, methodologists are still actively searching for the 
most appropriate ways to represent effect sizes for individual model parameters. Since r 
effect sizes were reported in Study 2, I tried various methods of calculating r effect sizes 
for the parameters in the multilevel analyses to make them comparable with the effects 
from Study 2. Since there is relative dearth of literature on the calculation of the effect 
sizes in these models, I was not able find a consistent way to calculate r effect sizes that 
didn't leave me with the lingering feeling that I was doing something wrong. In the end, 
I decided to follow the lead ofRaudenbush & Xiao-Feng (2001) and Tymms, Merrell, 
and Henderson (1997), who present similar approaches for calculating effect sizes in 
multilevel models. The basic approach is to generalize the standardized difference effect 
size measures discussed by Cohen (1988) and Glass (1981) to the multilevel context. In 
short, for dummy coded categorical variables and standardized continuous variables the 
effect size takes the following general form: 
A = /3Plp ~LPP , 
where I!J.p is the standardized effect size measure, f3Pl is a specific coefficient for the 
effect of interest, and ,JTpp is the square root of an appropriate random variance 
component. For example, assume that the primary effect of interest at level-l is the 
linear slope between the narrative and numerical probability level conditions in Study 3. 
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Assume that f3Pl is the coefficient indicating the difference between two probability 
format conditions (between subject variable at level-2) on this linear slope, in other words 
it is a cross level interaction effect. The effect size !:J.p, therefore, is a representation of 
the difference between the two conditions on this linear slope, f3Pl, divided by the 
population variation in the linear slopes (random variance component), and can be 
considered a standardized mean difference. 
Since these effect size measures have not been thoroughly studied, they should 
not be directly compared to other standardized mean difference effect sizes (e.g. Cohen's 
d), or the r effect sizes calculated in Study 2 that could readily be converted into Cohen's 
d. The main reason for presenting the effect size measures in Study 2 and Study 3 is to 
provide a framework for comparing the magnitude of the different effects within each 
study. So, for instance, the reader can compare the magnitude of important hypothesized 
effects like the effect of stated probability information compared to the effect of the 
properties of the narrative evidence on perceived likelihood. 
Power Analysis 
Under the assumption that the GLM was going to be used for analysis, a rough 
power analysis was conducted to estimate the sample size needed to test the between and 
within subject effects with adequate statistical power. Assuming between a small and 
medium effect size (using Cohen's criteria), a total sample size ofN=60 would produce 
power = .80 for the between subjects comparisons of interest. For the within subject 
effect, a total sample size ofN=60 would produce power = .96. However, this sample 
size may have been too small to reliably detect individual differences associated with the 
numeracy. Correlations between numeracy and the dependent variables in Study 1 
ranged from r = .20-.25. Assuming a correlation ofr = .25 and a sample size ofN=60, 
estimated statistical power = .65. If the total sample size was increased to N=80, then 
power=.80 for detecting a simple correlation with numeracy. At least from the 
perspective of the GLM, the sample sizes ofN=87 and N=81 appear sufficient. 
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However, formal power analysis was not conducted within the context of 
multilevel models. For multilevel models, in general, the number of groups has more 
effect on statistical power than the number of observations. In this case the individual 
participants are the group level variable, and it is recommended that the higher-level 
sample size (level-2) is at least 20, but preferably 50 for adequate statistical power 
(Garson, 2007). Thus, I expect to have adequate statistical power with N=87 and N=81 at 
level-2. 
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